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Abstract
This thesis will examine the massive impact of henequen on the state of Yucatán,
Mexico, specifically focusing on the time period from the mid-nineteenth century until the year
1930. Henequen is a fibrous plant that is native to the Yucatán peninsula and was a useful tool in
pre-Columbian Maya civilization. The Spanish arrival in Mexico brought elites who eventually
began to see the plant’s potential for profit. Henequen became a major export crop of Mexico
and revenue flowed into Yucatán. In less than a half-century, from the late 1800s to early 1900s,
Yucatán became one of the richest states in Mexico. This thesis will discuss the original uses of
the henequen plant in Mayan society and show how the industry evolved as a result of a great
demand for henequen fiber in the United States, especially during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. It will then show how the henequen industry revolutionized Yucatecan
society. Social classes became more defined between the millionaire elites of Mérida and the
impoverished hacienda laborers who were treated like slaves.

In addition, society was

“modernized” with new railroads, ports, and amenities. Finally, this thesis will examine the
downfall of the henequen industry and show how the policies of the Mexican Revolution and the
dependence on an individual crop eventually led to disaster for the state.
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Introduction
On July 7, 2007, the New Seven Wonders of the World Committee announced that
Chichén Itzá pyramid in Yucatán, Mexico, along with the Taj Mahal, the Roman Colosseum,
Machu Picchu, the Great Wall of China, the statue of Christ the Redeemer, and Petra, was named
one of the New Seven Wonders of the World.1 The Chichén Itzá pyramid was built by the
Mayans sometime between the eighth and twelfth centuries, and was a sophisticated temple of
worship.2

It served as an economic and political center of the Mayan civilization, and is

considered one of the greatest Mayan temples.3 The construction of this extraordinary sculpture,
with its intricate arrangement of brick and stone, was made possible by the use of a pulley
system of wood and rope. The rope was made out of a strong fiber that is contained in the leaves
of the henequen plant, which is a tall agave that only grows in the Yucatán Peninsula. Some
argue that without the use of henequen fiber to make the rope for the pulley system, it would
have been impossible to construct Chichén Itzá.4 This thesis will examine the enormous role of
the henequen plant in the development of Yucatán from the pre-Columbian period to the early
twentieth century.
The henequen plant was used in many aspects of everyday life in Mayan society, and
although it neither had its own god nor was revered to the extent of corn, it was ever-present in
Mayan society as it was used to make hammocks to sleep in and shoes to walk in.5 With the
arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century, the harvesting of henequen fiber would turn into a

1

New Seven Wonders of the World, “The New Seven Wonders of the World,” accessed February 20, 2014,
http://world.new7wonders.com/new7wonders-of-the-world-page/new7wonders-of-the-world.
2
National Geographic, “Chichén Itzá,” accessed February 20, 2014,
http://travel.nationalgeographic.com/travel/world-heritage/chichen-itza.
3
New Seven Wonders of the World, “The New Seven Wonders of the World.”
4
José Antonio Carrillo, Tour of Hacienda Sotuta de Peón, Tecoh, Yucatán, December 22, 2013.
5
Camilo Otero Rejón, “Presencia inadvertida, ki,” in Henequén: Leyenda, historia y cultura (Mérida, Yucatán,
México: Instituto de Cultura de Yucatán, 2006), 30.
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massive industry that boomed during the second half of the nineteenth century. Its legacy has
shaped the state of Yucatán, and even today, its presence is evident in daily life. Yucatecans
have sayings such as “te crees muy henequén,” or “you think you are like henequen,” which is
directed at people who are self-centered and do not seek the help of others. Henequen grows by
itself and does not need much care, so the saying refers to people who have similar qualities.6 In
addition, many hammocks, placemats, and ropes are still made with the henequen fiber. Most of
the gift shops in the center of Yucatán’s capital city, Mérida, sell items made with henequen.
Some stores are even devoted entirely to henequen products. Even though the industry has
declined, daily life in Yucatán, from the landscape to language, is still infused with henequen.
During the late-nineteenth to early twentieth century, henequen was a major industry that
brought wealth and change to the state of Yucatán. In a span of less than forty years, Yucatán
became Mexico’s richest state.7 The story of henequen is both unique and similar to the stories
of other Latin American export crops and their booms. The story of the henequen industry is the
story of a goal to become a modern capitalist economy, the achievement of that goal, and the
eventual development of a dependence on international demand. After Mexican independence in
1821, elites in Yucatán had looked for a way to insert themselves into the world economy. As a
result of various events in the state at the time, and in the fiber market as a whole, the conditions
were ideal for henequen to become a popular and successful export crop.

The profits of

henequen reached unprecedented heights, and many hacienda owners became millionaires.
Henequen came to shape Yucatecan society as it established an elite caste, which sought
to “modernize” Yucatán by enhancing infrastructure and turning Mérida into a “modern” world
city. These modernization efforts, however, were carried out at the expense of hacienda laborers,
6

María Elena Pinto Escamilla, in discussion with author, December 19, 2013.
Jeffery Brannon and Eric N. Baklanoff, Agrarian Reform and Public Enterprise in Mexico: The Political Economy
of Yucatán (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1987), xi.
7
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who were forced to live in slave-like conditions. In addition, society was dedicated to the
production and export of henequen fiber. Diversification efforts were never successful, and
Yucatán became dependent on its exports of raw fiber to the United States. Once the Mexican
Revolution arrived in Yucatán in 1915, the United States began to seek fiber from other sources,
and the economy of Yucatán was devastated. As quickly and as dramatically as it had rose, the
decline of the industry would convert Yucatán into one of Mexico’s poorest states.

Henequen in a Latin American Context
In order to understand the henequen industry of Yucatán, it is important to examine
henequen in a broader context. Since the sixteenth century, Latin America has been shaped by
its relationship with the global economy.8 The participating countries and products are often
changing, and the economic histories reflect the rise and fall of different goods. Central export
crops from regions in Latin America have included silver, sugar, and tobacco during the
sixteenth century, bananas and rubber in the nineteenth century, and cocaine in the twentieth
century.9 During the nineteenth century, the expansion of liberal capitalism in Latin America, in
which the market took priority over the state, increased the prosperity of Latin American export
crops.10

This new government mindset resulted in laissez-faire economic policies and an

increase in free trade, which led to an increase in exports. Between 1850 and 1913, Latin
American exports grew by 1000 percent and became five to eight percent of world commerce.11
The Industrial Revolution during the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe and North
8

Steven Topik, Carlos Marichal, and Zephyr Frank, eds, From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity
Chains and the Building of the World Economy, 1500-2000 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2006),
2.
9
Ibid., 3.
10
Ibid., 4.
11
Steven C. Topik and Allen Wells, eds, The Second Conquest of Latin America: Coffee, Henequen, and Oil during
the Export Boom, 1850-1930 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1998), 2.
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America resulted in a major increase in demand for raw materials from Latin America. 12 Like
many other Latin American export crops, henequen gained popularity at this time, and its success
was a result of the expanding demand in the United States.
For the most part, Latin American countries focused on the export of one specific
product. These products were principally exported to Great Britain, the United States, France,
and Germany.13 Some popular crops included sugar in Haiti and bananas in several Central and
South American countries.14 Many banana producing countries came to be controlled by United
Fruit Company, and all the profits left the region. This gave way to poor and dependent
countries often referred to as “banana republics.”15 Henequen, while not controlled exclusively
by foreign interests, reflects this tendency of dependence as well, since it came to depend on
United States purchases of the fiber.
The United States played a major role in these Latin American export economies during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, during the late 1800s, the United
States became the largest buyer of coffee and imported $23 million worth of coffee from Brazil
in 1899. That same year, the United States imported $15 million worth of sugar from Cuba, $5
million worth of henequen from Mexico, and $1.2 million worth of bananas from Central
American countries.16 The goal and purpose of these industries was to satisfy the United States
demand, and these industries became dependent on United States purchases.

Since Latin

American countries were often so focused on their export goods, they were unable to produce
their own goods. The United States began exporting goods to Latin America, which enhanced

12

Ibid., 8.
Ibid., 9.
14
Ibid., 3.
15
Ibid., 3-4.
16
“Our Growing Southern Trade,” Charlotte Observer, December 3, 1899, accessed November 9, 2013,
infoweb.newsbank.com.
13
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the level of dependence, and thwarted Latin American industrialization. Agricultural machinery,
corn, cars, and coal, among other goods, were commonly exported from the United States to
Latin American countries.17
The expansion of capital in Latin America led to improvements such as electricity,
lighting, and sanitation systems.18 Many elites sought to “modernize” their societies and looked
to the United States as an example. However, these modernizations only benefited upper classes
as lower classes lacked access to amenities.19 As a result of the market control in many Latin
American countries, lower classes became poorer and more repressed. They were subject to
difficult labor and did not have access to societal improvements.20 Companies often gained
substantial control over Latin American societies. For example, International Harvester, which
would come to form a monopolistic structure in the henequen industry, the American Sugar
Refining Company in the Dominican Republic and Cuba and United Fruit Company in the
Caribbean, would come to rule over society.21
While henequen does have a unique story, it fits into the broader context of Latin
American export economies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At this
time, Latin America was a region in which some areas, especially cities, were modernized
significantly as a result of export booms. At the same time, other areas remained rural and
untouched by the expansion of capitalism.

22

This description is applicable to the story of

henequen since modernization in Yucatán was geared toward cities, and neglected rural areas
and haciendas.
17

Ibid.
Topik and Wells, eds, The Second Conquest of Latin America, 9.
19
Ibid., 13.
20
Ibid.
21
G.M. Joseph, Revolution from Without: Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States 1880-1924 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 45.
22
Topik and Wells, eds, The Second Conquest of Latin America, 19.
18
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The Impact of Mexican Liberalism and Capitalism on Henequen
Similar to other countries in Latin America, the enactment of liberal policies in Mexico
during the second half of the nineteenth century helps explain how the henequen industry was
able to take hold. From 1876 to 1911, Mexico was governed by President Porfirio Díaz, known
as “liberal dictator,” who was focused on “orden y progreso,” or “order and progress,” in
Mexico.23

He was determined to enter the world market and create a more modern and

developed nation.24 In his quest to modernize society, Díaz favored wealthy landowners and
elites because he believed they could stimulate the economy in Mexico.25 As a result, lower
classes and laborers, which consisted mostly of indigenous peoples, were not included in Díaz’s
modernization efforts.26 Nevertheless, Díaz was a great force of modernization in Mexico, and
his goal to create a modern, developed economy helped henequen gain popularity as Díaz was
interested in promoting henequen.27 During the beginnings of the henequen industry, foreign
industries were hesitant to lend money, but many, such as those in the United States, trusted
Díaz, and when he took office, they were more comfortable lending.28 They saw Díaz as a stable
president who was interested in promoting capitalism and industry.
While power in Mexico tended to be more regional during the nineteenth century, liberal
policies still reached Yucatán.29 Yucatecan liberalism was focused on private property and

23

Sterling Evans, “King Henequen: Order, Progress, and Ecological Change in Yucatán, 1850-1950,” in A Land
Between Waters: Environmental Histories of Modern Mexico, ed. Christopher R. Boyer (Tucson, Arizona: The
University of Arizona Press, 2012), 157.
24
Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán, Facultad de Arquitectura, Arquitectura de las haciendas henequeneras
(Bogotá, Colombia: Escala, 1996), 21.
25
Evans, “King Henequen: Order, Progress, and Ecological Change in Yucatán, 1850-1950,” 159.
26
Ibid., 158.
27
Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán, Arquitectura de las haciendas henequeneras, 21.
28
Lawrence James Remmers, “Henequen, The Caste War and Economy of Yucatan, 1846-1883: The Roots of
Dependence in a Mexican Region” Volumes 1 and 2 (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1981), 529.
29
Allen Wells, Yucatán’s Gilded Age: Haciendas, Henequen and International Harvester 1860-1915 (Albuquerque,
New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1985), 4.
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individual rights.30 In order to stimulate the economy, colonial restrictions on land ownership
were reduced and land became more accessible to individuals.31 Elites and society leaders
wanted to make Yucatán look more like the United States as they sought to develop a modern
industrial economy.32 The state worked to concentrate wealth, facilitate exports, and break
worker resistance.33 The Yucatán government wanted to expand capitalism and they believed
that a market-focused economy would allow them to do so. As a result, elites were able to take
power through enterprise and politics.34 The lack of a strong government presence allowed elites
to gain control over society and do what was necessary to advance the henequen industry. While
Yucatán was often considered relatively autonomous in regard to the rest of Mexico, the ideas of
liberalism took hold in the state and elites sought to develop a modern capitalist economy.
Yucatán became a model of success for Díaz, and he considered the development and economy
of the state to be a great triumph.35 The success of henequen was unprecedented: no other
region of Mexico would ever be as involved in the world economy as Yucatán was during this
period.36

Scholarship on the Henequen Industry
Henequen is an important crop to study as it plays a primary role in shaping the history of
the Yucatán peninsula. The story of henequen, while it is unique, becomes part of the historical
context of Latin American export economies by the nineteenth century. The literature reviewed

30

Topik and Wells, eds, The Second Conquest of Latin America, 17.
Wells, Yucatán’s Gilded Age: Haciendas, Henequen and International Harvester 1860-1915, 23.
32
Evans, “King Henequen: Order, Progress, and Ecological Change in Yucatán, 1850-1950,” 158.
33
Allen Wells, “Reports of Its Demise Are Not Exaggerated: The Life and Times of Yucatecan Henequen,” in From
Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains and the Building of the World Economy, 1500-2000, eds.
Steven Topik, Carlos Marichal, and Zephyr Frank (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2006), 314.
34
Remmers, “Henequen, The Caste War and Economy of Yucatan, 1846-1883,” 29-30.
35
Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán, Arquitectura de las haciendas henequeneras, 21.
36
Remmers, “Henequen, The Caste War and Economy of Yucatan, 1846-1883,” 717.
31
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shows, through different perspectives, that henequen has indeed been responsible for the
development and formation of the Yucatán state. From ports and railroads to a rigid class and
labor system, it is clear that King Henequen, as it is occasionally called, possessed substantial
control in Yucatán. The United States has evidently played a strong role in the story of henequen
since it was the main importer of henequen fiber, and the wheat industry in the United States is
what caused the majority of the demand for henequen.
Scholars have shown that Latin American export economies tend to follow a common
trend in that similar government structures have often led to the focus on one specific crop.
While the henequen industry was unique in that it was originally a mostly Yucatecan industry, it
would later become more controlled by international interests, which shows that the story of
henequen has a place in this larger context. The story of henequen in Yucatán tells an all too
familiar tale of skewed dependence on the United States, unequal labor relations, a push for
progress and modernization, and the role of the state in the economy. Scholars of the topic of the
henequen industry support the notion that henequen created dependence on the United States and
that labor relations were unevenly distributed between millionaire planters and impoverished
laborers. They show that “modernization” efforts were geared mainly toward the advancement
of henequen, which did not allow for diversification once henequen lost popularity with the
intervention of the state government in the economy. Although henequen is not a major Latin
American export crop that comes to mind, its history is an important one to study in order to
understand the Yucatán state and its formation.
Dependency is a key theme in the history of Latin American export economies. Several
historians place henequen in the context of a variety of similar Latin American economies which
focused specifically on one crop. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, in their book,

13
Dependency and Development in Latin America, discuss the tendency of Latin American
economies to become determined by the “capitalist system.”37 They show how many Latin
American countries build their societies around the expansion of capitalism in Europe and North
America at the expense of indigenous populations.38

Cardoso and Faletto focus on two

structures of dependence: one being a form of external dependence on foreign capital, and the
other being internal dependence, in which a society requires the international market for food
and staples.39 Yucatán’s henequen industry fits into their internal dependence category as the
henequen industry was developed to satisfy the United States’ demand for fiber, at the expense
of Mayan laborers, and Yucatán eventually needed to import staple goods from the United
States.
In The Second Conquest of Latin America: Coffee, Henequen & Oil during the Export
Boom, Steven Topik and Allen Wells investigate various Latin American export products and
show a connection between their histories. The “second conquest” refers to the new form of
dependence in Latin America dominated by United States demand for goods instead of by
Spanish colonizers.40 Topik and Wells point to the formation of liberalism and capitalism in
Latin American countries to show how these export economies have developed.41 The Industrial
Revolution in Europe and North America called for natural resources from Latin America and
Topik and Wells show how this demand shaped many economies of Latin American nations.42
They prove that henequen does not have an entirely unique story – it shares characteristics with
the industries of coffee, oil, sugar, and bananas and thus fits into a larger context. In their work
37

Fernando Henrique and Enzo Faletto Cardoso, Dependency and Development in Latin America, translated by
Marjory Mattingly Urquidi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), xiv.
38
Ibid., xv.
39
Ibid., xix.
40
Topik and Wells, eds, The Second Conquest of Latin America, 2.
41
Ibid., 13-8.
42
Ibid., 8.
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From Silver to Cocaine, Steven Topik, Carlos Marichal, and Zephyr Frank present the
commodity chain theory to show how Latin American export crops fit into this category.43 They
examine the history of Latin American export crops, the birth of liberalism and free trade, and
the reasons for export booms in Latin America. Although each commodity has a unique history,
the general story of henequen fits squarely into their analysis of Latin American export crops
because it sprung from liberal and free trade policies, and focused on the development of the
industry over the state. 44
Several historians examine the different impacts henequen had on the Yucatán state with
respect to modernization efforts.

In his chapter, “King Henequen: Order, Progress and

Ecological Change in Yucatán 1850-1950,” in the book A Land Between Waters: Environmental
Histories of Modern Mexico edited by Christopher Boyer, Sterling Evans traces the history of
henequen and discusses its uses from the early Mayan civilizations to the present. He examines
how the Caste War (1846-1853) and certain laws directly influenced the henequen crop.45 Evans
also discusses the negative environmental impacts of henequen as a monocrop.

Rail

transportation and henequen fields caused deforestation, poisoned water sources, harmed the soil,
and reduced animal habitats.46 Anthony Andrews, Rafael Burgos Villanueva, and Luis Millet
Cámara’s article “The Henequen Ports of Yucatán’s Gilded Age” shows modernization efforts
that resulted from the henequen industry. These authors discuss the formation of ports in the
Yucatán state during the peak of the henequen exports. Hacienda owners began to turn their
plantations from corn and cattle to henequen.47 In addition, rail systems and ports began to

43

Topik, Marichal, and Frank, eds, From Silver to Cocaine, 14.
Ibid., 4.
45
Evans, “King Henequen: Order, Progress, and Ecological Change in Yucatán, 1850-1950,” 155-6.
46
Ibid., 150.
47
Anthony Andrews, Rafael Burgos Villanueva, and Luis Millet Cámara, “The Henequen Ports of Yucatán’s Gilded
Age,” International Journal of Historical Archaeology 16, no. 1 (March 2012): 31, http://search.ebscohost.com.
44

15
spread over the area as a system was needed to facilitate export.48 In accordance with Andrews,
Burgos Villanueva, and Millet Cámara’s article, Heather McCrea in Diseased Relations:
Epidemics, Public Health, and State Building in Yucatán, Mexico, 1847-1924 also points to
henequen in explaining the urban and industrial modernization of the Yucatán state.

She

discusses the benefits seen in urban areas such as railroads and new public health and sanitation
systems.49 McCrea also shows how henequen plantations caused the absorption of smaller towns
and communities by larger cities to expand the size and production of haciendas. 50 With the
increase in wealth and expansion of the henequen industry, elites sought to create a more modern
society that would be recognized on a world stage, and that would continue to facilitate the
export of henequen.
In his doctoral dissertation, Henequén, the Caste War and the Economy of Yucatán,
Lawrence Remmers also traces the history of henequen, but discusses the negative impact of
creating an economy solely focused on one product. Remmers presents the staple model theory,
which is when an economy focuses on a single export and fails to develop aside from that export
base. He says this theory applies to Yucatán as the state focused on henequen exports, and the
economy failed to develop and prosper outside of henequen production. 51 The singular focus on
henequen took funding from education and the development of other resources which provides
insight into why the economy endured such great suffering after henequen lost its popularity. 52
In his chapter “Henequen” in The Second Conquest of Latin America: Coffee, Henequen, and Oil
during the Export Boom 1850-1930, Allen Wells also provides a history of the rise and fall of the
48

Ibid., 28.
Heather McCrea, Diseased Relation: Epidemics, Public Health, and State Building in Yucatan, Mexico, 18471924 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 2011), 142-3,
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/laddbates/Doc?id=10492223&ppg=150.
50
Ibid., 140.
51
Remmers, “Henequen, The Caste War and Economy of Yucatan, 1846-1883,” 36-8.
52
Ibid., 40.
49
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henequen industry. Wells shows how henequen became prominent in the fiber market and
gained success over alternatives, such as Philippine manila.53 In his book, Yucatán’s Gilded Age,
Wells tells the story of henequen by examining the industry’s many effects on the society of
Yucatán. He focuses on the rise of henequen after the Caste War, and shows how the henequen
industry led to the rise of powerful families, such as the Molinas and the Peóns.54 He examines
the poor labor conditions that existed on henequen plantations, and discusses the development of
railroads in Yucatán.55
Piedad Peniche Rivero also focuses on the abysmal labor conditions in Yucatán. In her
chapter “From Milpero and Lunero to Henequenero: A Transition to Capitalism in Yucatán,
Mexico,” in The Lowland Maya Area: Three Millenia at the Human-Wildland Interface, Peniche
Rivero examines the new society that evolved from the henequen hacienda system.

She

discusses how the henequen industry was responsible for creating a slave-like labor system in
which workers were subject to debt peonage and were banned from leaving their employers.
Laborers were treated horribly as they were beaten and often attempted to run away.56 Wells and
Peniche Rivero show that the henequen industry was responsible for the great disparity between
classes as hacienda owners were very wealthy and powerful while laborers were very poor, often
in debt, and subject to terrible labor conditions.
Scholars have also demonstrated the great influence the United States has had on the
henequen industry, and it is evident that the development of Yucatán and its expansion of
capitalism have been fueled by the United States. In Bound in Twine, Sterling Evans examines
53

Allen Wells, “Henequen,” in The Second Conquest of Latin America: Coffee, Henequen, and Oil during the
Export Boom, 1850-1930, ed. Steven C. Topik and Allen Wells (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1998),
94.
54
Wells, Yucatán’s Gilded Age: Haciendas, Henequen and International Harvester 1860-1915, 67,78.
55
Ibid., 153, 89.
56
Piedad Peniche Rivero, “From Milpero and Lunero to Henequenero: A Transition to Capitalism in Yucatán,
Mexico,” in The Lowland Maya Area: Three Millennia at the Human-Wildland Interface,” ed. Arturo GómezPompa, Michael F. Allen, Scott L. Fedick et al. (New York: The Haworth Press, Inc., 2003), 580.
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the connection between the United States and the Yucatán. Evans shows how the prospering
wheat industry and inventions, such as the grain reaper, were directly responsible for the increase
in demand for binder twine from Yucatán.57 The goal of his work is to expose the connections
and dependencies between the United States, Canada, and the Yucatán, and it is clear that the
United States has played a strong role in controlling the henequen industry, which resulted in
dependence.58 The United States, as it was the major importer of raw henequen fiber, played a
major role in the decline of the henequen industry when it began purchasing fiber from other
sources. Several authors, including Wells and Evans, examine the rise of the United States
company International Harvester’s monopoly and how it came to gain control of the henequen
industry.59 Gilbert M. Joseph discusses the arrival of the Mexican Revolution in Yucatán in his
work Revolution from Without, and shows how the changes enacted by the new revolutionary
governments encouraged the United States to seek fiber from alternate sources. He shows that
the monoculture in Yucatán was focused on henequen, which resulted in a strong dependence on
the fiber. He examines how changes in society as a result of the Revolution, including the
expansion of labor rights and increased power of the state, ultimately led to the downfall of the
industry.60

The Reign of “King Henequen”
This thesis tells the story of Yucatán’s henequen industry and its major effects on the
state of Yucatán. It explores why henequen became popular and how it was able to gain such
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success during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It examines the impacts of the
henequen boom on Yucatecan society with respect to the social structure and “modernization”
efforts.

It concludes by describing the ultimate downfall of the henequen industry, and

discussing the factors that led to the end of this immensely profitable industry. This thesis will
build on Peniche Rivero’s and Wells’ discussions of the social classes in Yucatán to demonstrate
how the henequen industry came to control society and created a strong disparity between the
elites and laborers. It will draw on Remmers’ and Evans’ findings to show how the focus on a
single export staple and the resulting dependence would lead to disaster in Yucatán as the state
would be left with nowhere else to turn once henequen had lost popularity. Finally, it will build
on Evans’ and Joseph’s studies of the decline of the henequen industry to demonstrate how the
policies established by the arrival of the Mexican Revolution would lead to the rapid downfall of
the henequen industry.
Chapter One will examine the origins of the henequen industry and how conditions in
Yucatán led to the rise of this export crop in order to establish the context for the development of
the industry. It begins by showing how the climate of Yucatán is ideal for henequen cultivation,
discussing the Maya uses for henequen and henequen’s role in pre-Columbian society, and
examining the arrival of the Spanish and how the changes they imposed on Yucatecan society
influenced the henequen industry. The chapter will then discuss how events following Mexican
independence, such as the rise of elites who sought to enter the world economy and the
devastating Caste War of 1846, increased the push for henequen production.
Chapter Two will discuss the logistics of henequen production and how the industry
continued to grow. It argues that elites’ focus on the expansion of capitalism and modernization
of society allowed the henequen industry to gain momentum and prosper. It also argues that
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during this period, dependence on the United States was established as the United States became
responsible for purchasing a majority of henequen. Chapter Two shows how liberalism and
capitalism led to the expansion of industry, and later discusses how dependence evolved between
the United States and Yucatán. Although the United States came to depend on Yucatecan fiber,
the entirety of Yucatán’s economy was based on raw fiber exports to the United States, and
campaigns to diversify ultimately failed. The chapter will conclude by examining the rise of
International Harvester, and show how this monopoly formed a coalition of businessmen from
the United States and elites from Yucatán, who would gain complete control of the henequen
industry.
Chapter Three focuses on the local impact of the henequen industry. It argues that there
were two sides of “modernization” in Yucatán as a result of henequen: the elites, who gained
unprecedented fortunes, and the laborers, who suffered as a result of hard labor and poverty. It
begins by showing how the henequen industry brought incredible wealth and power to the elite
class in Yucatán, and how they were focused on modernization and beautification. It will
discuss how many of the modernization efforts in the state were focused specifically on the
expansion of henequen, which did not allow for diversification. The second half of the chapter
examines the plight of the laborers, who were bound to haciendas by debt and forced to endure
horrific working conditions. This great inequality, it seems, was necessary for the success of the
henequen industry, and while there were accusations of slavery in Yucatán, elites sought to quiet
these complaints. The henequen industry was built on the backs of the laborers, and in order for
elites to complete their goals of development, it was necessary to keep laborers in their slave-like
position.
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Chapter Four examines the downfall of the henequen industry. It argues that the changes
to society brought about by the Mexican Revolution ultimately led to the decline of the industry.
While revolutionaries and socialists, such as Salvador Alvarado and Felipe Carrillo Puerto, had
good intentions as they sought to increase labor rights, reduce the power and control of elites,
and increase the role of the state in the economy, their policies did not permit the continued
success of henequen. The changes led to an increase in prices and an insecurity that led the
United States to begin to pursue alternative fiber options. Without the quantity of purchases
from the United States, the consequences on the economy of Yucatán would be devastating. In
addition, several other events, such as increased competition and the invention of the combine,
would help to accelerate the already flailing industry. This chapter will conclude by examining
how dependence led to poverty and disaster for the economy of Yucatán as elites had invested
everything into henequen production and were left with no other options once henequen had lost
its popularity.
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Chapter One
Henequen’s Early Role in Yucatecan Society
From the Pre-Colombian Maya through the Caste War of 1846

Introduction
It is said that once a Mayan priest was surveying his lands in the company of his guards.
In a moment of carelessness, he was struck by a spiny leaf which caused him pain, so one
of his guards cut the leaf and began to beat it until a fiber from within became visible.
Upon seeing the fiber, the priest with his wisdom said: ‘This will be of use to us.’ And
from there they began to use the plant.1
The Mayan culture is rich with legends. For centuries, variations of the above story, which
explains the discovery of the henequen plant, have been passed down through generations. The
henequen plant has always had a strong presence in Yucatecan society and was of great use to
the Mayan people in the time before Spanish colonization. While there are many variations of
this legend, many agree that Zamná, a Mayan priest or prince, was passing through his lands and
was hurt by a henequen leaf, at which point one of his servants beat the leaf and exposed the
fiber within.2 The henequen plant, something unique to the Yucatán peninsula, was of great use
to the Mayan people in their everyday lives. From the day that Zamná discovered the fiber,
henequen has played a major role in shaping Yucatecan society. It began as a crop to produce
tools, bags, and hammocks for the Mayan people. It later evolved into a massive export crop
from the late-nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century.
The structure and development of the Yucatán through the Caste War of the midnineteenth century allowed henequen to take a lead role in forming society. First and foremost,
1
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the climate of Yucatán is perfect for the henequen plant to prosper. Once they realized its utility,
the Maya began to incorporate this plant into various aspects of their daily lives. At the time of
the Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century, the Spaniards saw the many uses of henequen and
eventually began to use it themselves. Around the time of Mexican Independence in 1821,
henequen became even more popular and began to be exported elsewhere. During Independence
and the Caste War in the mid-nineteenth century, other major industries in Yucatán’s economy,
such as cattle and sugar, were damaged, which allowed henequen to become even more prevalent
in society. These factors and developments eventually gave elites and society leaders motive to
focus on the export of this plant which led to a great export boom during the late nineteenth
century.
While henequen played a major role throughout the early period of Yucatecan society,
many factors that occurred during the pre-Columbian era through the Caste War of 1846 allowed
henequen to eventually take the stage as the major export crop and as an incredible source of
income for the Yucatán state. From its many uses in everyday Mayan life, to its uses in rigging
on Spanish ships, to its early export in the nineteenth century, henequen was ever present in
Yucatán’s society during this period. In addition, society leaders began to realize its great
economic potential and henequen slowly gained traction as a crop in the time before, during, and
after the Caste War of the mid-nineteenth century. While the Maya saw henequen as a useful
tool and not as a religious object, it was still important to their livelihood and remained an
important crop when Yucatecan elites began to turn toward henequen as their economic savior
during the first part of the nineteenth century.
This chapter will show that henequen played a major role in Yucatecan society from the
pre-Columbian time to the Caste War of the mid-nineteenth century. It will examine how the
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conditions of Yucatecan society during this period would cause elites and society leaders to
eventually turn to henequen as a major export crop. It will discuss the beginnings of henequen
industry growth during Mexican independence, and examine how the violent Caste War of the
mid-1800s further stimulated the industry. In order to fully understand the henequen boom and
how henequen was able to gain such success, it is necessary to examine how the henequen
industry was established.

After Mexican independence, elites of Yucatán were eager to

modernize and participate in the world economy, which resulted in the increasing popularity of
henequen as a tool to stimulate their economy. This chapter will argue that the conditions in
Yucatán during this period were ideal for the rise of King Henequen, and it will examine the
origins of the prosperous henequen industry in order to understand its later impact on society and
its eventual downfall.

The Henequen Plant and Climate of the Yucatán
The henequen plant is a short cactus-like bush that consists of around thirty to forty firm
pointed leaves that stem from the stalk. Inside each leaf are many tiny, strong fibers which
provide a great variety of uses. The henequen plant is a type of agave, which has some
similarities to hemp. There are two types of agave: agave fourcroydes, which is henequen, and
agave sisilana, which is known as sisal. The term agave is Greek for noble or magnificent, since
the plants are often thought to have an impressive presence. Henequen, which is called “ki” in
Maya, is the variety that is prevalent in the Yucatán.3 There are two common varieties of
henequen: green henequen, known by the Maya as “yax ki” and white henequen, known as “sac
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ki.”4 The “sac ki” variety was much more common for rope making and is the version that came
to be planted more frequently.5 Until the nineteenth century, the extraction of fibers from the
henequen leaves was done by hand.6 Laborers had to scrape the leaves to extract the fiber, which
was a very tedious process.7 To harvest the henequen leaves, workers had to know the right time
to cut the leaves in order to ensure the best fiber quality. Often there was a limited harvest
window and it was important to make sure to time the harvest correctly.8 The henequen plant
requires very specific conditions to thrive and the Yucatán’s unique environment is suited
perfectly for the growing of henequen.
According to Sterling Evans, a Yucatecan in the 1930s stated that ‘when God made
Yucatán, His original purpose was to use it for hell.’9 While the climate of Yucatán is quite
harsh, it is ideal for the henequen plant. Throughout the entire year, the Yucatán peninsula has a
very hot climate, which results in the soil drying out.10 In addition, almost the entire peninsula is
composed of limestone which has resulted in the natural creation of openings, depressions, and
caves.11 Yucatán also has a very scarce supply of natural water since almost the entire land area
is made up of limestone.12

There are no lakes or rivers, only “cenotes,” which are large

sinkholes filled with fresh water.13 The Yucatán consists of thousands of cenotes, which are the
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main sources of fresh water.14

People often tended to settle near water and built their

communities close to these bodies of water.15

Overall, the peninsula is not a conducive

environment for many crops and the heat and lack of water makes it a challenging place to live.
However, the henequen plant is one of the few that can live in such harsh conditions and the
relatively small amount of rainfall is just enough for henequen to thrive.16
The Yucatán, due to its unforgiving climate, is still largely unexplored and not suitable
for many crops, since the large amount of dense vegetation makes farming difficult.17 Due to the
limestone, it is not possible to plow or irrigate the land, which also adds a challenge to farming.18
While many crops would not prosper, the environment is perfect for henequen and such a harsh
climate does provide many benefits to growing henequen.

For example, weeding is not

necessary because there is a lack of soil and not many other plants will provide competition. 19 In
the Yucatán, there are no bugs or other pests that will eat henequen and it is not necessary to
cultivate or irrigate the land to grow henequen.20 Finally, the henequen plant is resistant to rot
and there is never a need to use fertilizers or pesticides when growing it.21 The Yucatán’s harsh
climate provides the perfect conditions for the henequen plant to prosper. While it is possible to
farm other crops, henequen is native to the Yucatán and provides less of a challenge due to its
suitability to the climate. Since henequen is one of the few crops that is successful in Yucatán, it
is logical that the pre-Columbian Maya were able to find a great variety of uses for the plant.
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The Importance of Henequen in Maya Society
Before the arrival of Columbus, the Maya of Yucatán were a very advanced people who
were able to find a way to use numbers and mathematics, and they had an impressive calendar
system.22 In addition, they were adept in pottery, ceramics, and architecture, which can be seen
in ancient Mayan cities such as Chichén Itzá and Uxmal, which consist of impressive pyramids,
palaces, and other intricately constructed buildings.23 Also before Columbus’ arrival, the Maya
were able to find great use for the henequen plant. For centuries, henequen, or “ki,” has played a
large role in their advanced society.24 Although some scholars believe that henequen was only
barely perceptible in Mayan society, it is evident from its many uses that it had a great presence.
As Zamná had predicted, even though it was never revered at the level of cotton or corn,
henequen had a great variety of uses and was indispensable to the Maya. 25
Henequen was used in many aspects of everyday life in early Yucatecan Maya society,
from walking, to hunting, to even sleeping. The plant was often grown outside of houses, along
roads and outside of towns.26 A major use for the henequen fiber in Mayan society was rope
used to fasten and pull.27 Laces for sandals were often also made with henequen fiber and these
sandals were known as “xanab” in Maya.28 In addition, the henequen fiber was used as material
for hunting bows and traps, as roofing thatch, and as fishing nets.29 In communities of Yucatán,
most people became accustomed to sleeping in hammocks due to the scorching climate of the
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peninsula, and henequen was used to make these hammocks. 30 Many bags, known as “chim,”
were made with henequen to transport items such as corn seed or other farming tools to cultivate
“milpas.”31 Milpas are fields that have been recently cleared, typically burned, in order to plant a
new corn crop. The sharp spines of henequen leaves, which according to the legend were
responsible for hurting Zamná, were used as needles.32 The Maya also used henequen fiber in a
turning mechanism to drill teeth.33 In addition, prisoners of war were bound with henequen
rope.34 Aside from its use for tools and practical objects, henequen also could be a decoration,
and the juices from the plant were used to make wine.35 Therefore it can be seen that henequen
had a strong presence in pre-Columbian Yucatán as the Maya used henequen in their everyday
lives. They walked in shoes made with henequen, they hunted with bows made of henequen, and
they slept in hammocks made of henequen, which shows that it was with them at all times.
While there is no evidence that henequen had a great presence in Mayan legend, art, and
ritual, it was still often present in the background, which was similar to its role in society. 36 In
several depictions of Mayan gods, henequen is present. For example, Ixtab, the goddess of
suicides, is often represented with a rope made of henequen around her neck.37 The goddess of
medicine, Ixchel, is often depicted knitting and in such depictions, there is henequen rope
attaching her work to her body.38 In renderings of prisoners of war in the Mayan city of Chichén
Itzá, henequen rope is used to bind the prisoners.39 While henequen was never prominently
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featured in such works of art, it nevertheless was present and fulfilled its practical role. In rituals
where Mayans would offer blood to the gods, they would use henequen rope to draw blood from
the tongue, penis, and ears of the person whose blood was being sacrificed.40 Although there
were never known to be rituals for henequen or depictions exclusively of henequen, it was
present and useful to them even in their art and rituals.
Mayan traditions in the Yucatecan town of Huhí also showcase the importance of
henequen in Mayan rituals. One ancient tradition of this town is that if a boy is born, the
placenta is buried next to a henequen plant because it expected that the boy will spend his days
working with henequen.

The burial of the placenta near henequen symbolizes his future

participation in the growing of henequen.41 If a girl is born, the umbilical cord is buried near the
henequen plant. The Maya believe that this will give her long, silky hair like the fibers of the
henequen plant and give her internal and external beauty even if faced with difficulty in life. 42 In
addition, henequen and its thorns are often thought to protect people from evil and disease. 43
Finally, henequen is used in children’s games and to whip children when they misbehave.44 It is
evident that henequen, while not a main character in legends or a main focus of rituals, still
played a prominent role in society and religion. It was often present as a useful tool, whether in
depictions of gods, in certain rituals, or in ceremonies such as those in the village of Huhí.
While some may disagree, it is clear that henequen did play a major role in preColumbian Maya society. The continuing traditions of the Huhí village show that henequen has
become engrained in Yucatecan Maya society. The fact that henequen has a popular legend to
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explain the origins of its use shows that while it may not have been valued at the level of corn or
cotton for the Mayan people, it was still significant in their culture. Henequen was one of the
few crops that thrived in the Yucatán, and the Mayans used this to their advantage as they
incorporated henequen into many aspects of their lives. Eventually, the Spanish colonists would
also realize the utility of the plant and turn to henequen production in the nineteenth century to
stimulate their economy.

The Formation of Spanish Society in Yucatán 1526-1800
The arrival of the Spanish brought political and societal changes to the established Mayan
lifestyle. Spain brought Christianity and European-style cities to the Yucatán in the sixteenth
century.45 The Spaniard Francisco de Montejo is famous for settling the Yucatán; originally he
travelled to Yucatán in 1526 with Hernan Cortés. De Montejo was commissioned by Emperor
Charles V to subdue the Yucatán, but he was unsuccessful at first due to the harsh climate of the
area and Maya attacks.46 Here early efforts of Mayan resistance to Spanish rule and domination
can be seen. Mayan resistance is an important element in the history of the Spanish presence in
Yucatán since the Maya took action against Spanish colonists on several occasions, most notably
in the Caste War of 1846. Eventually, however, de Montejo’s success improved and his son,
also named Francisco de Montejo, took control of the Mayan city, T’Ho in 1542, which he
renamed Mérida.47
Despite European colonization efforts, much of the Yucatán consisted of small villages
that remained traditional, mainly autonomous, and predominantly Maya. Methods of agriculture
45
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were akin to what they had been before colonization and many Mayan villages were left
untouched by Spanish colonization.48 The milpa farming system was kept in place and in this
way the Maya continued to grow corn, beans, squash, and peppers.49 This pattern was not
typical of other instances of Spanish colonization since the Spanish tended to take control of all
aspects of society. Instead, in the Yucatán, colonization efforts were mainly focused in cities and
larger towns since the Spanish had a limited ability to spread influence to isolated Mayan
pueblos due to the harsh environment of Yucatán.50 This created a very unique space in the
Yucatán since small towns were predominantly Mayan and cities were Spanish.51 In cities and
larger towns, there was a joining of cultures since the Maya were forced to coexist with the
Spanish. Many families reflected this fusion of cultures as few Spanish women came to the
colonies, which resulted in Spanish men often marrying Mayan women.52
The Spanish brought with them many changes in farming, eventually including a new
hacienda system, which would benefit the growth of the henequen industry. Upon their arrival to
New Spain in the sixteenth century, colonists were given land grants by the Spanish crown, and
many used their land to raise cattle.53 These land grants gave rise to the encomienda system, in
which the Maya were forced by the Spanish crown to pay a labor tribute to the colonists.54 The
Spanish used Mayan cities and towns as a basis to build their own settlements. In doing so, the
Spanish gained buildings, laborers, and cenotes (water sources).55 The colonists quickly realized
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that the land of the Yucatán was quite infertile and not suitable to their crops.56 The limestone
base, heat, and lack of fresh water made it especially challenging for their crops to grow so they
tended to focus on growing corn and sugar and raising cattle. In order to reduce the challenges
of farming, the Spanish used previously established Mayan settlements to build their own estates
so they could have access to resources and a Maya labor force.
The encomienda system, which ended in 1785, gave rise to the creation of haciendas,
which became instrumental in the mass production of henequen. 57 During the seventeenth
century, Spanish settlers built the first haciendas, which augmented corn production and cattle
raising in the Yucatán.58 Haciendas were typically composed of a variety of different structures,
including a main house, a kitchen, a warehouse, servant quarters, worker housing, stables, a
church, a store, a cemetery, a pigsty, roping areas, and gardens or fields.59 A hacienda turned
into a form of a small labor town, where many people could live, work, and shop in one place.
The development of haciendas gave Mayans the opportunity to earn some income and allowed
families of laborers to live together in provided housing.60

By 1800, half of Mayans in

Northwest Yucatán had settled on hacienda lands. As a result, they often became dependent on
hacienda owners, which will be examined further in Chapter Three.61 Around this time, cattle
and corn haciendas built in the Yucatán supplied the nearby cities of Valladolid, Mérida, and
Campeche.62
The hacienda system established by the Spanish allowed for henequen production to take
hold and prosper. Since the Spanish had not yet discovered the potential of henequen at this
56

Evans, “King Henequen: Order, Progress, and Ecological Change in Yucatán, 1850-1950,” 155.
Wells, Yucatán’s Gilded Age: Haciendas, Henequen and International Harvester 1860-1915, 20.
58
Paredes Guerrero, “De la hacienda ganadera a la henequenera,” 70-1.
59
Ibid., 71-2.
60
Ibid., 71.
61
Wells, Yucatán’s Gilded Age: Haciendas, Henequen and International Harvester 1860-1915, 20.
62
Ibid., 21.
57

32
time, corn, cattle, and sugar first became the Spaniards’ principal industries. However, the
farming system put in place with these haciendas allowed for the adaptation of preexisting
haciendas into henequen haciendas. Henequeneros, or henequen hacienda owners, would use the
previously established residences, workers’ quarters, equipment, and labor forces for henequen
production. These early cattle and corn haciendas allowed for henequen to easily take hold and
use the already built infrastructure to come to prosper as an industry.

Henequen’s Early Presence in Spanish Society and the Beginnings of an Industry
1720-1820
When the Spanish came to the Yucatán in the sixteenth century, they observed many uses
of henequen, but did not yet see its potential for mass production.63 They looked to the Maya to
learn how to grow henequen and eventually began to use it with more frequency in the
eighteenth century when it was used as rigging for their ships.64 They saw henequen as a strong
fiber that would be useful for them in their maritime endeavors. It is said that they began to use
henequen for rigging in 1720. There is a story from this time which says that a violent storm
broke all of the hemp cables on a Spanish ship. The desperate crew needed to use the ship and
therefore looked to henequen. Once they saw its potential for use on their ships, they began to
utilize it more often on the ships that travelled to and from Spain. 65 For the Spanish, henequen
was cheaper to produce, stronger, and lighter than hemp, an alternative for maritime rigging, and
it was more resistant to rot. This resulted in a new Spanish policy in the 1720s to use henequen
rope for ships in tropical waters because it was less apt to deteriorate.66
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During the late eighteenth century, henequen production began to increase due to a new
demand for products and new policies of the Spanish government. Under the “comercio libre,”
or “free trade,” policy enacted during the 1770s, goods could be shipped to markets outside of
New Spain, which allowed for an increased economic potential for henequen. 67

With the

enactment of comercio libre, colonists began to see that henequen could be used to strengthen
commerce. In other areas of Mexico, as well as in other parts of the world, people began to use
henequen in some of the ways the Maya had, for example, as rope, bags, nets, hammocks,
gunnysacks, and string.68 These goods found a place in both domestic and foreign markets. One
popular importer of henequen items in the eighteenth and nineteenth century was Havana,
Cuba.69 While henequen began to become an important export crop during the mid- to late
eighteenth century, the Maya still produced enough henequen to fulfill foreign and domestic
demand for the fiber.70 Therefore, at this point, it was not yet necessary to produce henequen on
a larger scale or on haciendas. Nevertheless, during the latter half of the eighteenth century,
exports of henequen tripled as demand for cordage and rigging increased.71 Although it was far
from a major export crop, the seeds of the henequen industry had begun to be planted during this
time period, which allowed it to expand substantially during the following century.
At the start of the nineteenth century, there was a major focus on commercial growth and
progress in the Yucatán. Benito Pérez, the governor of Yucatán from 1800 to 1811, put great
emphasis on the expansion of commercialism and trade. This focus allowed the opening of the
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Sisal port on the Northwestern coast of Yucatán in 1810.72 Records show that the first henequen
was shipped from Sisal in 1813.73 Sisal later became a major export port for henequen fiber and
the founding of Sisal provided the Yucatán with a more accessible port for henequen exports.
The early nineteenth century provided a basis for Yucatán to enter the world economy as it now
had a convenient port that could be used for exports. This allowed for the possibility of the
increased export of henequen fiber in the decades to come. One year after the first henequen was
shipped from Sisal, a local official, Policarpo Antonio de Echánove, submitted proposals to
expand henequen production to help improve the economy of Yucatán. De Echánove saw the
economic potential of the plant, but was ignored at the time as Spanish officials believed the
Maya population could produce what henequen was necessary to fulfill domestic and foreign
demand.74 Although de Echánove’s proposals would later be valued, at the time many did not
see the potential of henequen. Nevertheless, the early nineteenth century did provide a basis for
increased production of henequen and the expansion of the industry.

The Continued Growth of the Henequen Industry during the Independence Era 1821-1840
Before Mexico gained its independence in 1821, many roots of the henequen industry had
already been planted. For the most part, Yucatán was isolated from, and neglected by, Spanish
authority, so independence did not have a great impact on the area in regards to economic and
social changes in society.75 Yucatán was also unaffected by hostility during the Independence
War of 1810-1821 due to its geographic location.76

Also before independence, Spanish

protectionist policies had harmed earnings in Mexico and the absence of such policies after
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independence gave elites motive to expand economically in Yucatán.77 Although liberal policies
were put into place by the new Mexican government, there was still great inequality in society as
elites still remained in control of society and imposed their own policies.78

In Yucatán,

liberalism meant that less property restrictions were in place and land was more accessible to
individuals, which also gave entrepreneurs incentive to find economic uses for the land.79
Private property would allow for the spread of industry and capitalism as elites built their
industrial haciendas, which would give Yucatán the opportunity to enter the world economy.
Yucatán had always been somewhat independent due to its isolated location from the
central government. After the Independence War, this continued because the central government
was not as adamant about enacting its policies in the Yucatán, which gave Yucatán the
appearance of a relatively autonomous province of New Spain. 80 When Agustín de Iturbide
declared Mexican independence, Yucatán agreed to join Mexico only under the conditions that it
could trade with whomever it desired and it could collect its own tariffs.81 This showcases that
the Yucatán has always possessed some level of autonomy and often tended to see itself as a
separate entity from the rest of Mexico. After independence, Yucatán had the first provincial
assembly with delegates in all of New Spain.82 It is evident that citizens of Yucatán had a
distinct mindset and a spirit of independence and determination, which can be also be seen in the
continuing development of the henequen industry. Yucatecan leaders and entrepreneurs looked
for new opportunities after independence due to a changing and exciting economic and social
climate. The new independence-generation of elites had a desire for progress and a spirit of
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enterprise. They were hard to satisfy and were constantly in search of new ways to expand and
improve society.83

At a time when industry was flourishing in other parts of the world,

Yucatecan elites wanted to modernize their society and become a part of the world economy.
They wanted to move away from milpa-based subsistence farming and enter the export industry.
An advantage they had was that many elites were very wealthy and had control of most
economic affairs in the state, and therefore foreign capital was not needed.84 This was a distinct
characteristic of Yucatán because in many other Latin American societies, foreign investors were
responsible for supporting entire economies. Therefore, it was easier for elites to build the
henequen industry since they initially did not have to rely on foreign capital.
Several other factors that occurred around the time of independence also helped stimulate
the growth of the henequen industry. During the fight for independence, the cattle industry was
harmed. Cuba had previously been a major importer of Mexican cattle, but once Mexico
officially declared its independence from Spain in 1824, Argentina took over Cuban markets.85
Not only did Spain halt trade with Mexico, but Argentina also had a comparative advantage for
cattle, which meant it offered better prices and quality than Yucatán. 86 As a result, Yucatán’s
cattle industry suffered a great deal and this allowed room for other industries to gain ground.
Aside from the lack of the Cuban markets, the cattle industry in Mexico also experienced water
shortages and a lack of grazing pastures. Because the Spanish brought cattle with them to
Yucatán, they were not native to the area and it was challenging to raise them. In addition, cattle
were susceptible to insects and ticks as well as the occasional tiger attack. 87 The sudden decline
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of the cattle industry was yet another factor that allowed henequen to become more prominent in
the market. Although its presence was not significant at this time, henequen plants slowly crept
onto cattle haciendas as owners began to look for new sources of income.
The United States also came into play for the first time during the independence era. The
United States Navy began to use henequen for cordage on their ships during the 1820s, and this
resulted in demand for the fiber from the Yucatán.88 At this time, the Yucatán was the sole
producer of the world’s henequen. If a country had a specific demand for henequen fiber, it had
to come directly from the Yucatán peninsula. With comercio libre, the opening of the Sisal port,
and an increase in foreign demand, henequen found new world markets. With more liberal land
and trade policies in effect, elites in Yucatán were focused on creating a capitalistic society to
enter the world economy and create a greater flow of income to the state. Before the 1820s, all
henequen exported outside of Mexico had gone to Cuba, but during this time period, the United
States, Belize, and England also began to import henequen. 89 The United States would later
become a major importer of henequen and become responsible for purchasing almost all of the
henequen shipped out of Mexico, so opening trade with the United States was a crucial event in
the history of the henequen industry. The independence era, while it did not cause massive
expansion in henequen production, did result in some important moments that helped stimulate
the growth of the industry. Both the decline of cattle production and the beginning of foreign
exports, especially to the United States, increased the popularity and production of henequen and
helped it grow into a stronger market.
After independence, henequen continued to rise in popularity and began to make a real
impact on Yucatecan society. Since elites and societal leaders were looking for a way to
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strengthen the economy, they looked again to de Echánove’s proposals and used them as a basis
for a new program of promoting henequen production.90

A major breakthrough in the

development of the henequen industry was the 1828 “Ley agricola,” which was a state law that
required every citizen of Yucatán to raise no less than ten henequen plants each year. 91 This law
shows the first strong effort on the part of the government to stimulate the growth of the
henequen industry. It is evident that at this point, leaders were beginning to see the great
potential of henequen and saw it as a crop that was worth investing in. They were dedicated to
progress and industrialization and believed that even Mayan farmers should contribute to their
blossoming capitalistic society.

Around this same time, community lands began to be

transformed into henequen fields, which also shows the development of a capitalistic Yucatecan
society at the expense of Mayan communities.92 Leaders were starting to focus on the mass
production of henequen instead of the preservation of communal lands and traditional farming.
During the 1830s, hacendados, or hacienda owners, began to diversify their crops to
include henequen. The Compañía para el Cultivo y Beneficio del Henequén was formed in
Yucatán in 1830 to promote and increase the henequen industry in Yucatán.93 Also in 1830, due
to the new push for henequen production, Chacsinkín, a hacienda located five miles south of the
city of Mérida, was the first to diversify its crop to include henequen plants. While it was not
transformed into an exclusively henequen hacienda, about 21,000 henequen plants were planted
in Chacsinkín in 1830.94

Hacienda owners were motivated to include henequen in their

haciendas because it provided an opportunity to increase income due to the increasing demand.95
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By 1838, about 880 haciendas had diversified their crops to include henequen.96 This shows that
henequen was finally beginning to take its place as a strong force in the economy of Yucatán.
Even though it had been a useful crop since the pre-Columbian Mayan society, it was not
until the early to mid-nineteenth century that people of Yucatán really began to see the potential
to profit from henequen. In 1839, the United States imported a significant amount of henequen
fiber for the first time as ship builders saw henequen as the best material for riggings and cables
on clipper ships.97 Henequen was beginning to increase its presence in the United States market,
which would later prove to be immensely profitable for the industry. The Yucatán government
saw the importance of expanding capitalism and entering the world economy after independence.
Henequen seemed to have great potential for economic greatness as other crops, such as sugar,
were unable to firmly establish themselves in the world economy.

The Yucatecan Sugar Industry and its Decline
To understand the entire story of how henequen came to take the spotlight in the Yucatán
during the mid-nineteenth century, it is important to understand the history of the sugar industry
in Yucatán to examine the parallels and to see how the sugar crop gave way to the more
successful henequen crop. Sugar was a powerful industry in Yucatán and possessed a greater
market share than henequen even up through the mid-nineteenth century.98 While henequen
flourished in the Northwestern region of the Yucatán peninsula, sugar took hold in the interior of
Yucatán. The development of the sugar industry followed many of the same trends as that of the
henequen industry; however, sugar was not a unique crop to Yucatán and Yucatecan sugar never
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found a niche in the world economy. The lack of great potential for growth for the sugar crop
helped allow henequen to take hold, especially after the decline of sugar during the years of the
Caste War.
Unlike henequen, which was native to the Yucatán, the Spanish introduced sugar to the
Yucatán when they arrived in the mid-sixteenth century.99 During the early to mid-1700s, sugar
production moved to the interior of Yucatán because the land there was more fertile and suitable
for growing sugar.100 Although the corn and cattle industries helped bring capitalism to Yucatán,
it was not until the establishment of the sugar industry that market-oriented production began to
take hold.101 Before sugar, people in Yucatán were mostly subsistence farmers, but when the
sugar industry was expanding, many began to move away from their previous lifestyles to work
in harvesting sugar.102 Partly as a result of the sugar industry, by 1810, Yucatán had about 27
percent of the haciendas in Mexico.103 It is evident that there were drastic changes happening in
the Yucatecan economy and this clear transformation into a more capitalistic economy helped set
the stage for the henequen crop to later take control of this new economic atmosphere.
Similar to henequen, the Yucatecan government also promoted the sugar industry. The
new push for capitalism as well as new liberal policies gave rise to new opportunities for
Yucatecans. To help promote the sugar industry, the government encouraged settlement in the
interior of the Yucatán so that more people would turn to sugar production. In 1825, the
government passed the Ley de colonización, which opened lands in the interior to settlement.
The goal of this law was to promote individual land ownership and stimulate the sugar industry.
Purchasers of land had to find a plot of land and prove to the government that the land was not an
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ejido, or a communal Maya tract of land.104 The government then sold the land to the purchaser
at a highly reduced price and in this way thousands of acres were sold to private owners in
Central Yucatán.105 Like henequen, the government saw sugar as a viable source of income and
therefore saw a benefit to promoting sugar production. Sugar at this time was more successful
than henequen and movement of Yucatecan citizens to the interior of the peninsula was
substantial.
Although interior lands were more fertile for sugar production, the mass movement and
development of sugar in the interior later would prove devastating to the industry. During the
1820s and 1830s when the henequen economy was just forming and growing, sugar gained
substantial popularity due to high prices of sugar cane in the market. By 1845, it had become the
primary export crop of the Yucatán peninsula.106 The movement to the interior during this time
was great: between 1794 and 1846, most Yucatecan towns that saw substantial increases in
population were in the interior. For example, 75 percent of the Yucatecan towns that tripled in
population over this time period were located in the interior.107 In addition, twenty-seven out of
the twenty-nine towns founded in Yucatán between 1821 and 1846 were located in the
interior.108

At this time, while the government did promote henequen production as well,

inexpensive lands offered in the interior were appealing to elites and many seized the opportunity
to produce sugar.
While sugar did become very popular, there were some impediments to the expansion of
the industry, which henequen did not face. The United States received its sugar supply from
Louisiana at this time and was therefore not in the market for Yucatecan sugar. Similarly,
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European sugar imports were supplied by the Antilles and also did not require Yucatecan sugar.
Therefore it was impossible for the Yucatán to enter the worldwide sugar industry on a large
scale and the Yucatán had to resort to exporting sugar only to the rest of Mexico.109 Events
during the 1840s also led to the decline of the sugar industry. Yucatán left Mexico from 1840 to
1843 and again in 1846 to become its own independent country.110 Generally, in both instances
of separating, the Yucatán, an already isolated and relatively independent state, was angered by
the high tariffs put in place by the Mexican government.111 However, independence proved to be
very expensive for the Yucatán as it had to fight to keep its independence and could not rely on
the central government for financial assistance.112

These independence movements proved

detrimental to the sugar industry as the rest of Mexico was the only importer of Yucatecan sugar
and stopped importing when the Yucatán separated.113

At this time, prices of sugar fell

dramatically, and often below cost of production.114 Not only did the Yucatecan government
have high expenses resulting from the separation movements, but it also lost income from its
major export crop.
This loss of profits from the declining sugar industry helped demonstrate that henequen
was a viable and successful export crop. While the export economy of sugar relied on the rest of
Mexico, henequen found markets elsewhere. In this time of financial hardship for the Yucatecan
government, henequen proved to be a reliable source of income since sugar income was lost and
the government was desperate for income. In the years leading up to the Caste War, henequen
production remained relatively stable while sugar faced a decline, which gave it the opportunity
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to gain traction as a major export crop of Yucatán. It is clear that the sugar industry did not have
much growth potential as an export crop in the same manner that henequen did. Even though
sugar was the major export crop of Yucatán during the early part of the nineteenth century, it lost
even more ground during the Caste War. This allowed the henequen industry to pick up the
pieces of the destroyed sugar industry to find success.

The Caste War of 1846, the Devastation of the Sugar Economy, and the Great Rise of Henequen
The Caste War in Yucatán was an extremely violent and consequential event for the area.
It is important to understand the story of the Caste War to examine how henequen was able to
take control of the Yucatecan economy as a result of the devastation of the sugar industry. At
the start of the Caste War, henequen was second to sugar as the primary export of Yucatán, but
the already struggling sugar industry would decline even further during the Caste War years.115
In some cases, the Caste War was a direct response to policies of the sugar industry and
therefore, the sugar industry suffered great and unrecoverable loss as a result.
The Caste War began in 1846 as a Mayan uprising in reaction to fees imposed and lands
taken as a result of recent laws passed by the government of Yucatán. In 1842, baptisms,
marriages, and funerals for the Maya had increased in cost and were often challenging to
afford.116 An excessive tax put in place in 1844 on Mayan lands gave them further incentive to
sell their lands, which were eagerly bought by sugar hacendados.117 The Maya were angered that
they were forced to resort to sell their lands, but they were left with no other option due to the
excessive taxes. In addition, Maya mobility was restricted as many were becoming bound to
hacienda labor. Although hacienda labor will be examined in Chapter Three, it is important to
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note that there were laws passed which bound Mayan laborers to haciendas.118 At this time, most
haciendas were still sugar haciendas, so the Mayans were responding to their unhappiness with
the societal effects of the sugar industry. These laws and taxes established a racist system in
society, in which hacendados were favored by the government in order to promote capitalism
and progress. These discriminatory changes in society sparked great anger in the Maya and they
responded by raiding and killing the white settlers.119
In 1846, violence erupted in Yucatán when Mayan forces seized the town of Peto, located
in the interior of Yucatán, and attacked the city of Valladolid. The Mayan uprising was
surprisingly successful and by 1848, the Maya were in possession of 80 percent of the entire
peninsula.120 The colonists and their descendants were forced to live in fear of the Maya who
frequently raided and attacked. The city of Mérida became a refuge center for whites, but close
quarters resulted in dysentery and fevers which often led to death.121 The Yucatecan society was
in ruins and bouts of violence could break out at any time. In the spring of 1848, the Maya
returned to their farms because it was time to plant corn even though they had the upper hand in
the war. Without the harvest, they would go hungry, so they felt it necessary to return to plant.
This however gave whites the opportunity to regroup and begin to retake lands.122 Large-scale
fighting and territorial exchanges continued through 1850.123 In four years, the Caste War had
detrimental effects on Yucatecan society. Although it is challenging to determine the exact
number of casualties of the Caste War, estimates range from 25 to 50 percent of the population
of Yucatán due to the war and resulting starvation and disease. 124 Lawrence Remmers estimates
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that the population of whites in the Yucatán declined by about 41 percent between 1846 and
1850.125
This incredibly violent period in the history of Yucatán had great effects on society. The
Maya again proved that they were a force to be reckoned with and not a people that could be
controlled. A large portion of the population was killed and society became unstable. Some
estimates say that the Caste War lasted until 1901 and attacks and counterattacks continued until
then.126 One specific faction of the Maya formed a stronghold known as Chan Santa Cruz which
they held until the beginning of the twentieth century.127 The Caste War effectively damaged a
previous way of life to a point that could not be recovered. The rebellion instilled fear in
Spanish settlers of Yucatán and many settlers felt they had to leave their homes to move to safer
regions. The interior of the Yucatán suffered incredible loss in regards to population and
property. The sugar industry, which was based in central Yucatán, was devastated.
Henequen and sugar had previously been in competition with each other as the primary
export crop of Yucatán. The government focused on both crops as ways to bolster the economy,
but after the Caste War, only henequen remained a viable option as sugar production was
destroyed. The extensive violence in the interior left few sugar crops and a small amount of
working machinery on sugar haciendas.128 The city of Valladolid was harmed substantially by
the Maya, which was a major city in the Yucatán interior. 129 The great destruction of the interior
resulted in the movement of people from the interior to Northwest Yucatán.130 The government
had previously encouraged people to settle in interior lands, but with the devastation, a large
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portion of the population fled. Between 1846 and 1850, the number of people living in the
interior of Yucatán declined 75 percent.131 The cattle industry, which was still a significant
export of Yucatán, was also further devastated by the Caste War as haciendas were destroyed
and cattle were killed.132 In 1847, early on in the Caste War, there were approximately 350,000
cattle in Yucatán, but by 1862, less than 120,000 remained.133
The great exodus of people from the interior and destruction of equipment left it unlikely
for the sugar industry to recover. The cattle industry also suffered a great decline as a result of
the Caste War. In addition, the bankruptcy of the state treasury resulted in a need for a new
source of income.134 Only the henequen industry remained relatively untouched due to its
position in Northwest Yucatán.135

Since the treasury was bankrupt and the economy was

struggling, henequen again seemed like an excellent option to stimulate the economy. The
decline of the sugar and cattle industries, which were previously major export products, allowed
henequen to gain the attention of many elites looking to rebuild the economy.

Although

henequen had already been shipped outside of Mexico, elites and hacendados desired a greater
presence in the world economy.136 The large scale destruction of the previously successful sugar
industry left henequen as the only viable option to rebuild the economy after the devastating
Caste War.
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Conclusion
To understand the history of the henequen boom and its eventual decline, it is necessary
to understand how henequen came to be established as a major export crop in Yucatán. It is
evident that the conditions in Yucatán from the pre-Columbian time through the Caste War were
ideal for the development and eventual prosperity of the henequen industry. Henequen has
always played a significant role in Yucatecan society, but following this period, henequen would
come to take control of society. Although the Maya neither viewed henequen as a god nor gave
it religious significance, it was nevertheless present and useful in their daily lives. The Spanish
colonists would eventually realize that henequen could be a profitable and successful crop, and
the climate of Yucatán, while extreme, was ideal for the cultivation of henequen. Therefore it
was a logical crop to turn to in order to stimulate the economy. In addition, new liberal land and
trade policies in Yucatán encouraged elites to begin to create a modern industrial export society
and to focus on the development of capitalism.
At the start of Spanish colonization, settlers brought cattle and sugar with them and
continued the Mayan cultivation of corn. While they saw henequen as a useful crop, they at first
did not see the potential of expanding the henequen industry. However, the formation of a new
Spanish society was ideal for the development of the henequen industry. The Spanish began
constructing haciendas in the seventeenth century as an all-encompassing way to harvest crops.
The hacienda system proved ideal for the later integration of the henequen crop and previously
established cattle haciendas in Northwestern Yucatán eventually expanded to add henequen
plants in order to increase profit.
The Spanish began to see the possibilities of henequen toward the end of the eighteenth
century. They started to use henequen fiber to make the ropes on their ships, and Mayan bags,
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netting, and hammocks made of henequen sparked interest in foreign markets. Even though the
henequen export industry had begun in the early nineteenth century, it was still not a major
export crop of Yucatán. However, the independence era caused a decline in the cattle industry
which helped allow henequen to take a stronger hold in the economy. Elites were looking for
new opportunities and henequen was something that had potential in the market. They were
focused on progress and saw henequen as a way to enter the world economy in order to become a
more modern society focused on industry instead of subsistence farming. The devastation of the
popular sugar industry during the Caste War era allowed society leaders to focus on henequen as
their economic savior. The violence of the Caste War in the interior of Yucatán destroyed sugar
haciendas and caused a great migration to the Northwestern region of the peninsula. Previously,
the government had promoted movement to the interior to stimulate the sugar industry, but after
the Caste War, it become clear that sugar would not recover. Therefore movement to the region
where henequen prospered and a desire to repair and stimulate the economy made henequen the
ideal crop to save the Yucatán after the Caste War.
While it was always part of Yucatecan society, the Caste War gave henequen even
greater opportunity for growth and allowed it to later dominate the Yucatán export economy and
obtain massive revenue. Henequen has always played a crucial role in Yucatecan society, and
conditions and events since the pre-Columbian Maya period resulted in the turn to henequen in
the mid-nineteenth century as a main export crop. Elites saw an opportunity to use henequen to
enter the world market and within the next half-century, henequen would experience a
tremendous boom that would draw substantial wealth to Yucatán. The following chapters will
describe how henequen was able to achieve such success and examine the societal effects of its
newfound popularity.
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Chapter Two
The Henequen Industry, the Birth of Dependence, and the Rise of Monopoly
1860-1915

Introduction
Over the half-century following the Caste War, the henequen industry achieved
overwhelming success. Elites who had been searching for a way to enter the world economy
after the Caste War made a wise decision in investing in the henequen industry as henequen
brought great riches to the upper class in Yucatán. From 1845 to 1883, the amount of pesos of
henequen in the foreign market increased by 4,000 percent.1 Between 1860 and 1864, Yucatán
exported 8,545 bales of henequen, and between 1905 and 1909 this number had increased to
3,028,627.2 Yucatán went from a state scrambling for a way to enter to the world market to one
of the wealthiest states in Mexico.
The Industrial Revolution in the United States allowed henequen to gain prominence as
the wheat industry in the United States came to rely on henequen. The invention of the rasper in
Yucatán, which was used to extract henequen fiber from leaves, followed by the invention of the
grain binder in the United States, which used henequen to bind wheat bales, were crucial events
that increased the uses and demand for henequen. During the latter half of the nineteenth
century, advances in technology, and an exclusive focus on the henequen industry in Yucatán,
allowed henequen to gain a prominent position in the world economy. As capitalism was
expanding in the United States, the Yucatecan government and elites wanted to follow suit.
Elites saw the development and expansion of the henequen industry as a way to promote

1

Lawrence James Remmers, “Henequen, The Caste War and Economy of Yucatan, 1846-1883: The Roots of
Dependence in a Mexican Region” Volumes 1 and 2 (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1981), 11.
2
Piedad Peniche Rivero, “From Milpero and Lunero to Henequenero: A Transition to Capitalism in Yucatán,
Mexico,” in The Lowland Maya Area: Three Millennia at the Human-Wildland Interface,” ed. Arturo GómezPompa, Michael F. Allen, Scott L. Fedick et al. (New York: The Haworth Press, Inc., 2003), 576.

50
capitalism and create a modern industrial economy with a place in the greater world market. As a
result, with the rise of the wheat industry United States, the developed henequen industry was
able to meet the massive demand for fiber to bind the wheat.
While some henequen fiber was shipped elsewhere, a great majority was exported to the
United States. In 1871, the United States imported 76 percent of all henequen exported from
Yucatán and by 1906, the United States was importing 95 percent of the henequen exported.3
Although the United States would become dependent on the Yucatecan fiber, the wheat industry
in the United States was primarily responsible for driving the Yucatecan economy. The Panic of
1873 in the United States and the 1884 recession caused the henequen industry to take a hit
because demand for wheat decreased.4 Even though these events highlighted the dependence on
the United States market, henequeneros would continue to produce henequen because they
always believed the economy would improve.
The dependence between the United States and Yucatán increased over the latter half of
the nineteenth century as elites continued to focus mainly on producing raw henequen fiber for
export to the United States. Dependency theories in relation to Latin America often highlight the
one-sided dependence of Latin American economies on foreign markets. According to Steven
Topik, Carlos Marichal, and Zephyr Frank in From Silver to Cocaine, Latin American
economies are often driven by cheap exports and it is challenging for them to earn substantial
revenue.5 Similar to other regions, the economic dependence that formed in Yucatán was the
result of foreign influences, demand, and internal conditions. The Yucatecan government linked
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itself to the United States economy and relied solely on United States demand for henequen
fiber.6 However, even though the Yucatán’s economy was dependent on the United States wheat
industry, it was able to make large profits from its export, unlike other Latin American countries,
since Yucatecans retained substantial control of the industry and gained a monopoly over the
fiber market for much of the henequen boom. Unlike other instances of dependence in Latin
America, the United States wheat industry relied on the import of henequen fiber from Yucatán,
and this resulted in a two-sided dependence between Yucatán and the United States. However,
the United States economy did not hinge on the Yucatecan fiber in the same way Yucatán relied
on United States demand, and a decline in United States demand for fiber would result in the
economy of Yucatán suffering substantially.
During this period, the growing henequen market was appealing to businessmen and
investors because they saw the potential to obtain great profit. Eventually, the henequen industry
gave rise to a monopoly because it was so concentrated on the export of raw fiber. Cyrus
McCormick and Henry Peabody of the United States, and Olegario Molina of Yucatán, who all
gained success from the henequen industry, created an empire-like, monopolistic structure when
they merged their businesses to form the International Harvester Company.

International

Harvester controlled all aspects of the henequen industry: from investment and export houses in
Yucatán to the import businesses in the United States. As a result, it was able to control the price
of, and demand for, henequen. Businessmen took advantage of the highly concentrated industry
and were able to gain control. By consistently depressing the prices of its henequen to eliminate
competition, International Harvester was able to essentially form a monopoly over the henequen
industry.
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This chapter will examine how the henequen industry formed, how dependence evolved
between the United States and Yucatán, and how the industry gave rise to monopoly from the
period following the Caste War through 1915. It will begin by examining and describing
henequen production in Yucatán, and will show that the elites’ focus on modernization and the
turn to capitalism helped to strengthen the industry. It will argue that the henequen industry led
to an unequal dependence between the United States and Yucatán as Yucatán’s entire society
was driven by United States demand for henequen. It will show that efforts by Yucatecan elites’
to diversify the industry were ultimately unsuccessful. Although the United States became
somewhat dependent on Yucatecan fiber for its wheat industry, it still had many other economic
resources, and therefore, dependence was skewed since Yucatán ended up investing everything
in henequen exports. Finally, this chapter will argue that the structure of the henequen industry
led to the rise of monopoly. What had once been a fairly autonomous Yucatecan industry would
eventually come to be controlled by a foreign corporation, and the story of henequen would
begin to reflect one of other Latin American export economies.

The Logistics and Development of Henequen Production
After the Caste War, the elites of Yucatán put a great focus on the henequen industry in
order to stimulate capitalism in the state. As a result, many hacienda owners expanded their
haciendas to include henequen, and some even turned exclusively to henequen. By 1902, there
were about 1,200 henequen haciendas in Yucatán employing 1,100 mechanical raspers. 7 The
expansion of henequen production in Yucatán is important to understand in order to understand
how henequen came to take control of Yucatecan society. Elites believed turning to a more
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capitalistic society based on industry and export would strengthen their economy and allow them
to enter the world market. They focused on advancements in technology and the development of
a structure of production to allow the industry to take hold, prosper, and gain traction in the
world economy. Turning to capitalism, they believed, would allow Yucatán to become more
modern with a stronger position in the world market.
As discussed in the first chapter, many cattle and corn haciendas were transformed into
henequen haciendas between the 1830s and 1860s.8 The henequen haciendas began to resemble
a commercial plantation with the introduction of new machinery, but at the same time possessed
characteristics of the previous hacienda structure. Henequen haciendas continued under familial
management and ownership, which gave Yucatecans more control of the henequen industry. 9 In
other Latin American countries, many large plantations had foreign ownership, but in Yucatán,
haciendas for the most part remained under familial control. While elites strove to make
Yucatán’s society based more on capitalism, some traditional methods of farming and production
were still employed. Family-owned haciendas were prevalent before henequen, and henequen
was incorporated into these previously established centers of production.
Throughout the henequen boom, tools and equipment collections on haciendas remained
small as not much capital was needed to produce henequen fiber.10 Before the invention of the
rasper during the 1850s, the average laborer could rasp, or extract fiber from, about one hundred
leaves per day.11 Much of the rasping was done in the few hours before sunrise because the
juices from the henequen leaves would irritate the skin when heat rose. 12 This process was slow
8
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and difficult for laborers, so the Yucatecan government began to realize that a more efficient
method was needed to successfully produce fiber for the world market. In 1852, the government
of Yucatán offered a 2,000 peso reward for the most effective and economical invention to
extract fiber from henequen leaves.13

This shows that the government was serious about

embracing capitalism and focusing on the development of industry. With the invention of the
rasper, henequen production would become much more efficient and henequen would become a
more legitimate export crop.
By 1856, defibering machines could rasp 1,000 leaves in ten hours, which was a major
improvement over the need to scrape leaves by hand.14 In 1861, steam power was introduced to
the rasper, which further enhanced production, and by 1910, defibering machines could process
100,000 leaves in ten hours.15 The fact that the speed of production of henequen fiber was one
hundred times faster in 1910 than in 1856 allowed the henequeneros to satisfy the great demand
of the United States and expand the henequen industry. The raspers were further improved in
1913 with the introduction of diesel engines.16 The modernization of machinery and promotion
and expansion of capitalism during this time allowed raspers to become more efficient and
successful in satisfying the high demand for fiber. This allowed Yucatán to gain traction in the
world economy and provided substantial revenue to the state.
The harvesting process of henequen was not overly complicated, and therefore there was
not a need to train laborers since tasks tended to be straightforward. The process also did not
require extensive capital, so it was easy to realize high returns on investment. 17 After planting
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the henequen plant, however, it could not be harvested for seven years because the leaves had to
mature to produce effective fiber.18 This posed a problem for the henequen industry because
henequeneros could not plant based on demand; they needed to predict the demand seven years
in advance. As a result, many henequeneros simply planted large amounts of henequen with
hopes that the economy would continue to prosper. The best scenario on a henequen hacienda
was one third of henequen plants in cultivation, one-third in production, and one-third in
decadence.19 Henequen plants were typically replaced after fifteen to twenty years.20
The process to extract the precious and highly demanded fiber from the henequen leaves
was straightforward as well. Laborers chopped the spines off the ends of the henequen leaves,
then cut leaves from the plants with machetes, and bound them into bundles of about fifty leaves
each.21 Once the leaves were bundled, they were piled onto little, flat, mule-drawn carts which
brought them to the rasper.22 These carts were on tracks similar to railroad tracks, and were
known as “trucs” in Maya.23 The tracks led to the center of the hacienda from the henequen
fields.24 Once the carts arrived, laborers would catch, untie, and spread out the leaves and put
them on a mechanical belt, which carried the leaves to the rasper. Once the fiber was extracted
from the leaves in the rasper, it was dried in the sun for one or two days, and then sent to
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market.25 Eventually, some henequeneros developed truc lines that expanded to Progreso in
order to send their fiber directly to the port for export.26 While this process was not overly
complicated, it was very labor-intensive and took a physical toll on the workers. Henequeneros
needed to keep labor cheap and plentiful in order to have enough workers to produce the
precious fiber.27
The hacienda system, over the second half of the nineteenth century, was substantially
tailored to henequen production. Although this allowed Yucatán to fulfill the demand of the
United States market, it also created a society dependent on the success of henequen. The turn to
capitalism in Yucatán created a society based on the exportation of henequen, and advancements
and the increasing success of the industry only reinforced the continued production of the crop
and the expansion of the industry.

The Henequen Industry: Capitalist Policies and Expansion
From Post-Caste War through the end of the Nineteenth Century
While the henequen industry of Yucatán bore some resemblance to other Latin American
export economies of the nineteenth century, it was unique in that henequeneros were all
Yucatecan. Haciendas remained in the hands of the locals, even when some United States
companies came to gain some control over the industry.28 This meant that most of the profits
from henequen sales remained in Yucatán instead of in the United States.29 Unlike its direct
investment in companies such as the United Fruit Company, which obtained most of the wealth
25
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from the “banana republics” of Central America, the United States investment in henequen was
more indirect and allowed profits to remain in Yucatán.30 This was a result of the previously
established hacienda structure in Yucatán, which easily allowed for expansion to include
henequen plants. Therefore, United States investment was not as necessary since henequeneros
already possessed much of the infrastructure needed to grow henequen, and this gave Yucatán
more autonomy in henequen production.
After the Caste War, the Yucatán government was geared toward the expansion of
capitalism and industry and they saw henequen as the best option to achieve their goal of
entering the world economy. As a result of the great importance placed on henequen, Yucatán
became an export economy based on an individual crop. As evidenced by the governmentsponsored contest for the rasper invention, Yucatán government spending either went to
sponsoring the henequen industry, or paying for imports.31 Yucatán was investing everything
into the success of the henequen industry in order to stimulate its economy and promote
capitalism. The industry was so successful that a major goal was to produce as much fiber as
possible. This, however, caused henequeneros to focus on the quantity of fiber produced instead
of the quality of the fiber.
Before 1869, henequen fiber was attractive, and had an appropriate cleanliness and
length.

However, with the dramatic increase in price, henequeneros rushed production,

harvested into the winter, and did not dry or clean fibers correctly. The United States purchasers
were unhappy to find fiber that was dirty and uncombed, and this caused some damage to the
reputation of henequen.32 In Yucatán, many individuals and newspapers promoted the quality of
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henequen fiber, but legislative measures failed and quality campaigns were ignored.33 Henequen
remained the cheap, useful fiber, even though it was not always of the best quality. Most
Yucatecans were more concerned with producing great quantities of fiber to increase profits than
with creating a quality product. The primary goal was to stimulate their new capitalistic, marketbased economy and that meant to produce as much henequen fiber as possible.
Throughout henequen’s reign as the primary export crop of Yucatán, the government of
Yucatán never imposed high taxes on its production and export in order to preserve its success.
As a result, henequen was a very profitable crop since demand from the United States was so
great and the taxes were so low. Henequeneros were only required to pay a land tax, and in 1882
a small export tax was imposed. The Yucatán government’s support for henequen was so strong
because henequen had saved the economy after the devastating Caste War, and it was hesitant to
extensively tax the industry at risk of damaging its success.34 These capitalistic policies, and the
primary focus on henequen, allowed it to become the number one export crop in Mexico by
1883.35 In addition, according to Lawrence Remmers, a historian of the henequen industry in
Yucatán, the modernization of the henequen industry with equipment was basically completed
by 1883.36 Because the necessary machinery was in place, henequeneros no longer had to worry
about increasing capital, and this also added to the profitability of henequen. By 1890, more
than half of haciendas grew henequen, and almost a quarter of haciendas were exclusively
focused on henequen production.37
Yucatán found great success making profits from its henequen industry even though the
fiber market was challenging to enter. Henequeneros could not predict future prices or demand
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since they had to plant henequen seven years before harvest, and this made participation in the
market even more difficult.38

Therefore, most henequeneros planted, processed, and sold

henequen no matter what its price was.39 Nevertheless, the Yucatecan government and elites
believed henequen would allow their state to prosper and become more like other capitalist
nations. These goals were essentially realized as the development of the henequen industry
brought capitalism, industrialization, and great wealth to Yucatán, and allowed the state to enter
the world economy.

The Rise of Henequen in the United States Fiber Market
In order to understand how the United States came to purchase vast quantities of
henequen fiber, it is necessary to understand how henequen came to peak in the fiber market.
The initial main competitors to henequen were Russian hemp, Kentucky hemp, Indian jute, and
Philippine manila.40 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States imported
3,400 tons of Russian hemp per year and this number increased during the 1820s and 1830s. 41
Russian hemp was popular in the United States during the early 1800s, but it was heavy, dirty,
and inflexible. During the Crimean War in 1853, however, supplies of Russian hemp were
disrupted, and the United States was forced to turn to the Philippines for its fiber supply. 42
While henequen was not yet a major player, this reduced the competitors in the market since the
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Russian hemp industry was never able to recover.43 In addition, the value of henequen was
increased since there were less fiber options available.44
Manila from the Philippines was another major competitor to henequen. Compared to
henequen, manila was stronger, more resistant to rot, and smoother, but was also more
expensive.45 By the 1860s, manila had been established in the United States market, and was
commonly used in power cables and oil drilling.46 Since manila was a better option based on its
composition, henequen gained traction in the world market during the mid-nineteenth century as
it cost one to two cents less per pound than manila.47 While henequen and manila were both
inelastic to price changes in the market, henequen had a comparative advantage as a result of the
modernization of henequen production, the primary concentration of the economy on henequen,
and the ideal land for growing henequen in Yucatán.48 This allowed henequen to become
popular even though manila may have been a better option. In addition, in 1898, the SpanishAmerican War disrupted the supply of manila from the Philippines, and left henequen as the only
major fiber option for a period.49 The rapidly expanding wheat industry required a cheap,
reliable fiber that was available in great quantity, and henequen was the perfect option. As a
result, the United States would come to rely on henequen fiber for the majority of its binder
twine.

43

Ibid.
Remmers, “Henequen, The Caste War and Economy of Yucatan, 1846-1883,” 376.
45
Wells, “Henequen,” 87, 94.
46
Wells, “Reports of Its Demise Are Not Exaggerated,” 307.
47
Wells, “Henequen,” 94.
48
Wells, “Henequen,” 101; Evans, “King Henequen: Order, Progress, and Ecological Change in Yucatán, 18501950,” 158; Remmers, “Henequen, The Caste War and Economy of Yucatan, 1846-1883,” 419.
49
Remmers, “Henequen, The Caste War and Economy of Yucatan, 1846-1883,” 810.
44

61
Demand in the United States: How the Wheat Industry Came to Require Henequen and the
Beginnings of a Two-Sided Dependence
Throughout this period, the demand for henequen fiber in the United States increased
dramatically. This eventually led to a rise of dependence between Yucatán and the United
States. The demand for binder twine in the United States encouraged Yucatecan elites to
continue to focus mainly on the production of henequen fiber because they were making such
large profits. The entirety of the Yucatecan economy came to depend on the success of the
United States wheat industry since the United States was responsible for importing most of the
henequen fiber exported. At the same time, the United States came to rely on Yucatán for its
source of binder twine as most of its binder twine was made from henequen. Some newspapers
of the time even described the supply of bread in the United States as dependent on the
Yucatecan fiber.50 While there existed this two-sided dependence between the two regions, the
United States earned revenue from many other outlets and its economy was not solely dependent
on henequen. Yucatán, however, had concentrated its economic efforts on henequen and was
entirely dependent on the success of the United States wheat industry. Therefore, the two-sided
dependence that existed was uneven because the trade only affected one industry in the United
States, while henequen had become the main industry of Yucatán.
Before henequen became a major import product to the United States, cotton helped form
the basis for trade between Yucatán and the United States. Although the cotton industry of
Yucatán was harmed substantially during the Caste War, it later gained momentum, and Yucatán
began to ship cotton to New England and England. Between 1863 and 1864, cotton was a major
industry in Yucatán due to the lack of Southern cotton as a result of the United States Civil War.
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In 1863 alone, Yucatán shipped 4,000 bales of cotton to New England and England. 51 However,
after the South fell in 1865, cotton production increased again in the United States, and there was
no longer a high demand for Yucatecan cotton.52 Nevertheless, the short-lived international
success of the Yucatecan cotton industry helped sustain henequen’s position in the market.
Yucatán had opened trade routes with its cotton industry, which made it easier to increase the
export of henequen.
The major catalyst for the enormous henequen boom was the wheat industry of the
United States. The Industrial Revolution of Europe and the United States during the latter half of
the nineteenth century had created a massive demand for raw materials.53 The United States
needed wheat to feed its rapidly expanding population, which resulted in the creation of many
new farmlands in the Western United States. Between 1860 and 1880, the number of farms in
the West increased by 96 percent and wheat production increased 188 percent, making the
United States the largest wheat producing country in the world.54 The massive expansion of the
wheat industry created a strong demand for henequen fiber since farmers needed a way to bind
wheat bales. Henequen became a necessity in the United States wheat industry: while coffee and
bananas from Central and South America were luxuries for the people of the United States,
henequen, on the other hand, was an essential input to wheat production.55 This created a
dependence on henequen in the United States as henequen became the best option for binder
twine. As a result, Yucatán focused its entire economy on the production of henequen, and
became dependent on the United States industry as well.
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The demand for henequen in the United States sprung from the invention of the grain
binder. Similar to the situation surrounding the invention of the rasper in Yucatán, the growing
wheat industry required people to search for ways to make production more efficient and
effective. In 1831, Cyrus McCormick, who would later become a major player in the henequen
industry, invented a horse-drawn grain reaper.56 About two decades later, John Heath invented a
binder that used metal wire.57 After Charles Worthington made further improvements to the
binder in 1877, John Appleby invented a mechanical knotting device that could be used in the
binder in 1878.58 This industrialization of the agriculture industry created a massive demand for
binder twine since farmers could use it in their mechanical binders.
With early wire binders, pieces of metal would become stuck in the machines and in
bales of hay. This would cause cows to fall ill since they ate the metal pieces that became
engrained in the hay.59 It was evident to farmers that something natural was needed, which
stimulated testing of henequen fiber.60

During the 1870s, Cyrus McCormick began to

experiment with fiber from Yucatán in the binders and found that it was strong and effective.
Since it was also resistant to rot and insects, it became a practical option for farmers in the
United States.61 During the late 1870s and early 1880s, binder twine became more popular and
manufacturers of twine binders began to release negative propaganda, which blamed wire
binders for cow deaths. While this did happen and was a concern for farmers, twine binder
manufacturers exaggerated to an extent. Nevertheless, this negative propaganda caused more
farmers to purchase twine binders instead of metal wire binders. They did not want to risk the
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loss of their cattle as a source of income and sought the more natural option of binding material.
This shift to twine binders further increased the demand for henequen fiber.62
Before the invention of binder twine in the 1870s, henequen had other uses in the United
States. During the mid-nineteenth century, henequen was commonly used on ships as rope,
rigging cable, and towlines. Smaller ships used up to one ton of rope, while larger ships, such as
the U.S.S. Constitution, could use up to one hundred tons of rope.63 Between 1845 and 1860,
there was a high demand for cordage fibers on clipper ships.64 However, with the creation of
binder twine, the henequen market expanded significantly, and binding material became the
primary use for henequen fiber in the United States. The industrialization of the farming process
required binder twine, and henequen was the ideal fiber for binders. Henequen could be made
into a smooth, one strand cord, which made it very useful for farmers. 65 Between 1897 and
1902, McCormick’s binder manufacturing company sold about 152,000 binders per year, which
continued increasing the demand for henequen fiber from Yucatán.66 By 1900, 85 percent of
binder twine in North America was made with henequen from Yucatán.67
The extensive use of henequen for binder twine demonstrates the dependence between
Yucatán and the United States. Overall, the United States purchased more than 90 percent of all
henequen output from Yucatán, and mostly all was used for binder twine.68 For every acre of
wheat in the United States, two to six pounds of binder twine were needed. In 1890, 36.7 million
acres of wheat were harvested in the United States.69 These numbers show how strong the
demand was for binder twine from Yucatán, and how dependent the societies were on one
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another. The United States primarily used henequen for binder twine, and Yucatán was the only
source of henequen. At the same time, the Yucatán had to satisfy the insatiable demand of the
United States, which generated a singular focus on henequen production. Aside from binder
twine, the United States continued using henequen for rope. Farmers also found other uses for
henequen, for example, they used it to lace shoes, to tie pants and fence rails, and to repair
harnesses.70 During the 1880s, henequen hammocks became popular among the upper class of
the United States.71 While these were not huge markets, they show that henequen had found a
place in United States society.
The enormous United States demand for henequen fiber caused Yucatán to focus solely
on producing henequen for the United States market, and other crops and societal developments
began to fall by the wayside in order to make way for king henequen. The great focus on
henequen caused the Yucatecan corn industry to decline and led to a greater dependence on the
United States because at times, the Yucatán could not feed its own population. Although the
population in Yucatán increased substantially between 1862 and 1885, the acreage of corn farms
fell by 32 percent.72 Large landowners often preferred to grow henequen since it was much more
profitable, and there was no incentive to switch to corn.73 As previously discussed, henequen
took over some corn haciendas because hacienda owners saw henequen as a much more
profitable option.74 The Yucatecan government promoted henequen production to stimulate the
economy and did not put great consideration into the corn industry. As a result, corn prices rose
and there were occasional shortages.75 At several points during the latter half of the nineteenth
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century, the Yucatán was forced to import corn from the United States to feed its population.76
In 1890, even though there were still less henequen holdings than cattle and corn holdings, it is
important to note that Yucatán could not produce enough corn to feed its population.77 This
added another level of dependence between the United States and Yucatán: Yucatán had focused
such great effort on the expansion of henequen that it needed to import food to feed its people.

The Connection and Dependence between Yucatán and the United States Increases
During the second half of the nineteenth century, Yucatán and the United States became
more intertwined and henequen evolved into a major industry.

United States businesses

expanded into Yucatán, and Yucatecans made connections with United States businesses to
increase revenues and become more involved in the trade. As the Yucatecan elites had dreamed
after the Caste War, Yucatán was becoming a force in the modern world economy.
Communications between regions increased and New York businesses sought to take control of
the henequen industry, which shows they saw it as profitable and successful. However, as
Yucatán began importing more from the United States in terms of food and luxury goods, it
further increased its dependence on the United States. Even though this dependence was great,
the United States also relied on Yucatecan fiber since its options were limited, and the regions
formed a kind of mutual, yet unequal, dependence.
At this time, New York, which was a major center of industry in the world, began to
become involved with the henequen industry. In 1852, a line of credit from New York banks
was extended to Yucatán for henequen production.78 This was the first instance of any sort of
foreign investment in the henequen industry, but it shows that people in the United States began
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to see the potential of investing in henequen. Eusebio Escalante, a wealthy merchant in Yucatán,
who was responsible for shipping a large portion of henequen to the United States, began
establishing connections to New York during the 1850s in order to secure investments for the
industry. He formed a relationship with Bouchaud, Thebaud, and Company, which was a
business that found henequen buyers in the United States.79

The fact that Yucatecan

entrepreneurs sought assistance from the United States, and that the United States took interest in
such endeavors, shows that the henequen industry was becoming a legitimate and successful
industry.
According to the New York Herald on January 28, 1869, “the cultivation of henequen as a
substitute for hemp, in the state of Yucatan, [is] now assuming immense proportions and
becoming an important article of commerce…[and] the interest of both countries [call] for its
ready and prompt exportation to the United States.”80 People in the United States realized the
importance of henequen and saw that it would benefit both regions to focus on expanding the
industry. This article goes on to state that for Yucatán to become more progressive, to prosper,
and to become more peaceful like the United States, it was necessary to focus on the expansion
of the henequen industry.81 It is evident that the authors of this article had similar opinions to
those of Yucatecan elites: they too believed that henequen could promote capitalism and propel
Yucatán to a more prominent position in the world. During the henequen boom, elites found
success expanding capitalism and promoting industry as the United States had during the
Industrial Revolution, and they were able to realize great profits.
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Over time, business interests in the United States began to see henequen as a successful
source of revenue and wanted to control the importation of the fiber. New York businesses
began to seek more power in the henequen industry, and speculators began to take advantage of
henequeneros with corporations and monopolies.82 At this time, most of the henequen that
entered the United States entered through New York, and as a result, New York had control over
the industry.83 Banks in New York and New Orleans sought to monopolize imports of henequen
to the United States to increase their control.84 United States companies also saw opportunities
in Yucatán. The largest fiber importer, Henry W. Peabody and Company of Boston, established
a trade house in Mérida in 1891.85 Such export houses had local Yucatecans in charge, but were
mostly controlled by foreign interests.86 Communications improved between the United States
and Yucatán during the 1870s as well, and the Revista magazine in Yucatán began to print trade
statistics with the United States.87 In addition, United States companies began to advertise in
Mérida in 1877, as upper class residents were becoming accustomed to a high standard of living
and could afford luxuries from the United States.88 It is clear that the expanding capitalist
economies of Yucatán and the United States became interconnected during this time. Although
they had done so at the expense of the henequen laborers, the elites of Yucatán had entered the
world economy.
The binder twine industry began to expand in the United States as a result of henequen
imports. Cordage manufacturing companies began to form to create rope and twine from the
henequen fiber: one major cordage manufacturer was Plymouth Cordage Company in Plymouth,
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Massachusetts.89

The main ports for the import of henequen in the United States at the

beginning of the twentieth century were New Orleans, New York, Boston, Mobile, Pensacola,
Galveston, and Portland, Oregon.90 After arriving at one of these ports, henequen fiber was then
distributed to cordage manufacturers or to prisons, where binder twine was also produced.91 The
binder twine then most commonly ended up in the Midwestern states, Florida, Georgia, and
Texas.92 It is evident that henequen helped form a major industry in the United States and its use
was present throughout the United States. Also, since the Yucatán was the only source of
henequen fiber for the United States, and effectively, the only major source of binder twine, the
United States could not control prices by playing one region against another.93 In a sense,
Yucatán had control over the industry since it had a monopoly on henequen production. The
United States had to rely on Yucatán’s supply and the prices it set, which shows the level of
dependence the United States had on Yucatán.
Even though the United States did not rely solely on wheat to earn revenue, its expansive
wheat industry was dependent on Yucatecan henequen. At the same time, Yucatán depended on
the United States wheat industry to keep its economy afloat. According to a Washington Herald
article from February 18, 1917, “The United States is dependent on Yucatan for its bread
supply…our bread supply is at the mercy of Yucatan.”94 Since henequen was a necessity for
binding wheat and hay, this had some truth to it; without binder twine, the United States would
not be able to distribute wheat. This worried United States businessmen and around this time,
they began searching for alternatives to henequen fiber in case something were to happen to their
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Yucatecan fiber supply. While the bread supply of the United States may have been dependent
on Yucatán, the entirety of Yucatecan society was dependent on the United States. According to
a posting by the Comisión Reguladora del Mercado de Henequén in The Sun newspaper on
February 9, 1917, “Yucatan produces practically nothing except…fib[er], and buys her food,
clothing and other necessaries of life in the American markets.” 95 Yucatán began to import food
in greater quantity from the United States at the start of the twentieth century because there were
so many laborers to feed.96 Aside from corn, Yucatán also imported wheat from the United
States, some of which was likely bound with henequen fiber.97 It is evident that although there
was dependence on both sides, Yucatán depended much more on the United States since it
devoted its entire economy to henequen, even at the expense of subsistence crops.
It is clear that over this period, Yucatán became much more dependent on the United
States. Although the United States needed henequen fiber to bind wheat and support its rapidly
expanding wheat industry, Yucatán’s entire economy hinged on the purchase of henequen fiber
by the United States, and it was forced to turn to the United States for food since it could not
produce enough to feed its laborers. Since Yucatán was so focused on producing henequen and
making profits, it came to rely more on the United States because it could not balance the
production of henequen with food. The dependence on the United States was dangerous for
Yucatán because it had invested everything in henequen, and if the market changed, it would
result in disaster. Elites in Yucatán worried about this and sought methods to reduce this
dependence, but ultimately, they were unsuccessful since henequeneros were hesitant to diverge
from the method of production that had brought them such great wealth.
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Campaigns to Diversify the Market and Reduce Dependence
The henequen industry in Yucatán relied mainly on the export of raw fiber to the United
States and some elites believed that it was necessary to diversify in order to create stability. If
the demand for raw fiber from the United States disappeared, the Yucatecan economy would
face a major challenge and this worried elites. During the first couple years of the 1880s,
Yucatán began to construct more cordage plants in order to produce more than simply raw
fiber.98 These factories were typically built on a North American model and were used to make
rope and twine. Hammocks and sacks were still constructed by hand in Yucatán, however, since
the factories were not equipped to manufacture these goods.99 The purpose of these factories
was to create goods out of raw fiber to export, instead of simply relying on raw fiber. The goods
coming from these factories were typically of high quality, and Yucatecan henequen goods had a
positive reputation in the market.100 However, as the 1880s progressed, henequen planters
stopped selling to these factories because there was such a high demand for raw fiber.101
Henequeneros were making a much higher profit from selling raw fiber to exporters and as a
result, cordage factories were forced to shut down.
In 1883, four of the largest and most modern cordage plants in Yucatán were closed. La
Miraflores was one such example: it had modern machinery and was driven by steam power.102
The closing of these factories was, in a sense, going back in time for Yucatán. Instead of further
expanding capitalism with modern factories and production, they returned to the sole focus of
exporting raw fiber. The fiber would then be processed in the United States to produce twine,
and Yucatán was only needed to supply the raw material. Yucatecan elites had expanded
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capitalism to a point where it brought great profit, but then decided that further modernization
was too great a risk. This put them at a disadvantage because it would make it more challenging
for them to adapt to changing markets and demands as they invested everything in the production
of raw henequen fiber. In 1897, Yucatecan elites again attempted to create a cordage plant.
Cyrus McCormick saw value in this factory and invested in its construction.103

He even

considered making this factory, La Industrial, a major supplier of binder twine to the United
States, but then realized this would be challenging because Yucatán was further away than North
American cordage factories.104 Unfortunately for the elites of Yucatán, in 1899, McCormick
decided to build his own factory in Chicago. Yucatecan plants could no longer compete with
these larger United States plants that were more convenient for United States buyers, and in
1903, La Industrial was forced to close.105 Even though these cordage plants were an attempt to
diversify the industry to ease the dependence on the United States, they ultimately failed and
could not compete with plants in the United States. The major source of profit was still raw
fiber, and henequeneros did not want to diversify and potentially harm their flow of income.
Around this same time, some Yucatecan elites also considered diversifying their exports
to include European markets. They saw the danger of solely relying on the United States and
believed that expanding to Europe would create a more stable market.106 The henequen market
tended to experience great fluctuations, and economic downturns in the United States effected
Yucatán negatively. The Panic of 1873, for example, took a toll on the henequen market and
elites believed that expanding the market to Europe would alleviate such problems resulting from
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a dependence only on the United States.107 In 1876, Yucatecan Governor Eligio Ancona placed
a bounty on henequen to Europe as he thought it would be wise to expand the market and not
only depend on the United States.108

This shows that even the Yucatecan government

understood the importance in diversifying. In 1879, the United States Foreign Minister to
Mexico, John W. Foster, learned of the bounty on European henequen and was upset since he
believed that it was “discriminating,” and would harm the supply of henequen to the United
States.

Even though this bounty had expired after two years, the United States saw the

consideration of shipping to Europe as a threat to its own market and twine supply.109 Most of
the henequen that ended up in Europe at this time was actually imported by New York and later
sold to Europe by United States companies. Many Yucatecans and Europeans were unhappy
with this arrangement and wanted to eliminate the United States’ role to reduce its stronghold on
the industry.110
Although there was a strong campaign to diversify the henequen market to Europe in
Yucatán, it was ultimately unsuccessful. Henequeneros had a stable source of income from the
United States and did not want to take the risk of losing money by shipping to Europe instead.111
Many hacienda owners realized such great wealth from the United States that it did not seem
practical to diversify to Europe.

Export firms also had previously existing contracts and

relationships with United States businesses and were worried about losing business by expanding
to Europe.112 Overall, expanding to Europe was not worth the risk to Yucatecans. While they
understood that dependence on the United States could be dangerous, since fluctuations in the
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market were felt strongly in Yucatán, they saw the United States as a mostly reliable source of
revenue.

The henequen industry was extremely profitable, which made many Yucatecans

hesitant to take the risk of harming their successful recipe.

Nevertheless, the lack of

diversification reinforced the dependence on the United States market, which led the United
States and certain individuals to gain even greater control of the industry over the next few
decades.

International Harvester: The Henequen Monopoly from 1902-1915
Dependence on the United States further increased with the consolidation of the
henequen industry in the International Harvester Company. Yucatecans had previously enjoyed
substantial control over the henequen industry, but others began to see the opportunity to make
profits. As a result, International Harvester would come to essentially form a monopoly over
henequen production and many elites of Yucatán were forced to relinquish their control over the
industry. Elites had explored the option of diversifying, but ultimately, they decided to remain
with what brought the most revenue. This lack of diversification allowed International Harvester
to easily gain control since the United States was responsible for almost all imports of henequen
fiber. By forming alliances with people in Yucatán, International Harvester came to control
prices and demand. It gained so much control that the United States Senate even investigated
complaints of an International Harvester monopoly after the company was dissolved in 1915.113
Elites had been hesitant to diversify because exporting raw henequen fiber to the United States
provided great revenue, but this ended up harming independent hacienda owners who became
indebted and bankrupted by International Harvester.
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The consolidation of the International Harvester Company had its roots at the end of the
nineteenth century. In 1898, Cyrus McCormick, who was responsible for the manufacture of
binders, signed a contract with Henry W. Peabody, a henequen importer with an office in
Mérida, in which he loaned Peabody a large amount of capital.

This contract also gave

McCormick the right to monitor Peabody’s purchases and transactions in the henequen
market.114 This contract between two powerful players in the henequen industry would later
include Governor Olegario Molina Solís of Yucatán, who was the most successful henequenero
during his time and would enforce International Harvester’s policies from Yucatán.

This

formation of a monopoly was a major implement of United States control over the henequen
industry.
In 1902, Molina founded Molina y Compañía, or Molina and Company, which reduced
his competition and forced down the price of fiber. As a result, some henequeneros were forced
into debt because they had expected higher fiber prices.115 By eliminating competitors, Molina
was able to acquire more plantations and control over the industry in Yucatán. Eventually,
Molina offered mortgages and credit purchases, had a hold on communications, infrastructure,
and banking, and controlled production and prices.116 His motto was “plant more henequen,”
and he encouraged Yucatecans to continue to grow henequen plants to uphold the success of the
economy.117

Also in 1902, Molina signed a contract with the newly created International

Harvester Company to be the exclusive Yucatecan henequen agent. International Harvester
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required him to drive down prices further in order to eliminate competition and keep henequen as
the best fiber option. As a result, prices for henequen generally fell between 1903 and 1911.118
Molina controlled the henequen industry from the Yucatán side, while McCormick
supplied the capital from Chicago, and Peabody was responsible for the exportation of the fiber.
Between 1900 and 1915, Peabody was responsible for 80 percent of all henequen shipments,
which shows the level of control this company had over the industry.119 International Harvester
supplied a line of credit to Molina and his family to continue expanding his holdings in the
industry, and as a result, Molina was able to invest when the economy was suffering. When
other henequeneros went bankrupt and lost holdings, Molina would purchase their haciendas
cheaply with the money supplied by International Harvester. In 1909 for example, International
Harvester granted Molina a $600,000 line of credit.120 By 1913, Molina owned 247,000 acres of
land in Yucatán and controlled 75 percent of the henequen trade. 121 This shows the extensive
control Molina gained over the industry, and it is evident that the United States had great power
as Molina was financed by International Harvester. As International Harvester was forming a
monopoly, Yucatán was becoming even more dependent on the United States as United States
interests were coming to control the industry.
Eusebio Escalante and Manuel Dondé, who were previously major players in the
henequen industry, both went bankrupt, which allowed International Harvester to become the
only body in control of the henequen trade. Dondé went bankrupt in 1894, during an economic
panic, and Escalante followed suit in 1907, as a result of another panic and the increasing control
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of International Harvester.122 The henequen market had previously been competitive, which had
allowed henequeneros and exporters more freedom and reduced their dependence, but
International Harvester eliminated such competition.123 During its control of the henequen
industry, from 1902 to 1915, International Harvester controlled 90 percent of the Yucatecan fiber
trade and in 1910 alone, it controlled 99.8 percent.124 The International Harvester philosophy
was to produce a large amount of henequen and sell it cheaply in order to eliminate competition:
between 1902 and 1911, henequen dropped from nine cents per pound to three cents per pound
due to International Harvester’s control.125 The Times-Picayune newspaper of New Orleans
describes the opinion of Dr. Victor Rendón, who was a representative of the Yucatán State
Commission: “so long as there was competition in Yucatan between the American cordage
manufacturers, the producers were able to make some profit from their crop.” 126

Rendón

testified against International Harvester, and he believed that profits were decreased as a result of
the forced down prices of henequen. International Harvester had effectively taken control of the
henequen trade, and henequeneros became dependent on the company. Although they had
always been dependent on the United States, henequeneros were now required to conduct
business through International Harvester, which added another level of dependence as they
became solely dependent on one specific company. International Harvester gained full control of
prices and the export of fiber, which left hacienda owners with little freedom of choice.
In 1912 and 1913, even Molina began to see the negative impacts of the International
Harvester monopoly. He saw the depressed prices as harmful to the Yucatecan economy and as
a result, he terminated his contract with the company.
122
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Montes, took his place as the Yucatecan connection to the company.127 International Harvester
continued its monopolistic control over the Yucatecan industry: in 1914, it consumed about two
times as much fiber as all of the other smaller manufacturers combined.128 Sterling Evans
compares the company to United Fruit Company since it essentially formed an empire in
Yucatán with its widespread control of production and pricing.129

Before International

Harvester, Yucatán’s henequen industry was unique from other Latin American export
economies, such as the “banana republics,” due to its autonomy. However, with the arrival of
International Harvester, Yucatán became completely dependent on United States interests, which
reflects a pattern of other Latin American export economies that became solely dependent on
United States corporations. The previously Yucatecan industry had become infiltrated by United
States interests and henequeneros became dependent on International Harvester.
The United States, while it still did not have ownership in Yucatán, gained great control
over the industry with International Harvester. Cyrus McCormick was offered to buy railroads
and large plantations, including Yaxcopoil, which was one of the largest henequen plantations
near Mérida, but he ultimately declined.130 He preferred to stick with his policy of indirect
control because in that way, he was able to continue to dominate the market without making
large, potentially risky, investments.131 International Harvester had such control and fame that
some investors even suggested calling a henequen zone “Ciudad McCormick,” but this was
never done.132 In 1912, International Harvester donated a substantial sum to the presidential
campaign of Woodrow Wilson.133 It is clear that International Harvester had great power and
127
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influence during its time, and it is evident that it came to control the henequen industry in
Yucatán. The development of this monopoly shows that the henequen industry was profitable
and desirable since United States interests saw benefit in gaining control.
While Yucatán became integrated into the world economy through the henequen
industry, the massive export trade did not result in equal development. The monopoly eliminated
competition, elites collaborated together to control society, and labor was coerced.134 As a result,
lower classes were unable to experience the benefits as elites did. In addition, with the formation
of International Harvester, many henequeneros went bankrupt due to falling profits from price
reductions. Many American farmers, as well as Yucatecans, were unhappy with the International
Harvester monopoly because it controlled the entire industry, including imports and prices. 135
There was less freedom for henequeneros and American farmers with the extensive control
imposed by International Harvester. In Dr. Rendón’s testimony, he describes an International
Harvester agent bribing railway and telegraph employees to not allow independent producers to
obtain their own cars to ship their products.136

Assuming this was factual, it shows that

International Harvester did what was necessary to gain control over the henequen trade. Even
though the company never owned land in Yucatán, it still formed an almost imperialistic empire
in Yucatán.137 It forced its prices and policies on the henequeneros of Yucatán, and tailored the
industry in order to expand its influence and success. International Harvester gained great
control during its thirteen years, and this had a great impact on Yucatecan society. While
henequen remained popular and successful, it fell under monopolistic control and only a few
people could realize the profits.
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Conclusion
At the beginning of the henequen industry, Yucatán had been more autonomous and
profitable than comparable Latin American export economies.

However, by the twentieth

century, with the control of International Harvester, it became completely dependent on foreign
interests. While the growth of the industry reflected a turn to capitalism and brought immense
revenue to Yucatán, society did not progress in the same manner. Labor conditions were
abysmal and there was essentially a “plantation economy” in place.138 Nevertheless, Yucatán
had entered the world economy. Henequen became the second highest valued export of Mexico
during the 1870s and 1880s and Progreso became the second largest volume export port in
Mexico between 1872 and 1884.139 From 1873 to 1915, Yucatán went from exporting 31,000
bales of henequen fiber to 1.2 million bales of the fiber.140 Between 1880 and 1902, some of the
peak years of the henequen boom, almost 7 million bales of henequen were shipped out of
Yucatán and had a value of about $185,937,955.141 Elites who had turned to henequen after the
Caste War saw their product bring massive wealth to Yucatán as henequen realized unparalleled
success.
The henequen industry sprung from the Industrial Revolution and the rise of international
capitalism. The insatiable demand for binder twine in the United States wheat industry resulted
in the expansion of henequen production. Henequen was the best material for binder twine, and
Yucatán was the only supplier of the henequen fiber. Therefore, the United States came to
depend on the Yucatán for its binder twine material. The great success and expansion of the
wheat industry caused the henequen industry to succeed as well. However, the primary focus on
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henequen in the Yucatán resulted in a great dependence on the United States as the United States
was its main source of revenue with its henequen purchases. The almost exclusive focus on
henequen production caused Yucatán to demand food from the United States on several
occasions because it could no longer provide for its growing population. It is evident that even
though the United States depended on Yucatecan fiber for wheat production, the entire economy
of Yucatán was centered on henequen, which created a much stronger dependence on the United
States. Elites and the government of Yucatán attempted to diversify the industry to reduce this
dependence, but ultimately to no avail. They were worried that a downturn in the United States
economy, or the lack of demand for henequen fiber would devastate their economy, but
henequeneros were not willing to take the risk of slowing their flow of revenue.
The henequen industry was so profitable that United States interests sought to gain
control, and eventually International Harvester formed a monopoly over henequen production
and imports. This ended the previously existing structure of industry, which was mostly in
Yucatecan hands, and gave control instead to United States entrepreneurs. As a primarily
foreign run business, International Harvester essentially created an empire in Yucatán since it
gained such great control by setting prices and nearly eliminating competition. Merchants and
henequeneros lost the freedom to trade on their own and were forced into the web of
International Harvester, which increased Yucatecan dependence on the United States as foreign
interests had effectively gained control of a previously Yucatecan industry. Even though there
were never any haciendas owned or operated by foreign investors, International Harvester still
had control over the industry, although more indirectly.
Many elites believed that henequen would never lose its popularity and during World
War I, henequen exports would reach record highs with the major demand for United States
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wheat. However, later events would stimulate the downfall of the golden age of henequen. The
Mexican Revolution, which had begun in 1910, reached Yucatán in 1915, and worried the
United States, which began to seek alternatives to henequen fiber. The Yucatán’s dependence on
the United States would prove disastrous since it did not have another viable option to stimulate
its economy. Chapter Four will discuss the decline of the henequen industry and examine the
factors that were responsible for the substantially reduced demand for the fiber.
The henequen industry also had an incredible influence on the society of Yucatán. The
entire class structure was reinforced by the focus on henequen. While elites enjoyed massive
wealth, advancements and profits did not reach the lower classes, who were essentially slaves on
the henequen plantations. Even though there existed great class disparity, certain areas of
Yucatán did benefit from the henequen boom as railroads and ports were created and Mérida was
modernized and beautified. Chapter Three will examine the profound impact the henequen
industry had on Yucatecan society during the time of the henequen boom.
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Chapter Three
The Impact of the Henequen Industry on Yucatecan Society: Elites,
Modernization, and Labor
1870-1915

Introduction
The concentration on the export of henequen fiber after the Caste War brought about
great changes to Yucatecan society.

In order to sustain the massive revenue from fiber

production, elites believed it was necessary for the state to tailor its society to the growth and
export of henequen. This dedication to the expansion of capitalism began to realize great success
for Yucatán in terms of profit and development. Yucatán had been one of the poorest states in
Mexico prior to the growth of the henequen industry, but henequen brought immense wealth to
the state. Elites made fortunes and lived extravagantly on their palatial estates in the wealthy
section of Mérida.

They gained substantial control of society in government and in the

development of infrastructure.

For example, the most powerful henequenero of the time,

Olegario Molina Solís, gained hundreds of thousands of acres on the Yucatán peninsula and was
governor of Yucatán in the early years of the twentieth century. As a stark contrast to the great
wealth obtained by the elites, impoverished laborers were bound to haciendas through debt
peonage. Due to demands for increased production, workers were subject to live in slave-like
conditions where they had limited rights and were subject to backbreaking labor.
While laborers struggled to afford basic staples of life, the revenue from henequen
allowed Yucatán to modernize with new railroads, ports, and other services and amenities. The
state poured resources into the development of railroads and ports, especially the port of
Progreso, in order to ensure the continued export of henequen. Mérida especially began to
reflect a “modern” city with paved roads, expanded education, and banks. According to an 1869
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article in the New York Herald, “it is the opinion of all the more progressive and enlightened
Mexicans that their country will become peaceful and prosper in proportion to the extent and
freedom of its intercourse with the United States.”1 Elites in Mérida sought to create a society
that resembled the United States, and the revenues from henequen allowed them to develop a
more modernized, and beautiful, capital city.
Over the latter half of the nineteenth century, public and private capital increased
substantially in the state of Yucatán due to the expansion of the henequen industry, which
allowed for spending on modernization projects.2 Yucatán saw modernization as the expansion
of capitalism and services and the development of a worldly city that would compare to other
prosperous Latin American cities. This increasing wealth brought a spirit of enterprise to
Yucatán and the “elevated level of affluence suddenly seemed possible to even the working-class
people in Mérida.”3

Yucatecan society was changing dramatically and people saw the

attainability of great wealth. In 1916 for example, henequen received a 53 percent return on
capital invested, and some of the wealthier henequeneros received around a 600 percent return
on capital.4 This incredible accumulation of wealth allowed elites to live in immense luxury and
keep up with the lighting and plumbing of the time. They had houses at their haciendas with
multiple pools, marble surfaces, and porcelain chamber pots.5
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These elites created a new wealthy class of Yucatán composed of henequeneros,
investors, merchants, bankers, and dealers.6 Many of them were recently wealthy and often were
not careful in their investments, which created debt. Toward the end of the nineteenth century,
the economy of Yucatán was based on credit. Henequen prices and the confidence in the
security of continued revenue caused henequeneros to invest substantially in capital and spend
on luxury goods.7 Since the main focus of the economy was on the export of henequen, the
entirety of society was dependent on henequen prices. 8

This dependence, which would

eventually prove disastrous, was especially evident when there were fluctuations in prices as the
entire economy felt the effects.
Modernization and the expansion of the Yucatecan henequen industry also brought
changes to land organization and industrial labor opportunity. Urbanization was part of the
modernization process in Yucatán as cities were expanding and absorbing smaller towns and
communities so that society as a whole would become more “modern.” Henequen haciendas
also expanded their holdings into smaller communities. While this initially provided labor for
some rural residents, they would quickly discover that the labor was challenging and binding. In
addition, new taxes, loss of land, and new political districts resulted in unrest among rural
communities and there are reports of some violence ensuing as a response.9 In addition to the
increased demand for henequen laborers, expanding haciendas also needed blacksmiths and
carpenters to work on machinery in case there were problems. As discussed in the previous
chapter, henequen machinery became more modern over the late 1800s with inventions of new
defibering machines. In order for henequeneros not to have to worry about the expenses of
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importing foreign parts for the machines, they employed blacksmiths and carpenters. 10 Many of
these professionals had shops at specific haciendas and some lived on the haciendas, so they
could be easily accessible should there be a machinery malfunction. 11 While there were very
distinct elite and labor classes, the expansion of henequen also led to the development of a
middle class. They played an important role in the henequen-based society as they provided
services to elites and contributed to the operation of the industry.
This chapter will examine the massive impact henequen had on every aspect of
Yucatecan society from the latter decades of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the
twentieth century. It will show how the successful and expanding henequen industry allowed for
great wealth and advancements in Yucatán. It will examine how elites, such as Olegario Molina,
became millionaires and took control of society. The influx of revenue from henequen allowed
elites to create a movement to beautify and modernize the city of Mérida in order for it to
become a more worldly city. This modernization also included a focus on the expansion of
railroads, ports, education, and banks. This chapter will then discuss the more negative side of
modernization efforts in Yucatán by examining the labor structure on the henequen haciendas.
Many refer to the henequen era in Yucatán as the “era of slavery,” and this chapter will show
how henequen laborers were bound to haciendas by debt and were treated abysmally. 12 This
chapter will argue that there were two sides to modernization in Yucatán: elites and cities
profited with wealth and advancements, but this modernization was backward for laborers who
were stuck in slave-like conditions on haciendas without freedom. This chapter will conclude by
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examining President Porfirio Díaz’s visit to Yucatán in order to highlight the extreme inequality
of these modernization efforts.

The Elites of Yucatán
Although the economic focus on henequen had begun some time earlier, it was not until
the 1870s and 1880s that elites began to accumulate large fortunes. 13 The profits from henequen
allowed hacienda owners to obtain power and elevated status in society. Over the last part of the
nineteenth century, these elites governed most of the wealth and land of Yucatán and worked
with foreign companies to build railroads and fix the exchange rate of henequen fiber. 14 While
foreign companies played a small role in the henequen industry, for the most part, the henequen
industry was entirely Yucatecan, which allowed profits to remain in the area. There was not a
need for foreign investment and foreign companies did not have holdings in the state, which
allowed Yucatecan elites to obtain substantial revenues.15
The henequen era elites were a fairly homogeneous group. They were often white and of
Spanish descent, and typically came from one of two categories: either they were born into
Creole families who were well-off before the development of the henequen industry and adapted
to the changing economic climate, or they used the import and export trade of henequen to obtain
new wealth.16 Many of the elites were part of the first category, and came from families that had
been wealthy and powerful during the colonial time.17 Although the Yucatán government was
13
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under liberal control during this period, as discussed earlier, the state was careful to protect the
interests of the elites to preserve the industry and revenue.18 Without the henequen industry, it
was likely that Yucatán would return to poverty, so the government believed it necessary to
protect those who brought wealth to the state. This gave elites great power in society and they
invested in railroads, banks, and other industries, which gave them even greater power and
wealth.19 Many elites lived in Mérida and were involved in politics, communications, and
commerce as well.20 They lived in stone mansions, enjoyed French lessons, and owned pianos.21
Elites had insatiable appetites for land and wealth, and sought to do what was necessary
to increase their fortunes. Early on in the henequen era, elites wanted the abolition of ejidos, or
communal Mayan lands, so they could expand their plantations.22 If land was made private, they
would have the opportunity to purchase it. When reform laws in 1856 divided up communal
lands among village leaders, henequen elites were quick to buy the land from the Mayans. The
impoverished Mayans saw the sale of their land as a way to earn some money and provide for
their families.23 However, this led to elites becoming even more wealthy and powerful. By
1907, there were nearly as many millionaires in Mérida as in the rest of Mexico combined.
According to a 1907 Kansas City newspaper, one out of every 2,000 inhabitants in Mérida was a
millionaire.24 Many hacienda owners lived lavishly in Mérida and left their haciendas in the
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hands of overseers, only visiting once in a while.25 Elites also had a high standard of living and
often purchased foreign goods and followed trends in foreign fashion.26
While there were many elites that were successful in the henequen industry, twenty to
thirty families of Mérida became known as the “casta divina,” or “divine caste.” These families
had incredible power and were said to have had control of 80 to 90 percent of the henequen
industry.27 In other states in Mexico, it was common for there to be one family with substantial
power, but in Yucatán, the power was divided up among the members of the casta divina.28
They were the people who were responsible for a majority of the investment in Yucatán and
owned a majority of the land in the state. The three hundred or four hundred henequeneros who
were not part of the casta divina were still powerful, but often faced financial challenges.29 Due
to the volatility of henequen prices and the seven year delay in harvest from initial planting,
many henequeneros were in debt.30 They also saw the profits of the henequen industry as
endless, and therefore borrowed substantial amounts of money on the future success of the
crop.31 These henequeneros also became accustomed to excessive luxury and spent beyond their
means to live fancy lifestyles.32
Eulalio Casares was one example of a wealthy henequenero who ended up bankrupt due
to poor investments and lavish spending. When the Yucatecan government divided up the ejido
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lands, Casares purchased 400 hectares from community leaders.33 He gained a prominent role in
society and loaned money to the Mérida-Valladolid railroad project.34 According to Allen Wells
in Yucatán’s Gilded Age, Casares had many large parties and even bought a tram car from North
America in 1893 to transport his guests.35 While Casares is just one example of a henequenero
who relied on the future success of henequen, many other henequeneros who were not part of the
casta divina also had the same fate. In 1895, Casares was forced to file for bankruptcy because
his henequen revenues could not keep up with the debt he had accumulated.36 Many times,
henequeneros became indebted to members of the casta divina, and as a result, the casta divina
families would earn even more money and gain property when the indebted henequeneros went
bankrupt. This, and the fact that the wealthiest henequeneros, such as Molina, were in control of
the government and trade, was frustrating for many hacienda owners.37 As the casta divina
gained more wealth and holdings, it became more challenging for other henequeneros to gain
prominent positions in society.

The Rise of Molina
Olegario Molina was the most powerful member of the casta divina, and was sometimes
known as the “King of Henequen Kings.”38 During the early to mid-nineteenth century, the
Molina family was not wealthy.39 The Spanish-descended family was originally a family of
tobacco farmers in Campeche until their plantations were harmed during the Caste War and by
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people with different political opinions. Unlike many other residents of Campeche, the Molinas
did not support its secession from Yucatán. After their crops were sabotaged again in 1857, the
Molina family decided to flee to Mérida for a new beginning. 40 Olegario Molina received a law
degree in 1866 and was appointed as the director of the Literary Institute in Mérida. Molina was
a liberal, and when the liberals won elections at this time, they appointed Molina to this
position.41 Some years later, Molina obtained an engineering degree and began to work as a
railroad engineer in Yucatán.42 He worked on the railroad from Mérida to Progreso in 1874,
which was a crucial project for henequen exports.43
Joining the Mérida-Progreso railroad project gave Molina the opportunity to gain
substantial power. The project was one of José Rendón Peniche, who owned an import and
export company. As an ambitious businessman, Molina established a partnership with him, and
once he earned substantial revenue, he bought out the business in 1887 and created Olegario
Molina and Company.44 The new company allowed Molina to work with North American
importers, as well as sell equipment, extend lines of credit, and offer loans and mortgages. It
was at this time that Molina began to establish his power in the henequen industry because he
was extending many loans to henequeneros. When they were unable to pay their debts, they
were forced to relinquish their property to Molina.45 As a result, Molina was able to gain
henequen lands little by little and Molina and Company began to earn profits. By 1903, Molina
had gained significant amounts of land and wealth.46
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As a powerful and well-known man in Yucatán, Molina ran as the liberal candidate for
governor and won. He occupied the role of governor from 1902 to 1908. 47 As governor, Molina
believed it was his job to create a “modern Caribbean capital,” and began many construction
projects.48 Although he still retained substantial control in the henequen trade as governor, he
also oversaw the state’s social, economic, and political life and was often known as “el
constructor,” or “the constructor.”49 Like many other elites of Yucatán, Molina wanted the area
to be modernized and gain a more prominent position in the world. He donated large amounts of
his own money, and even his first year salary as governor, to projects that would make Mérida
into a modern world city. As governor, Molina achieved success in building a hospital, an
asylum, a theater, and a more modern prison system.50 He also focused on combating diseases
and protecting the environment from deforestation.51 During his time as governor, Molina also
served as President Díaz’s Minister of Development, which shows Molina’s dedication to
development and modernization.

Molina symbolized Díaz’s mission to modernize Mexico

through his success and policies, and although Yucatán was somewhat autonomous from the
central government, Díaz saw Molina’s Yucatán as one of his great successes.
As the most wealthy and prominent henequenero, Molina used his power to gain the
governorship of Yucatán. As henequeneros went into debt, Molina obtained even more land and
continued to profit from his henequen plantations. By 1913, during the time of International
Harvester, Molina owned 247,000 acres of land on the Yucatán peninsula and was in control of
75 percent of the henequen trade.52 Molina’s family also became successful and powerful:
47
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several of Molina’s sons-in-law made successful investments and purchased large henequen
plantations. Avelino Montes, a son-in-law of Molina, was in charge of Molina’s export house
during his time as governor, and eventually became one of the most powerful men in the railroad
projects of Yucatán.53 While Molina is one extreme example of henequen industry success, it is
evident that henequen brought great power and wealth to Yucatán. Molina not only controlled a
major portion of the henequen trade, but also controlled the government for a period of time.
Other henequeneros were very involved in politics and development as well, and this was only
possible as a result of the wealth accumulated from henequen production.
The Peón Family was another family in the casta divina that gained immense success
from the henequen industry. While Molina followed the pattern of elites who gained success by
joining the import and export business, the Peón family was wealthy before the establishment of
the henequen industry. They were a more typical Latin American elite family of Spanish descent
who owned large tracts of land. As henequen became a major industry of Yucatán, the Peóns
adapted their lands to grow henequen and were able to profit substantially.54 Unlike Molina, the
Peóns were not able to gain power in the government because they were conservatives at a time
of liberal control.55 However, several members of the Peón family were on the board for the
development of railroads, and they invested heavily in railroads.56 They also provided credit to
henequeneros and received lands when the henequeneros could not pay their debts. Like many
other henequeneros of the time, the Peóns purchased former ejido lands from Mayan
communities.57 While the Peóns were not as active politically, they gained substantial control in
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many other aspects of society, and are another example of successful elites who gained even
more wealth and power through henequen.
Although there was a previously established class of elites in Yucatán before the onset of
the henequen industry, henequen brought even more power and wealth to many elites. In
addition, there was a new wealthy class of people who had not been members of the upper class
before the henequen era. Olegario Molina is one such example of a man who used henequen to
gain exceptional power and wealth. Although he was known as the “henequen king,” many
others also found new opportunities in the henequen industry, and were able to invest and obtain
government positions. While there were many henequeneros who did not invest wisely and
became indebted to powerful figures such as Molina, for the most part, henequen brought
immense wealth to the elites of Yucatán and created a new class of wealthy hacienda owners
who became accustomed to living lives of luxury.

Henequen Brings “Progress and Modernization” to Yucatán
With the great influx of revenue to Yucatán as a result of the henequen boom, efforts to
modernize society began. Elites wanted to make their society a more modernized capitalistic
society based on more “modern” nations such as the United States. They wanted to prove to the
world that their state had become part of the world economy, and that they could construct a
worldly city.

Under President Díaz, between 1877 and 1911, there were many efforts to

modernize Mexico. In Yucatán, the government had the means to modernize from the success of
henequen, and began to construct railroads, telegraph lines, and hospitals. There was also a
focus on beautifying public spaces.58 A new public health system and new sanitation services
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were put into place that would show Yucatán’s advancement.59 During the early years of the
twentieth century, elites undertook large measures to combat malaria, typhus, and yellow fever. 60
In 1906, Governor Molina even launched a campaign to fight against yellow fever in Yucatán. 61
However, for the most part, modernization efforts were only realized in urban areas, since elites
did not concentrate on rural areas and haciendas.62 The goal was to convert the cities, especially
the capital city of Mérida, into modern, clean, and healthy places to live and conduct business.63
They believed that this would attract the attention of the rest of the world, whereas it was not
necessary to modernize the rural areas because they would not be in the limelight.
Elites were focused on agricultural and industrial modernization, and believed the state
should direct the economy. Private property was important as well for the success of the state. 64
While Yucatán was somewhat removed from the central government, President Díaz’s liberal
policies and way of thinking still reached Yucatán.65 Liberalist ideals were not present on
haciendas, but the ideas of freedom, private property, and laissez-faire capitalism were everpresent in the government of Yucatán. Many elites also believed that if Molina and other
members of the casta divina were successful, the rest of Yucatán would prosper as well. 66 The
success of henequen propelled Yucatán into the spotlight and became a model of modernization
for Díaz.67 Even though Yucatán often considered itself separate from the rest of Mexico,
Molina worked with Díaz, and both governments essentially possessed the same political ideals.
Díaz wanted Mexico to become a modern world power, and he believed that the success of
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henequen could help him achieve this goal. Molina and the elites of Yucatán wanted to establish
Yucatán in the world economy as well, and henequen was their way of doing so.
Education was also important to elites in modernizing their society. While hacienda
laborers did not receive much education aside from the production of henequen, other residents
in Yucatán saw an expansion of education. In 1857, there were twenty-one public primary
schools with less than 2,000 students, but by 1883, there were 225 schools with over 8,000
students.68 In addition, secondary and professional education advanced. By 1884, Yucatán was
the state with the fifth most secondary and professional schools in Mexico.69 Despite all of the
increases in education, the literacy rate was still low due to the many laborers on haciendas. 70
The overall expansion of education shows the effort by elites to create a more modernized
society with an educated citizenry. The revenues from henequen allowed the government to
build schools and hire teachers, and they felt that education was necessary to become a more
modern society.
As stated earlier, a goal of Molina was to create a modernized Caribbean capital city, and
aside from building infrastructure to support henequen, modernizing Mérida was a major focus
of elites. Throughout the henequen era, Mérida’s streets were paved and the city received an
entirely new sanitary system.71 Mérida also became the new economic center of Yucatán: it
became the center for commerce, finance, and transportation.72 Many new stores opened and
professionals migrated to open offices.73

According to Heather McCrea, the goal of

henequeneros was to increase production, but the main goal of the Yucatán government was to
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beautify Mérida to give Yucatán a new and improved image in the world.74

The state

government also focused on developing enterprise with incentives to expand the market and
stimulate investment, production, and trade.75

However, all of this expansion focused

specifically on henequen. As discussed in Chapter Two, the development of industry in Yucatán
was solely based on henequen, and all of these economic efforts were no different. Aside from
the beautification of the city to attract foreign attention, elites mainly catered to the needs of the
henequen industry in the modernization of Mérida.76
In developing Mérida, Molina and other elites wanted to prove to foreign capitalists that
their city had become a city with a place in the world.77 What before was a city of poverty, war,
and illness became an affluent and beautiful city.78 The street Paseo de Montejo was constructed
with stately, stone mansions for the elite henequeneros.79

The government contracted a

Philadelphia-based company to build sewers and byways in Mérida.80 Mérida became the first
city in Mexico to be completely lit by electricity, it had horse-drawn street cars to transport
visitors and elites, and streets were numbered scientifically.81

Many new gardens and

roundabouts were installed to increase the visual appeal of the city.82 Efforts of the government
and elites proved successful as European and American travelers began to take notice that
Mérida had become a more modern city.83 In addition, when President Díaz visited Mérida in
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1906, he was impressed, enthusiastic, and referred to Yucatán as an “integral part of the rapidly
modernizing Mexican nation.”84
Elites wanted to promote the culture of Yucatán as well to attract the interest of
foreigners. During the mid- to late-nineteenth century, Yucatán began to promote its arts, crafts,
industry, and agriculture to the world. For example, in 1865, when Empress Carlota visited
Yucatán, she was presented with an exhibition of elements of Yucatecan culture. 85 In addition,
Yucatán held an exhibition in 1879 with over five hundred exhibits of local Yucatecan
products.86 Finally, Yucatán participated in many fairs in the United States and Europe to show
its local products.87 This shows that the state government made a huge effort to prove to the
world that Yucatán had become a modern region in the world. These exhibitions show that
Yucatán was integrating into the world community, as well as the world economy. Henequen
allowed Yucatán the means and opportunity to gain recognition on the world stage, and elites
took advantage of this to promote Yucatán, especially its capital city, to the developed world.
Most of the other modernization that occurred in Yucatán was to promote and expand the
henequen industry. In order to facilitate henequen exports, it became necessary to construct a
system of transportation that could work well enough to keep up with world demand. Before the
construction of railroads, there were only narrow trails and paths.88 By 1890, however, Yucatán
had more rail construction than another state in Mexico.89 Two years later, Yucatán was second
only to the Federal District in the modernization of its railroad lines. 90 Many new roads and
railroads linked the towns and cities of Northwestern Yucatán to assist with the transport of
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henequen. There were new rail transportation routes between Mérida and Motul, Valladolid,
Izamal, Sotuta, and Ticul.91 By the 1920s, there were about 4,500 kilometers of rail lines in the
Northwestern region of Yucatán.92 Some tramcars were American-made, and some of the rails
were from French manufacturers.93 In order to function as a modern, capitalistic society, it was
necessary for Yucatán to have the supporting infrastructure. Railroads were cheaper, faster, and
more reliable than the previously established Maya truc system.94 The development of railroads
allowed Yucatán to more easily transport henequen to the ports.
While they were built specifically for the henequen industry, railroads also provided
employment and helped transport imports to Yucatán. Even though labor opportunities were
plentiful with the henequen haciendas, railroads provided another source of employment and
income.95 The development of the henequen industry allowed the railroad industry to prosper as
well, and helped make Yucatán a more modernized region with modern transportation.
Railroads also provided an easier way to transport goods coming from other regions of Mexico
or the world.96
Most of the railroads were located in the Northwest, where henequen was mainly grown.
However, in 1897, there was a movement to build railroads in Southeastern Yucatán. Molina
and three members of the Peón family were on the board of directors for these new railroads. 97
The efforts never proved fruitful, though.
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unnecessary and would take away henequen laborers.98

It is important to note that the

Southeastern rails would have been the first rail system built that would not provide direct
benefit to henequen.99 For this reason, they ended up failing, because many people did not see
the purpose of constructing railroads that would not benefit the most profitable industry. This
reinforces how dedicated Yucatán was to henequen, and only henequen.
The expansion of the henequen industry also led to the development of ports to facilitate
the export of henequen. Progreso was the major port that was built during the henequen era.
During the 1840s, people began to discuss that the Sisal port was too far from Mérida.
Therefore, Simon Peón and Juan Miguel Castro came up with the idea to build a more accessible
port.100 The government of Yucatán had tried to promote settlement in Sisal, but to no avail.101
In addition, by truc, goods took thirty-six hours to reach Sisal from Mérida, as opposed to twelve
hours to reach Progreso.102 The development of Progreso was halted during the Caste War, and
it was not until the henequen industry became significantly more successful that Progreso finally
opened in 1871.103 In 1870, the Yucatecan government had moved the customs house from Sisal
to Progreso.104 A railroad to Progreso, funded by the state and federal government, began
construction in 1875, and was completed in 1881.105 Progreso quickly became the major port for
shipping henequen to the United States.106 By 1900, it was the second largest volume export port
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in Mexico.107 It is evident that Progreso represents progress and modernization in Yucatán as a
result of the henequen industry as it became a main port in Mexico in less than thirty years.
While Progreso was the main port developed as a result of the henequen industry, other
ports were also created to support henequen exports. Some of these ports were constructed
simply for henequen exports, while some were converted from previously established fishing
ports.

San Crisanto, for example, was originally a fishing port later converted to export

henequen.108 Many ports were also created to export henequen to the port of Progreso, from
where it would usually be shipped to the United States. Four ports were specialized for shipping
to Progreso and they were linked to haciendas by railroads. 109 Elite hacienda owners often
owned the smaller ports and many were responsible for transforming them from fishing ports to
henequen ports.110
Overall, there was a massive effort to develop ports during the henequen industry to
make exporting as easy and profitable as possible.

The influx of revenue allowed the

government and elites to construct these ports to facilitate henequen exports. According to
Anthony Andrews, Rafael Burgos Villanueva, and Luis Millet Cámara, who studied the
development of Yucatecan ports, ports represent the “massive investment of labor and capital at
the height of the henequen industry.”111 Ports were crucial to the expansion of the henequen
industry and they were successful in reducing transportation costs to maximize henequen
profits.112 Therefore, the construction of these ports as a result of the henequen industry created
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a more modernized economy in Yucatán and allowed it to become a major center of import and
export.
Before the henequen industry took hold in Yucatán, there were no banks in existence in
the state. For that reason, loans to henequeneros typically came from New York banks or
wealthy elites. It was challenging for many henequeneros to find credit because so much was
required for the expansion of henequen plantations. However, in 1882, the Banco Nacional
Mexicano, or the Mexican National Bank, was the first bank to open in Yucatán, due to the
demand for credit.113 Seven years later, the first Yucatecan banks opened to provide credit to
henequeneros. In 1889, Banco Yucateco and Banco Mercantil de Yucatán were founded.114 In
order to support the expansion of the henequen industry, it was necessary to establish banks in
Yucatán that could provide credit to henequeneros. The economy became based heavily on
credit, which shows that banks aided the growth of industry. Even though the establishment of
banks was not as prevalent as railroads or ports, it demonstrates another way in which the
henequen industry helped modernize the state of Yucatán.

Yucatán’s “Era of Slavery”: Hacienda Labor during the Henequen Era
While elites were enjoying their wealth and luxurious amenities, the conditions that
hacienda laborers faced reflected a darker side of this modernization as workers were subject to
strenuous labor and often bound to haciendas by debt. There was such a great demand for
hacienda laborers in Yucatán that many rural community members, mostly Mayan, sought work
on haciendas. The modernization of Yucatecan society had a very different effect on the
hacienda laborers; while elites were prospering and developing society, laborers were stuck in a
113
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backward slave-like system on haciendas. Since they did not often venture away from their
haciendas, they were stuck in an ancient system and unable to benefit from the changing society.
While elites relied on their labor to modernize society, henequen workers were essentially slaves
as a result of the debt peonage system. The beautification of Mérida and development of
railroads and ports all came at the expense of these impoverished hacienda laborers.
In 1840, one-third of people lived on haciendas and ranchos in Yucatán, but by 1910, 75
percent of rural Yucatecan residents were living on haciendas.115 The division of labor on
haciendas before the henequen era continued into the henequen era as well. As stated earlier,
many hacienda owners lived in Mérida and only visited their holdings once in a while. As a
result, they left administrators, overseers, and foremen in charge of managing tasks and laborers.
These people were often given the task of disciplining laborers, and they tended to do so
harshly.116 After those in charge of haciendas, labor was divided into categories. Most workers
were known as “luneros,” which came from the term for laborers who only worked one day a
week on haciendas to pay their debts.117 They were then divided into “solteros,” or bachelors,
who were responsible for weeding and harvesting henequen; “muchachos,” or boys, who tended
to fiber and plant nurseries, and transported waste; and “reservados,” who were older men
responsible for cleaning the hacienda and fields.118 No matter which category a worker was in,
labor was very demanding and challenging and overseers were cruel.
As a result, many refer to the henequen era as “la época de esclavitud,” or the “era of
slavery,” in Yucatán. There was, and still is among scholars, a debate about whether the labor
system of Yucatán was one of slavery. Many writings and reports of the time discuss whether or
115
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not slavery existed.119 While it may not have been slavery in a literal sense, the labor system in
Yucatán could be seen as a form of modern, capitalist slavery. It is important to note, as will be
examined more in-depth later, that many laborers were not free to leave haciendas until their
debts were paid, which in many cases was impossible. Therefore, they were subject to endure
the cruelty of the overseers on haciendas. Violence was prevalent, and accepted, on haciendas.
The secretary of Yucatán’s henequen commission, Felipe Cantón, was quoted as saying that it
was necessary to beat workers to make them do their jobs.120 A Yucatecan proverb of the time
said, “los indios no oigan sino por las nalgas,” which means something like “the Natives [Maya]
do not listen except with their backsides,” implying that it was necessary to beat them into
compliance.121 As early as the 1870s, laborers began to protest their rights being taken away.
Conflicts and violence ensued as luneros were beaten and overseers were not paying wages.122
Many other characteristics of labor in henequen-era Yucatán reflect tendencies of
societies that have instituted slavery. In 1882, the government of Yucatán passed an agricultural
law (ley agrícola), which stated that if a worker escaped and another hacienda owner protected
him, that hacienda owner could be subject to arrest.123 Laborers often escaped due to the harsh
conditions, which gave rise to bounty hunters in Yucatán.124

Newspapers included

advertisements for laborers who had run away from their haciendas, and all laborers were
required to bring identification when travelling away from the hacienda where they were
employed.125 Some workers were even locked up at night so that they would not escape.126
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While many elites claimed that there was no slavery in Yucatán, the actual situation had a strong
resemblance to slavery. Luneros even often conspired to kill hacienda owners because they were
so unhappy and treated poorly.127
In addition to the harsh treatment by overseers and lack of freedom, the rasping and
harvesting of henequen fiber was tedious and backbreaking labor.128 Health problems and
injuries were prevalent, but workers did not have access to medical treatment. Henequen is a
rough, spiny plant, and its continued contact with skin often caused irritation and eczema among
laborers. The challenging manual labor led to many fractured or broken arms and legs. In
addition, carrying henequen leaves in the sun and heat of Yucatán was especially grueling.129
Between 1858 and 1881, an estimated 3,000 workers were killed or maimed while operating
henequen machinery.130

To worsen the situation, public health agents ignored hacienda

conditions and doctors were rarely present.131 Despite the modernization efforts in society,
healthcare on haciendas was virtually non-existent, so modernity was mainly limited to spaces
outside of the hacienda system. Conditions were unsanitary, and diarrhea was the leading cause
of death, especially among infants.132 Poor diets and the lack of sufficient food led to starvation
for many laborers, and suicide was not uncommon.133 Doctors and medicines were only present
on larger haciendas, and even then, they were not sufficient to treat the quantity of health issues
faced by laborers.134
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Despite the denial of slavery by Yucatecan elites, two travel writers journeyed to Yucatán
and reported their findings. Channing Arnold and Frederick J. Tabor Frost were British writers
who claimed, after their trip, that “Yucatán [was] rotten with afoul slavery” and compared it with
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which describes horrific slavery conditions in the
United States during the nineteenth century.135 Arnold and Tabor Frost also reported that
“Yucatán [was] governed by a group of millionaire monopolists whose interests [were] identical,
banded together to deny all justice to the Indians, who, if need be, [were] treated in a way an
Englishman would blush to treat his dog.”136 Finally, they observed that the Mayan laborers
were basically prisoners and that if they were given “freedom” from their work, they would not
know what to do. They say that the concept of freedom would be “too dazzling for their poor
atrophied eyes.”137 While these are strong claims, it is evident that conditions for laborers on
haciendas in Yucatán were very poor. Although elites were sensitive to the term “slavery,” in
actuality, their laborers lived in conditions that appeared close to slavery. The concept of
“freedom” described by Arnold and Tabor Frost gives the impression that it was unattainable for
laborers who were bound to the haciendas and forced to endure cruel treatment. These laborers
were so engrained into the slave system that they did not have the capacity to become a part of
the modernizing society. Their role was to allow elites to continue to exploit their labor to
develop their own society, separate from the hacienda system.

The Accumulation of Debt leads to a Lack of Freedom
The government of Yucatán and elites believed that slavery did not exist because laborers
were earning wages and free to leave haciendas at their will. However, with the establishment of
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the credit system on haciendas, laborers quickly became indebted and were then forbidden to
leave haciendas. While they were not purchased by hacienda owners as in other cases of slavery,
they still became bound to haciendas and were forbidden to leave. During the 1840s, hacienda
laborers were paid sixteen to seventeen cents per day in food and wages. They were given a
place to live, land to farm, animals, water, and firewood.138 Throughout the henequen era,
laborers at henequen haciendas were given rent-free housing, employment, income, food, land,
water, and credit.139 This was very enticing at the beginning, but credit became dangerous for
laborer freedom. In addition, they were paid very minimally, based on the area weeded or
amount of leaves harvested, and their food typically consisted of two tortillas, a bowl of beans,
and a plate of fish.140
Henequeneros created accounts for laborers at their haciendas, which was a manner of
social control because the laborers would instantly become indebted to the hacienda owners.
There were two types of loan accounts: “nohoch cuenta,” which was a large account, and
“chichan cuenta,” which referred to a small account. Nohoch cuentas typically were accounts
used for large events, most commonly weddings, baptisms, or funerals.141 In 1842, the clergy
increased the costs of these large events and laborers could no longer afford to pay without
borrowing money.142 Workers also used the large accounts for retirement funds, medical care,
and housing expenses.143 Most haciendas had a hacienda store, or “tienda de raya,” which was
another instance where credit was used as a manner of control. These stores often had goods that
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could be purchased in the town center, but they were usually less expensive.144 However,
laborers would purchase items on credit and become more indebted to the hacienda owners. The
state government even aided the hacienda owners in their increasing control over laborers. In
1839, a law was passed, which stated that workers could not leave haciendas until their debts
were paid off.145 An Agricultural Law of 1843 prohibited laborers from leaving haciendas
during the agricultural year, which also limited the freedom of the workers.146
On haciendas, it was very challenging, if not impossible, for laborers to come out of debt,
which inhibited their freedom.147 This was because laborers often accumulated massive amounts
of debt; for example, on Hacienda Yaxnic, which was just to the south of Mérida, the average
debt of laborers increased by 300 percent between 1876 and 1890. 148 In just two years, between
1878 and 1880, the amount of laborers in debt servitude in Yucatán increased from 16,362 to
20,767.149 Even though elites claimed that laborers had the right to leave haciendas, realistically,
they were accumulating huge debts and were unable to escape. For this reason, many people
claim that hacienda workers were enslaved since it was often impossible for them to pay off their
debts, which meant they were prohibited from leaving the hacienda at which they were
employed. Another consequence of low wages and high debt was the lack of a domestic market
in Yucatán. Around 1900, rural laborers were spending half to three-quarters of their incomes on
basic staples of life, mainly food.150 This meant that there was very little demand for goods in
Yucatán because the majority of residents could only afford to buy food. 151 While laborers were
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treated as if they were enslaved, chronic indebtedness forbade them from leaving the haciendas,
and they were therefore subject to slave-like conditions. Debt was another method of control for
the henequeneros, and it ensured their continued supply of labor and the laborers’ lack of
freedom.

Families and Women on Haciendas
As discussed earlier, haciendas were comparable to towns for the laborers since they
lived, worked, and shopped at the haciendas. Families of laborers lived with them at the
haciendas and often stayed at specific haciendas for many generations.152 They were rarely
separated because henequeneros encouraged family units and marriages so that laborers would
work harder in order to support their families.153 Following the same line of thought, marriages
were often prohibited to people outside of the hacienda.154 Henequeneros wanted to keep
laborers loyal to the hacienda, and by having a family there to support, it encouraged workers to
stay. When there were deaths, families reformed and joined with other families, and many
people became interrelated on haciendas.155 In this way, the society became more connected,
and laborers had stronger reason to remain where they were instead of moving to a different
hacienda.
In the family structure, men had the authority since they earned wages. Women had less
mobility and remained mainly in the home.156 It was very rare for women to work with the
henequen crop.
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retrieving water and firewood, making hammocks, and doing other household chores.157 They
were also expected to reproduce to create another generation of henequen laborers for the
hacienda owner.158 While women were often banned from manual labor in the fields, on the rare
occasion that they were needed, they were not paid for their work.159 Since men earned the
income, they had the power over the women, who were seen as having the lowest status in
hacienda society. The male laborers were subordinate to their overseers, and as a result, their
wives were subordinate to them.160 There were often cases where workers would beat their
wives due to frustration from the challenges of their job.161 Allen Wells refers to this as
“misdirected rage” since the laborers felt the need to exercise their authority somewhere, and
took out their anger on their wives.162 Women were also subject to the sexual impulses of men.
It was usually permissible for men to follow sexual urges in what Sterling Evans calls a “tyranny
of lust.”163 Sexual subordination was also used to show where power was located on the
hacienda. In what was known as the “First Night Ritual,” a henequenero or overseer would
invade a laborer’s hut and violate his spouse or daughter to show that he was the ultimate source
of power at the hacienda.164 The power structure was very clear on henequen haciendas. While
laborers were treated like slaves, their wives often experienced the effects of their anger and
frustration in the form of violence. Women on henequen haciendas had very few rights and were
under the control of both their husbands and their husbands’ overseers.
Mayan families were also required to comply with restrictions and did not receive much
education. In Yucatán at this time, much of the education was devoted to the expansion and
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success of the henequen industry, and as a result, laborers were mainly trained in henequen
production. Therefore, many people in Yucatán were illiterate.165 In addition, laborers were
required to wear specific types of clothing. They were not allowed to wear foreign styles as only
those of European descent could wear imported styles. Finally, workers and their families were
required to cut their hair a certain way.166 This shows the amount of control henequeneros had
over the laborers since the laborers had minimal rights and needed to comply with the stringent
demands of their overseers. Although hacienda owners claimed slavery was non-existent, their
rules and practices bear strong resemblance to a slave society.

Imported Labor
The henequen industry grew at such an exponential rate that it became necessary to
import laborers from elsewhere because Yucatán could not supply the amount of workers
needed. During the 1880s, elites began to discuss the option of bringing laborers from other
parts of Mexico and the world. They first talked about contracting African laborers and Chinese
laborers.167 For the most part, people were supportive of these ideas because it was necessary to
hire more workers, but recognized it would be expensive to transport them to Yucatán. In
addition, some elites were wary about the possibility of another race war after the experience of
the Caste War.168 In 1882, laborers from elsewhere in Mexico began to migrate to Yucatán to
work at henequen plantations.169 There was a great demand for the laborers, and they were eager
to find employment.
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railroads that would support henequen exports and during this period, railroad workers were
imported from China and Korea, as well as elsewhere in Mexico.170 However, Chinese and
Korean laborers had difficulty with Spanish, did not earn sufficient revenue to send home, and
felt like outsiders. In addition, they were not used to the agricultural techniques or harsh climate
of Yucatán.171 Therefore, while there was some importation of labor, for the most part, it was
more logical to look for workers closer to Yucatán.
The most prevalent hacienda laborers who were not Yucatecans were the Yaqui natives
from central Mexico. In 1880, the government of Sonora had confiscated hundreds of thousands
of acres from Yaqui communities due to the strong presence of natural resources on their
lands.172 However, the Yaquis were not passive and resisted the government with great force.
The government was spending large amounts of money in wars against the Yaquis, and it was
necessary to find a solution.173 During the early years of the twentieth century, Molina, as the
national Minister of Development, facilitated the transport of Yaquis to work as laborers in the
henequen industry.174 Both states benefitted from this arrangement: wars would subside in
Sonora with less resistance, and Yucatán would gain a larger labor force. Between 1905 and
1908, 15,700 Yaquis were transported to Yucatán.175 However, they were not used to the
humidity and diseases that were present in Yucatán, and two-thirds of the laborers died during
their first year in Yucatán.176 Some Yaquis tried to escape, but they were often forced into
marriage or bought by hacienda owners.177 Although non-Yucatecan laborers never constituted
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more than ten percent of the labor force, many haciendas came to depend on Yaqui labor because
there was such a labor shortage.178 The Yaqui situation also reflects a slave-like society as many
were rounded up and sold to hacienda owners. The conditions for the Yaquis were often as bad,
if not worse, than those of the Maya laborers, since they were not used to the climate and were
ripped from their homeland.

Labor Unrest in Yucatán
Some reports of Yucatán during the henequen era claim that Maya laborers were passive
and accepting of their situation. However, laborers did rebel and used many forms of resistance
against henequeneros.179

Violent events, such as assaults, robberies, and murder, occurred

occasionally on haciendas.180 There were even instances of murders of overseers and hacienda
owners. In 1873, for example, twelve laborers joined together and killed Manuel Rodríguez
Solís, who was the owner of Hacienda Kancabchén, a hacienda located between Mérida and
Cancún.181 While events like this were not very common, they still show the great unrest of the
laborers.
Fortunately for the henequeneros, revolutionary movements never took form because
laborers were isolated on their specific haciendas and could not create organized resistance.182
Nevertheless, there was a constant fear among elites of rebellions and uprisings, and as a result,
they increased the presence of police officers and bounty hunters. 183 Elites were also afraid to
imprison laborers because they felt it could create the potential for more revolts.184 However,
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rebellions tended to be short-lived and did not accomplish a great deal. For the most part, they
simply showed the frustrations and dissatisfaction of the laborers. 185 Since organized resistance
was not as common, workers tended to express their unhappiness in other ways; in addition to
treating women violently, suicides and alcoholism were present on many haciendas. 186 Overall,
it is evident that labor conditions on henequen haciendas were abysmal. Laborers were treated
poorly and were very unhappy, and many did not have the option to leave as a result of their
debts. However, they were unable to organize and form strong resistance since they were
isolated on their distinctive haciendas.
Gilbert Joseph poses an interesting question in Revolution from Without when he asks:
why were laborers treated so poorly if there was a labor shortage?187 Since there was such a high
demand for labor that it was necessary to import workers from other regions of Mexico and the
world, it would be logical for henequeneros to treat their workers well. However, Joseph gives
possible answers to his question, saying that the henequen market fluctuated frequently and it
was necessary to work laborers hard during the peak times to produce and export as much fiber
as possible. If laborers were ill or died during less crucial harvests, it would not affect the
hacienda, so it was important to use them to the fullest of their abilities. He also suggests that
the fact that many henequeneros were also in debt made it impossible for them to provide
services they could not afford.188 The capitalist system in Yucatán created a credit system that
was utilized by all classes, and it ultimately created a dangerous system of debt not only among
laborers, but among henequeneros as well.
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Whatever the reason for poor treatment, it is clear that laborers were treated like slaves
and did not have the freedom to escape from their situation. Henequeneros had the power on the
hacienda, especially with the credit system, and laborers had no choice but to continue harvesting
henequen. While elites of Yucatán deny that there was ever slavery present to this day, the
henequen system was verging on a slavery system. Workers were beaten, occasionally worked
to death, and forbidden from leaving the haciendas by the law. Even though the elites would
show President Díaz a happy and prosperous labor body, it is clear that they had gone well out of
their way to hide the atrocious labor conditions that were present on most haciendas.

President Díaz Visits Yucatán
The incredible success of the henequen industry, but also rumors of slavery in Yucatán,
captured the attention of President Porfirio Díaz. He decided he would travel to Yucatán and
experience the labor situation for himself; his visit would be the first presidential visit to
Yucatán.189 The success of the henequen industry brought about national attention, and in
addition to the labor question, Díaz was also interested in seeing the development of the state due
to his strong interest in the modernization of Mexico. Channing Arnold and Frederick Tabor
Frost also documented Díaz’s visit to Yucatán, in addition to their descriptions of the slave-like
conditions. According to Arnold and Tabor Frost, Díaz was not concerned about the welfare of
the Mayans, but he was concerned about the image of Mexico and therefore felt it necessary to
investigate the accusation of slavery.190 Elites were worried about Díaz’s opinion since Díaz had
heard of the existence of slavery, and they wanted to prove to him that the rumor was false.
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The elites of Yucatán decided that it was necessary to do everything possible to hide the
labor conditions from Díaz on his visit. They cleaned the roads and lined them with flowers and
hosted huge feasts and banquets. One single dinner cost $60,000. Some henequeneros even
went into debt to distract Díaz from the slave-like labor conditions.191 The effort by elites to hide
the actual conditions on the haciendas shows that they were embarrassed and were aware they
were committing wrongdoing.

However, the president observed energy, perseverance, and

“tranquil happiness” in the faces of laborers he saw.192 Arnold and Tabor Frost state that the
workers had to say they were happy, or else they would suffer severe punishments.193 While
Díaz was not overly concerned with the welfare of the laborers, he was likely relieved to not see
first-hand evidence of the slave-like system.
On his tours, Díaz witnessed clean, furnished laborer huts with amenities, such as sewing
machines. It was likely that the huts were constructed specifically for Díaz’s visit so that they
would appear to be of the highest quality.194 In addition, the furnishings that were supposedly
present in these huts were returned to stores after Díaz returned to Mexico City.195 While Díaz
did not see anything to validate the claim that slavery existed in Mexico, he was sheltered from
the atrocious conditions by the elites. It is evident that the elites felt they had something to hide
from Díaz, and they went into debt in order to preserve the positive image of Yucatán and the
henequen industry.
As a major force of modernization in Latin America, Díaz was interested to see the
progress made as a result of the henequen industry. His visit culminates what was the essence of
modernization in Yucatán. The modern society – the beautification of Mérida, the wealth, the
191
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railroads, and the ports – was built on the backs of the laborers who could not even comprehend
the concept of freedom. The injustices against laborers were hidden from Díaz because elites
knew that the conditions they faced were unacceptable. Elites focused on modernization and
development to impress Mexico and the rest of the world, and this became even more evident in
Díaz’s visit. They were aware, as Díaz likely was as well, that the laborers lived in a slave-like
system, and went to every measure possible to cover up what was happening on haciendas.
While there was substantial modernization in society, laborers were unable to witness the various
changes going on in their state. Their lack of freedom secured their position on haciendas and
elites were able to prosper on a world stage at their expense.

Conclusion
The massive changes to the Yucatán peninsula brought about by the prosperity of
henequen reflected two sides of modernization: while on the one hand, elites prospered and
enhanced their society and infrastructure; on the other, laborers were subject to harsh, slave-like
conditions on haciendas. Henequen prices drove the economy, and the desire to maximize
profits and become part of the world market was strong among elites. The profits of henequen
created a new wealthy class in Yucatán who wanted to modernize society. Elites became
incredibly wealthy and were involved in every aspect of society. Many gained immense power
and control with their investments and in the government. Olegario Molina is one example of
someone who used the henequen industry to accumulate great wealth and power as he was able
to obtain significant land and win the governorship. Although there were many henequeneros
who were not careful with their investments, Mérida was still home to many millionaires whose
fortunes came from henequen.
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While laborers were stuck in slave-like conditions on haciendas, Yucatán, and especially
Mérida, received many modernization efforts. Mérida received paved roads, new sanitation
systems, gardens, and mansions. It became a city that foreigners recognized as a modern world
city. The henequen industry also brought about expansions in education and the creation of
railroads, ports, and banks. Even though many efforts were to promote the henequen industry,
they still show how henequen brought modern changes to Yucatán. The economy became so
focused and dependent on henequen that changes in world demand, and changes to the industry
brought about by the Mexican Revolution, would eventually result in disaster.
As elites enjoyed their luxuries and amenities with new advancements in society, at the
opposite end of the social structure were the laborers. While there is still debate about whether
or not slavery existed in Yucatán, it is evident that laborers were treated horribly and did not
have many rights. They were beaten and easily became indebted. Because they could not afford
to pay off debts, they were often bound to haciendas for life and subject to brutal labor. Labor
was in such high demand that henequeneros imported labor from elsewhere in Mexico and the
world, but these workers usually faced even greater challenges and many died as a result of the
climate and unfamiliar diseases. Rumors of slavery were so serious that President Díaz made a
visit to Yucatán to see the situation himself. However, elites put great effort into hiding the true
conditions from him, and he left Yucatán feeling that it had become a modernized state with free
and content laborers.
Although the Mexican Revolution began in 1910, Yucatán did not begin to see changes
to society until 1915. Revolutionary leaders saw the control elites had over society, especially
with the formation of International Harvester, as discussed in Chapter Two. They decided to
expand rights to laborers and raise the price of henequen. However, the Revolution, which
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would become the first challenge to the “modernity” that had been established in Yucatán,
ultimately had a negative impact on the henequen industry, and Chapter Four will examine how
the wealth and profits of the henequen era would become only a memory of the past.
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Chapter Four
The Death of King Henequen: Revolution, Competition, and Dependence
1915-1930

Introduction
In 1915, Yucatán’s golden age of henequen began its rapid decline. What had previously
been a flourishing, profitable industry for the elites of Yucatán would become only a nostalgic
memory. The imagery of this downfall, which began with the onset of the Mexican Revolution,
was captured in a 1924 Cleveland Gazette article:
With changing political and labor conditions, the henequen industry has been passing
through a serious crisis. Owing to the lack of labor and lack of funds for operation, many
of the plantations have been permitted to grow up to weeds and brush. The machinery
and equipment on these temporarily abandoned plantations deteriorate more quickly than
if used…1
While the author of this article states that the plantations were “temporarily” abandoned, many,
in fact, would never be used again. The abandoned haciendas scattered throughout Yucatán,
with their rusted machinery, would become symbols of a past glory that would be impossible to
recover.
Henequen had enjoyed unprecedented success during the end of the nineteenth century
and early twentieth century, but a series of events in the second decade of the twentieth century
would lead to the downfall of the successful henequen empire in Yucatán. At the beginning of
the twentieth century, Yucatán enjoyed 90 percent of the binder twine market, but by the end of
the 1930s, Yucatán would only claim 30 percent of the market. 2 This rapid demise of the
industry was a result of a variety of factors stemming from the arrival of the Mexican Revolution
in Yucatán. The increased presence of the state in the economy and its reforms caused the
1
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United States to seek competing fibers, and Yucatán’s exclusive focus on the export of raw fiber
would ultimately bring devastation to the state.
At the beginning of the 1900s, elites had remained confident about the future of
henequen, and did not predict the downturn in the industry. A Yucatecan authority was quoted
in a Kansas City newspaper in 1907 saying that “the stability of the henequen industry
[was]…greater than that of any bank.”3 As late as 1910, this great confidence in the industry
remained. An article in the Colorado Springs Gazette from September of that year stated that the
future of henequen was assured and that “in view of the constantly growing demand for binder
twine caused by the vast new acreage being planted to wheat…the future demand for this staple
article seems destined to far outstrip the ability of the planters to supply it.”4 This false sense of
confidence among elites distracted them from diversifying the industry and pursuing other
options. Even though demand for henequen fiber did remain strong throughout World War I, it
was evident that the reign of henequen was coming to an end.
World War I was actually the most successful period of the henequen industry, but the
great revenue brought in from that period was not enough to stop the ultimate downfall of the
industry.

During the war, there was a rise in henequen prices and demand for the fiber

skyrocketed.5 This increase in demand resulted from the heightened demand for United States
and Canadian grain.6 In the United States, “wheat will win the war” was a popular catch phrase
during wartime as the United States supplied wheat to other allied powers.7 In addition, Turkish
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forces had blocked the export of wheat from Russia, so there was a huge demand for North
American wheat in Europe since its supply had been interrupted. This resulted in a large
increase in prices of wheat from the United States.8 President Woodrow Wilson encouraged
farmers to increase their wheat production in order to supply Europe’s wheat demand, and by
1919, wheat farms had increased by 13.5 million acres in the Midwest.9 Between 1890 and
1918, wheat harvests in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming had
increased by 176 million bushels. This great increase in wheat production resulted in a massive
demand for binder twine from Yucatán.
However, while wheat and henequen were prospering during World War I, the Mexican
Revolution had arrived in Yucatán, and the new leaders sought to reform the society that had
been established by the henequen industry by increasing labor rights and the role of the state in
the economy. The attempt by the new government to preserve the henequen industry while
reforming society ultimately proved unsuccessful. The industry had been built on a system of
slave-like laborers and powerful elites, and without that structure, it would come unraveled. This
caused severe damage to the industry as the United States reacted to revolutionary changes by
seeking alternative options so as to reduce its dependence on the seemingly unstable Yucatán.
President Wilson and other United States officials realized that sole dependence on Yucatán for
fiber could prove disastrous, and the Revolutionary agenda caused them to worry about their
continued supply of fiber.10 In addition, after World War I, Europe was more successful in
growing wheat, and no longer needed to import wheat from the United States.11 Even though
henequen realized great success during wartime, the henequen industry machine had begun to
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fall apart. Wilson and others had begun to seek alternatives, and World War I would become the
final hurrah of the henequen industry.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the dependence on the United States that developed during
the henequen boom would prove detrimental to Yucatán. While the United States sought to
reduce its dependence on Yucatecan fiber, Yucatán had no other sources of revenue to explore
aside from its export of raw fiber to the United States. It is not until the decline of the henequen
industry that it becomes evident how disastrous dependence could be. The economy of Yucatán
was solely focused on the production of henequen, and most of the societal and technological
advancements presented in Chapters Two and Three were for the sole benefit of the henequen
industry. Therefore, the Yucatecan economy and society did not really develop outside of
henequen production. The lack of diversification and the inability to switch to a different
resource left Yucatán with no other option once there was less demand for henequen fiber. Elites
had invested everything in henequen, and when the United States turned to other fiber options,
Yucatán would quickly become one of the poorest states in Mexico.
This chapter will examine how the arrival of the Mexican Revolution and its interference
in the Comisión Reguladora del Mercado del Henequén, or Henequen Market Regulatory
Commission, inadvertently changed the structure of the henequen industry in a way that would
lead to its downfall. Although the revolutionaries’ changes were well-intentioned, Yucatecan
elites and the United States did not react well to them due to increased prices, labor costs, and
instability in Yucatán. This chapter will then discuss the competition to henequen that increased
during this period as a result of substitutes and new technologies. It will also show how
reactions to the goals of Governor Felipe Carrillo Puerto’s socialist government would further
influence this demise. Finally, it will examine how Yucatecan dependence on the export of raw
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fiber would result in disaster for the economy and society. This chapter will argue that the
Mexican Revolution, as a result of its goals to reform Yucatecan society by expanding rights to
lower classes, while diminishing the power of elites, was primarily responsible for the downfall
of the henequen industry. It will also point to increased competition and strict dependence on
henequen fiber as contributing factors to Yucatán’s launch into poverty.

The Mexican Revolution Comes to Yucatán: The Challenge of Reforming Society while
Preserving Industry
According to an elite and educated Yucatecan in an interview on September 7, 1927, the
Revolution was the sole cause of the decline of the henequen industry of Yucatán. He said that it
was necessary to return to a more conservative government in order for the henequen industry to
regain its prior success.12 The Mexican Revolution arrived in Yucatán in 1915, five years after it
had begun in Mexico City. Yucatán had always been somewhat autonomous, and the location of
the state and its prosperous economy helped delay the Revolution’s arrival.13 At first, the
revolutionaries were liberal constitutionalists who were focused on state intervention in the
economy and labor rights.14 They sought to preserve the henequen industry because they saw
how crucial it was to the economy of Yucatán, but it proved impossible to impose their changes
and maintain the success of the industry at the same time. Laborers had experienced slave-like
conditions, and the revolutionaries sought to give them more rights. This “freeing” of the labor
class, in addition to land seizures, angered elites and disrupted the smooth operation of henequen
production. In addition, the governmental unrest in Yucatán worried the United States, who
began to seek fiber from other sources.
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In September 1914, President Venustiano Carranza appointed Eleuterio Ávila as military
governor of Yucatán in order to establish the revolutionary presence in Yucatán. Ávila outlawed
the slave-like labor system on haciendas and cancelled workers’ debts so that they would have
the freedom to live where they pleased.15 However, henequeneros and International Harvester
rebelled against Ávila’s changes and were able to restore their previous way of life. 16 Yucatán’s
unwillingness to cooperate with the Revolution angered Carranza, who said that “Yucatán
need[ed] to obey,” and sent General Salvador Alvarado to Yucatán with troops. Although
Alvarado entered with his forces, the Revolution in Yucatán was nonviolent: the only casualties
were a few criminals and soldiers who had committed crimes.17 However, Alvarado enforced
land divisions and freedoms, which satisfied laborers, but infuriated elites.18
Carranza and Alvarado both saw the importance of the henequen industry and sought to
preserve the industry and increase prices of henequen.19 Alvarado was devoted to his success in
Yucatán and wanted to make Yucatán a successful populist and socialist revolutionary
movement.20 He sought to make henequen profits bring greater benefits to Mexico, instead of to
the United States and other foreign interests, such as International Harvester.21 One of his main
goals was to interfere in the Comisión Reguladora del Mercado del Henequén, and turn it into an
organization that focused on bringing the benefits of henequen exports to Yucatán. 22 In order to
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preserve the henequen industry, Alvarado recognized the importance of defending capitalism and
preserving private property, but he also sought to increase the wages of laborers and put an end
to their indebtedness.23 In his efforts to clean up the hacienda structure by increasing labor rights
and confiscating excess hacienda lands, Alvarado interfered with the way of life of henequeneros
and interrupted their successful production system.24 It was a great challenge to expand labor
rights, while at the same time preserving the henequen industry and its success, and it proved to
be impossible.
A book published by the Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán states that the Revolution
gave way to an anti-henequen production structure as revolutionaries sought to increase labor
rights and allow everyone to have access to capitalism and participate in the economy. 25 This
shows that the slave-like system of labor in place prior to the Revolution had allowed for the
prosperity of henequen, and the expansion of labor freedom was detrimental to henequeneros.
Between August 1915 and February 1917, the cost of production of henequen fiber increased by
more than double due to the increase in wages for workers. In addition, laborers worked fewer
hours, children were prohibited from working, schools were opened, and working conditions
improved.26 These changes were positive for laborers, but henequeneros were forced to pay
higher wages and provide more services to the workers. Since these changes occurred during the
henequen boom of World War I, henequen was still profitable since demand was so high, but
once that demand subsided, it would be impossible for henequeneros to continue supporting
labor rights and produce henequen profitably at the same time. While Alvarado did not work to
mobilize laborers because he understood their crucial role in henequen production, the expansion
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of rights still proved burdensome to hacienda owners.27 In addition, many Yaqui workers who
were still in Yucatán were returned to Sonora with the onset of the Revolution, so henequeneros
were also unable to exploit their labor.28
Aside from increasing rights to laborers, the Revolution also brought land reform to
Yucatán.

Elites, including the Molina and Peón families, were required to give up lands

beginning in 1915.29 Alvarado did not like the extreme wealth of the casta divina and wanted to
relieve them of their power over society.30 He wanted to divide up lands among workers, and he
allowed many rural workers to become small landowners.31

He created some ejidos and

distributed land among lower classes.32 In addition, the Constitution of 1917 returned land to the
people from whom it had been taken during the expansion of the henequen industry. 33 Although
henequen lands were often not part of redistribution, elites were still angered to lose their lands
and were less willing to cooperate with Alvarado’s wishes.34 While some henequeneros learned
to work with Alvarado, many were against the Revolution and resisted its authority.35
One major effect of the Revolution on the henequen industry was that it worried
President Wilson and United States officials that they would not receive their henequen supply.
Since the United States had come to rely on Yucatecan fiber, fiber manufacturers had a huge
influence on Washington.36 The instability in Yucatán as a result of the Revolution and the great
dependence on henequen fiber would encourage the United States to seek other fiber sources. In
27
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1915, Wilson was worried that the Mexican Revolution would disrupt the fiber supply and sent a
gunboat to Yucatán to establish a United States presence.37 That same year, Carranza imposed a
blockade on the port of Progreso in order to prevent the import of arms to rebels in Yucatán and
to stop illegal deals between International Harvester and henequeneros.38 During this blockade,
200,000 bales of already-contracted fiber were blocked. The incident appeared on the cover of
the New York Times, and Wilson was not amused.39 The blockade was very worrisome to the
United States because it depended on Yucatecan fiber, mainly from International Harvester, and
Carranza had blocked the import of henequen to the United States. Wilson issued an ultimatum
to Carranza to remove the blockade after fiber was prevented from entering the United States,
and Carranza complied as he did not want the United States to intervene in the situation.40
Although Carranza supported the henequen industry, Wilson still saw him as a threat to
the henequen economy and the import of henequen to the United States.41 Upon the arrival of
the Revolution, rumors spread that Carranza would destroy and burn henequen crops in order to
reform society. While there was never any evidence of this, it worried Wilson as well. 42 In his
efforts to take power from International Harvester, Carranza had blocked railroads from
International Harvester. This thwarted fiber supplies to the United States as the blockade had,
and at Wilson’s request, Carranza reopened the railroads to International Harvester. 43 The land
reforms that had angered elites at the onset of the Revolution in Yucatán were stopped by
Carranza in 1916, and it is likely that this decision was influenced by the United States. 44
Carranza relied on Wilson for diplomatic favors, arms shipments, and supplies, and he likely did
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not want to anger Wilson.45

Wilson clearly had some influence over Carranza since he

convinced him to lift the blockade and reopen the railroads, but nevertheless, Wilson did not
entirely trust Carranza and believed his actions to be harmful to the henequen industry.
As the Revolution entered Yucatán and henequen export and production was threatened,
the United States became more aware of its dependence on henequen. When henequen exports
were suspended, the wheat industry suffered.46 Even though Alvarado sought to protect the
henequen industry, the instability of the market under the revolutionaries caused the United
States to seek substitutes for henequen, which will be addressed in further detail later in this
chapter.47 According to the book about the henequen industry published by the Universidad
Autónoma de Yucatán, the Revolution did not produce new social relations or strengthen the
economy. It simply arrived and interfered with the successful recipe for henequen production,
which would result in disaster for the economy of Yucatán.48 While there is no doubt that
revolutionary changes were positive for laborers who suffered in conditions that bordered on
slavery, the structure of society had been ideal for henequen production. It was impossible to
restructure the industry on Yucatecan terms since the United States already had substantial
control, and would not respond well to the necessary price increases that would result from
expanded labor rights. As a result, the state’s disruption to the industry brought about by the
Revolution would cause irrevocable damage and eventually cause Yucatán to fall into a state of
poverty.

45

Ibid., 132.
Evans, Bound in Twine, 120.
47
Ibid., 119-20.
48
Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán, Arquitectura de las haciendas henequeneras, 24.
46

130
The Reestablishment of the Comisión Reguladora del Mercado del Henequén Causes Further
Damage to the Henequen Industry
The Comisión Reguladora del Mercado del Henequén was created in January 1912 by
the legislature of Yucatán as a response to the control International Harvester had over the
henequen industry. It was a cooperative organization of henequen farmers under the control of
the state government, but it was unable to gain success due to International Harvester’s control of
the industry.49 However, with the arrival of the Revolution and efforts to decrease the power of
International Harvester, the Comisión Reguladora was reestablished by Alvarado in November
1915 in an effort to ensure that all profits were going to farmers. 50 International Harvester had
driven prices so low that henequen planters were unable to find buyers in New York, and were
forced to sell at International Harvester’s reduced prices.51 Therefore, the Comisión Reguladora
sought to take over the monopolistic control of International Harvester and raise the prices in
order to allow henequeneros to earn more profit. An article in the Washington Herald in 1917
said that the people of Yucatán had become sensible and eliminated the middle man.52 This was
a result of the reestablishment of Comisión Reguladora and Alvarado’s mission to increase
profits. Even though this organization was beneficial to many henequeneros who were able to
earn higher profits, it damaged the henequen industry because prices were raised, and the United
States responded by looking for alternative products. United States purchasers had become
accustomed to the low prices under International Harvester and did not appreciate the increase in
prices under Alvarado.
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The presence of the Comisión Reguladora represented the transition between economic
liberalism and state intervention.53

Previously, International Harvester and powerful

henequeneros had full control of the market and labor.

However, with the arrival of the

Revolution and the Comisión Reguladora, this stronghold was loosened by the state. The casta
divina, which Alvarado resented, was not included in the Comisión Reguladora to allow other
henequeneros to have the chance to earn more revenue.54 The Comisión Reguladora was created
with investment from United States and Canadian banks.55 According to the Times-Picayune, in
1916, a $10 million loan was given to the Comisión Reguladora by New Orleans banks. This
newspaper goes on to say that this loan was not in the best interest for the United States because
it allowed for fiber prices to increase. While it would help henequen farmers, it was not in the
interest of wheat farmers as fixed prices were eliminated and henequen prices returned to
competitive levels.56 As a result of these changes, Henry Peabody’s export business was forced
to close in 1915 because 90 percent of henequeneros had signed contracts with the Comisión
Reguladora.57
The Comisión Reguladora guaranteed that hacienda owners would sell their henequen
and would forgive debts if they sold all of their fiber to the Comisión Reguladora for a five-year
period.58 If they failed to complete the contract, they were required to pay a fee, and they were
required to report all of their acquisitions and sales to the Comisión Reguladora.59 Nevertheless,
they were given more opportunities with the organization that sought to replace the casta divina
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and International Harvester with its own monopoly. Alvarado saw Comisión Reguladora as an
opportunity to join henequeneros together to rebel against the established monopolies so that
they could have more control of prices and the opportunity to earn profit. It is evident that
Alvarado believed it was very important to maintain the henequen industry through his
reestablishment of the Comisión Reguladora, but the effects of his organization would alienate
United States buyers with high prices.
Although the United States had supported International Harvester even though it was
essentially a monopoly, Congress went after the Comisión Reguladora with claims that it had
monopolistic power. The United States government cited that the prices of henequen were high
and that buyers had no option but to buy from the Comisión Reguladora.60

International

Harvester essentially had controlled the entire henequen market, but prices were so low that it
did not seem to bother the United States. However, the United States would continue to fight
against the power of the Comisión Reguladora. Congress held hearings and sought to disband
the monopoly.

Dr. Rendón, who worked for the Comisión Reguladora, testified that the

organization increased revenue for Yucatecan farmers, reduced debt peonage, earned money for
schools, and promoted development of services.61

In addition, even though United States

farmers were paying five cents more per acre with the increases in 1916, they were earning
several dollars more per acre for their grain crop.62 Congress, however, was more preoccupied
with the increases in prices for wheat farmers and ruled that the Comisión Reguladora was in
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fact a monopoly.63

Luckily for Alvarado, the United States government did not have the

authority to call for the breakup of his monopoly.64
Even though the United States could not take power from the Comisión Reguladora, the
Senate did recommend that United States farmers begin to seek twine from alternative sources.65
Prices were still high in 1918, and United States Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover
suggested a food embargo on Yucatán until prices were reduced.66 This was ineffective because
there was a huge harvest in 1918 and farmers did not have enough twine without the supply from
Yucatán.67 This also demonstrated to the United States how dependent it was on Yucatecan fiber
as it could not survive a harvest without its supply of henequen. Events like this worried Wilson
and United States officials and further encouraged them to seek fiber from other sources.
Although International Harvester’s monopoly had been eliminated with the establishment
of the Comisión Reguladora, the company still had control of henequen purchases in the United
States.

However, in 1919, International Harvester stopped purchasing henequen from the

Comisión Reguladora due to the high prices. The United States had purchased enough fiber in
1918 for both the 1918 and 1919 seasons, which made this embargo possible. This resulted in a
large supply of unsold henequen fiber in the hands of the Comisión Reguladora.68 The inability
to sell fiber caused the Comisión Reguladora to be unable to pay the henequeneros, who became
angry. Henequeneros in Yucatán began to agree with people in the United States that the high
prices of henequen could be detrimental. If the United States was not purchasing any fiber,
henequeneros would not earn any revenue.69
63

Evans, Bound in Twine, 170.
Ibid.
65
Joseph, Revolution from Without: Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States 1880-1924, 153.
66
Ibid., 160.
67
Ibid.; Evans, Bound in Twine, 172.
68
Evans, Bound in Twine, 173.
69
Joseph, Revolution from Without: Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States 1880-1924, 164.
64

134
In April 1918, Yucatecan elites formed the Asociación de Hacendados Henequeneros, or
the Henequen Hacienda Owner’s Association, to express their complaints to President
Carranza.70 In addition, an angry mob stormed Governor Castro’s home, who had become
governor after Alvarado. The mob burned down his house, killed his son, and could only be
broken up by federal forces.71 Laborers were not getting paid because the Comisión Reguladora
was unable to pay their employers, and as a result they became violent and rebelled. 72 In
response to the disaster brought about by the United States’ embargo on the Comisión
Reguladora, Carranza liquidated the organization in July 1919.73 The decrease in fiber demand
after World War I and increased competition inhibited the success of the henequen industry, and
the high prices of the Comisión Reguladora could not be sustained.74 Although Alvarado had
good intentions when he reestablished the Comisión Reguladora, it would eventually contribute
to the downfall of the industry. He sought to expand the role of the state in the henequen
industry to liberate the labor force and keep profits for the people of Yucatán. However, the
success of the industry was built on a model of slave labor and powerful elites who controlled
the economy. Once Alvarado and the state interfered and increased the prices of henequen, the
United States reacted to these high prices by pursuing other fiber options.

Competitors to Henequen Gain Traction in the Fiber Market
The hard fiber market has always been a volatile market with strong competition.75
Henequen had fortunately been able to find success in the market at a time when competitors
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were more expensive and not as readily available. However, its time at the peak of the fiber
market had come to an end with the arrival of the Revolution. The United States had always
known that it was dangerous to depend solely on the Yucatecan crop and had begun to explore
other options early on. In 1892, the first sisal plants were brought from Yucatán to Florida, then
to German East Africa. By the 1920s, there were many flourishing sisal plantations in Kenya.
Sisal fiber was stronger than henequen, and labor costs were much cheaper in Africa, especially
with the wage increase in Yucatán as a result of the Revolution.76 International Harvester and
other companies also explored other options for henequen plantations. For example, in 1907,
people of Brownsville, Texas saw that henequen had brought fortunes to Yucatán, and attempted
to establish henequen plantations.77 However, this never really took off, but it reflects the efforts
in the United States to find other suppliers of twine.
The instability in Yucatán with the arrival of the Revolution, as discussed earlier in this
chapter, caused Wilson and others to look to other sources of fiber as well. During the halted
exports in 1916, International Harvester began a hemp farm in North Dakota and attempted to
establish sisal plantations in Florida.78 Canada had also begun to experiment with growing
fibrous plants.79 While these efforts never ended up being fruitful, it shows how dedicated the
United States was to seeking other sources of fiber. It had become evident that the United States
had a strong dependence on Yucatecan fiber, but that it could not rely on Yucatán as a result of
Alvarado’s unpredictable government. Therefore, it was crucial to find substitutes.
During the early 1920s, Yucatán again tried to increase the prices of henequen fiber, this
time by withholding fiber from the United States so that scarcity would lead to higher prices.
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This greatly angered the United States and caused them to increase purchases from elsewhere in
the world. In 1922, International Harvester and other fiber buyers began purchasing fiber from
East Africa, the Philippines, and Java.80 A Cleveland Gazette article from July 5, 1924 stated
that with increased imports of henequen from Cuba, sisal from East Africa and Java, and manila
from Philippines, there was “little danger of a serious shortage of fiber for binder twine during
the coming season.”81 Even though a majority of fiber still came from Yucatán at this time,
other markets were gaining more popularity in the United States, and the United States was
diversifying its fiber supply. It would not be long before Yucatán would lose its monopoly to
become one of many fiber suppliers.
The 1920s saw a massive decrease in Yucatán’s presence in the fiber market. The United
States had begun to look for other fiber suppliers as a result of the Revolution, and these other
suppliers began to gain more traction in the market during this decade. In 1920, East Africa
supplied one-fifth of the world’s fiber, not including Yucatán, but by 1930, it was the number
one hard fiber producer aside from Yucatán.82 By 1927, Asia and Africa made up 50 percent of
the world’s hard fiber production.83 The United States began to buy more fiber from these
sources, and therefore needed less from Yucatán. In addition, East Africa began to supply
Europe’s twine market after World War I. In 1923, East Africa produced 20,000 tons of sisal,
but in 1931, it produced 83,000 tons.84 This shows how much success East Africa had gained in
the fiber market in a short amount of time, and this also took away from Yucatán’s share of the
market.
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Diversification of the fiber market continued to increase during the latter part of the
1920s as well. In 1900, almost 100 percent of hard fibers in the world had come from Yucatán,
and during World War I, 88 percent still came from Yucatán. However, even though slightly
more than 50 percent of hard fibers in the world came from Yucatán in 1929, it was the first year
that East Africa, Java, and Cuba would produce more fiber than Yucatán.85

In 1929,

International Harvester also began to experiment even more with fibers in the Philippines,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Africa. A sisal plantation in Cuba
began producing 2,500 tons of fiber starting at this time as well.86 Finally, the onset of the Great
Depression further diminished the demand for Yucatecan fiber. There was a decrease in demand
for wheat since people could not afford to buy an excess supply. As a result, there was less
demand for twine.87 Market prices had dropped during the 1920s and 1930s with increased
competition, which led to less henequen planting in Yucatán because henequeneros were used to
such high prices.88 At the end of the 1920s, not only had competition to henequen increased
substantially, but overall demand for fiber had decreased. This led to a massive decline of the
henequen industry in Yucatán from which it would be impossible to rebound.
In terms of market factors, the ultimate nail in the coffin of the henequen industry was the
invention of the combine. Although it was invented in 1838, it did not gain popularity until the
1920s on wheat farms in the United States.89 At first, combines were expensive, so farmers were
hesitant to buy them. Binders were considered a safer investment, but eventually, the advantages
of the combine outweighed those of the binders.90 Combines were much faster than binders and
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required much less labor.91 However, combines did not require binder twine, which greatly
reduced the demand for fiber from Yucatán.92 During the 1920s, combines became incredibly
popular: in Kansas for example, 4,700 combines were in use in 1920, but by 1925, there were
over 24,000 in use.93 Between 1926 and 1930, there were 117,000 combines sold in the United
States.94 The increased popularity of this equipment provided yet another reason for the United
States not to purchase fiber from Yucatán. While the combine was not direct competition to
henequen, it provided competition to the once-popular machine that had required binder twine.
During the latter half of the 1910s and the 1920s, competition to henequen increased
exponentially, and hurt the Yucatecan market substantially. Initially, Wilson and United States
officials were wary of dependence on Yucatán’s fiber, which prompted the exploration of other
options and the development of industries in East Africa, Asia, and elsewhere in Latin America.
Even though Yucatán retained a large percentage of the industry, it had lost great revenue and
prosperity due to the arrival of competitors. While it is likely that competitors would have
entered the market without the influence of the Revolution, Wilson’s search for alternatives
accelerated their success. Finally, the popularity of the combine further harmed the henequen
industry since it could harvest wheat without using binder twine. The decade of the 1920s
proved devastating to the henequen industry as it had quickly lost its market stronghold. The
instability in Yucatán at the time of the Revolution, which promoted the United States’ quest for
substitute fibers, coupled with the state’s strict dependence on the United States and the failure to
diversify, resulted in a lack of additional economic opportunities. Therefore, it was detrimental
to the economy of Yucatán when other fibers gained popularity.
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The Continued Decline of the Henequen Industry under Felipe Carrillo Puerto and the Socialists
By 1920, it was evident that the henequen industry’s glory was falling apart under the
revolutionaries. The United States’ search for substitutes as a result of Alvarado’s monopoly and
high prices brought ruin to the henequen industry. However, the arrival of Governor Felipe
Carrillo Puerto in Yucatán further promoted the goals of the Revolution and reactions to his
policies continued to damage the already declining henequen industry. While Carrillo Puerto did
attempt to save the industry, his policies were ultimately ineffective since they angered elites.
Carrillo Puerto was more of a socialist than Alvarado, and was even more focused on the rights
of the laborers. Alvarado had been removed from power by Carranza in 1918 after he had lost
popularity among the people of Yucatán, especially henequeneros.95 The henequen industry had
continued to be successful under Alvarado, but this was because he was in control during the
World War I boom. After he left office, the industry declined substantially.96
Carrillo Puerto took office in 1922 after several interim governors. 97

Similar to

Alvarado, his main goal was to increase the role of the state in society and take power from elites
and distribute it among laborers. He had always looked out for the working classes, and
considered himself a populist and a socialist.98 He even claimed that his government was the
first Socialist government in the Americas.99 Like the revolutionaries, Carrillo Puerto recognized
the importance of henequen industry success and wanted to preserve the industry to the extent
possible.100 However, he attempted to mobilize laborers, and was seen as the man who saved the
Maya from slavery.101 He also broke up some, though not many, henequen plantations into
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ejidos, so that lower classes could be in possession of land.102 Finally, in order to preserve what
was left of the henequen industry, he sought to diversify by forming his own Comisión
Exportadora, or Export Commission. Henequeneros were very opposed to Carrillo Puerto’s
government as he mobilized their laborers, took their lands, and interfered with their business.
Even though Carrillo Puerto understood the importance of the henequen industry, his changes to
society generated anger among the henequen elites, who ultimately rebelled. They were so
accustomed to the previous structure of industry that they could not accept Carrillo Puerto’s
changes, which added to the decline since they were no longer as willing to cooperate in
henequen production.
In an attempt to relieve tension among henequeneros, Carrillo Puerto increased loan
amounts for hacienda owners and named a henequenero ally, Tomás Castellanos Acevedo, to
lead the Comisión Exportadora.103 However, planters remained unhappy with the changes he
had imposed. Carrillo Puerto also angered elites by expanding education in Yucatán. While the
expansion of education is typically positive, his educational system taught socialism, which
angered the more conservative elites. Many sent their children away to be educated as a
result.104 In response to Carrillo Puerto’s actions, some planters rebelled and removed fields
from production. If they could afford to, they stopped planting and laid off workers.105 The year
after he became governor, Carrillo Puerto was overthrown and kidnapped right before enacting a
major land reform. There is a theory that hacienda owners had a hit out on him because he ended
up being killed the following year.106
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Despite his abbreviated role as governor of Yucatán, Carrillo Puerto had added to the
devastation of the henequen industry, in part because his additional land reforms and
mobilization of laborers angered elites, who rebelled and decreased the supply of henequen. The
increased instability in Yucatán encouraged the United States to continue to seek other sources of
fiber. While the henequen industry had already been in decline, the reactions to Carrillo Puerto
and his socialist reforms helped to accelerate this decline during the 1920s. Even though Carrillo
Puerto did understand the importance of henequen and attempted to diversify to save the
industry, elites were unhappy with his changes in society and did not respond to his wishes.
Carrillo Puerto was correct in his understanding that the henequen industry should be diversified,
as the exclusive dependence on the export of raw fiber to the United States would bring
devastation to society in Yucatán.

The Devastating Results of the Dependence on a Monocrop Economy on Yucatecan Society
Once henequen became popular and profitable, elites had focused solely on the export of
raw henequen fiber. As discussed in Chapter Two, this fostered a strong dependence on the
United States since the henequen industry was the only major source of revenue for Yucatán.
Therefore, with the arrival of the Revolution, the subsequent reestablishment of the Comisión
Reguladora, and the increased competition in the hard fiber market, the Yucatecan economy
would face disaster. They had no other options to maintain their prospering economy, and the
decline of the henequen industry resulted in poverty and economic disaster. It is important to
note, however, that while the Yucatán became dependent on the United States, regions can only
sell products that others demand. The law of comparative advantage states that specific areas
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specialize in one or a few different products.107 Yucatán is an example of this: it built an
industry around the United States’ demand for fiber, but unfortunately, it would lose its
comparative advantage to competitors early in the twentieth century. This section will focus on
the consequences of the dependence on the United States, and why the Yucatán was unable to
stimulate its economy once the henequen industry began its decline.
An article in La Prensa newspaper in 1930, titled “The Yucatán Henequen Industry is
going through a Crisis of Life or Death,” stated that “the situation is chaotic because the
Yucatecan does not have any other product other than the [henequen] fiber, and does not have
any other market than that of the United States.”108 It had become strongly evident to Yucatán
and the United States that the henequen industry was going through a crucial period, and the lack
of henequen industry success would lead to disaster in Yucatán. As discussed in Chapter Two,
despite evidence that the Yucatán had become increasingly dependent on the United States
market, elites continued to focus exclusively on the production of henequen.

Instead of

producing sufficient staple crops, henequen took precedence.109 According to elites, if they
could buy corn somewhere else, why should they reduce production of the more profitable
henequen crop?110 While this was a logical argument at the time, it did not foster economic
expansion or self-sufficiency.
As a result of dependence on the United States, the economy of Yucatán failed to develop
aside from henequen. Henequen is a key example of the staple crop model in Latin America:
many regions focused specifically on one single export staple, which did not allow the economy
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to diversify from their one specialized crop.111 As a result, many Latin American regions are
negatively affected when their single crop loses popularity, and they are left with no other
options to improve their economies. According to historian Lawrence Remmers, in Yucatán
there was “dependence and skewed growth without development.”112 In order to sustain longterm growth, it is necessary for a region to have the ability to shift resources.113 However, it is
evident that Yucatán did not possess this ability since it had focused its entire economy on
henequen. Once dependence had been established, it was difficult to reverse, and Yucatán could
not respond to the new competitors or unanticipated changes in the market.114 In Yucatán,
henequeneros were often short on cash and focused on traditional methods of production, so
there was a lack of resources to adapt to change and henequeneros became tied to the market.115
For the most part, henequen production did not undergo great changes over time, and elites, for
the most part, chose the method that made them most comfortable and that earned the most
profit.

This made diversification and development nearly impossible in Yucatán.

When

revolutionary changes arrived, the already established economy was unable to adjust to the new
labor rights, and it had become too late to diversify since Yucatán had invested everything in
henequen.
As a result of the dependence on henequen, Yucatecan society failed to develop outside
of the henequen industry. Most of the changes discussed in Chapter Three – the railroads, the
ports, and the banks – were all for the advancement of henequen production. Almost all
advancements in infrastructure had been solely for the benefit of henequen.116 In addition, since
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International Harvester had such great control of the industry, there were no resources to build
more schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure that was not related to the henequen industry.117
For the most part, education in Yucatán was focused on the henequen industry, which meant that
people did not have experience or education in other fields, which added to the challenge of
development aside from henequen.118 The lack of a domestic market further inhibited the ability
to develop the economy as there was no possibility for the emergence of a new industry. 119 In
1918, Yucatán only had produced 30 percent of its food supply.120 Society was tailored to the
success of henequen, and without it, poverty would ensue and Yucatán would be unable to
rebuild its economy.
The great dependence on henequen would also be detrimental to henequeneros as many
went bankrupt due to risky investments on the future success of henequen. Many henequeneros
had invested in the long term success of their henequen crops as they borrowed large sums of
money in confidence that henequen would remain profitable years into the future.121 In addition,
many henequeneros invested in haciendas, railroads, and ports, all of which depended on the
success of the henequen industry.122 As a result, they could not afford to pay back loans with the
fiber they had promised, which resulted in indebtedness and bankruptcy. 123 These hacienda
owners had millions of dollars of debt as a result of real estate mortgages and crop liens. Even
though Alvarado relieved much of their debt when he created the Comisión Reguladora, they
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were still broke.124 The decline of the henequen industry meant that producers did not have the
fiber they had promised to pay their debts with, and as a result, they were forced into poverty.
They had invested only in the future of henequen, and when it was failing, they did not have
anywhere else to turn.
The 1920 to 1921 season of production was the first time that Yucatán’s earnings were
negative. The state lost almost 25 million pesos in export earnings, which continued to devastate
the region.125 In 1921, political violence became prevalent as laborers went hungry due to the
inability of henequeneros to pay salaries. There were rebellions, and even some murders of
hacienda administrators, foremen, and laborers.126 During the 1920s, elites made a desperate
attempt at diversification. While they had considered diversifying the industry at the end of the
nineteenth century, they never followed through since it seemed illogical to stray from the
successful recipe of the export of raw henequen fiber. However, this time they began to
advertise the use of henequen for carpets, drapes, tapestries, hammocks, bags, and rope.127 The
industry was not designed to produce these goods, and it was impossible to regain henequen’s
previous glory.

Yucatán was left with no alternatives to remain part of the international

economy once henequen had substantially declined.128 The dependence had resulted in disaster
and poverty for Yucatán, and it was too late to seek alternatives since the entire economy had
been dedicated to the production of raw fiber.

During the boom, elites had not pursued

diversification of the industry, and the downfall of henequen in Yucatán demonstrates how
detrimental sole reliance on a specific export crop can be.
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Henequen Revenues and Exports, 1918-1922
Year Revenues (USD) Tons of Henequen Exported
1918 91,000,000+
n/a
1919 37,581,495
141,414
1920 30,184,291
154,249
1921 11,878,348
100,905
1922 6,192,557
63,979
Figure 4.1 (from Joseph, Revolution from Without, 250)

Conclusion
The arrival of the Mexican Revolution in Yucatán marked the beginning of the end of the
success of the henequen industry. Carranza and Alvarado, while recognizing the importance of
maintaining the henequen industry, imposed changes to society that did not allow for the
continued success of henequen. Yucatecan elites and the United States did not react well to their
revolutionary changes, which accelerated the decline of henequen. The industry was built on the
back of a slave-like labor system, and the extension of rights to workers harmed profits due to an
increase in prices and labor costs. Most importantly, the instability of the industry under
Alvarado worried President Wilson. The only reason henequen continued to prosper under
Alvarado was the massive demand created by World War I. However, the United States had
already begun searching for alternatives to the once-popular Yucatecan fiber due to the
instability of Alvarado’s government. East Africa and Asia became major raw fiber suppliers,
and with the new popularity of the combine, henequen was no longer in high demand.
While the Revolution, unlike many other revolutions, did not bring violence to Yucatán,
the goals of Carranza and Alvarado to “free” laborers and raise henequen prices resulted in
problems for the henequen industry. Henequeneros had to pay higher wages and were unable to
maintain their high levels of profit. In addition, land reforms further angered elites who lost land
as a result of Alvarado’s redistribution. The unrest in Yucatán and rumors that Carranza was
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opposed to the henequen industry made the United States realize how dependent it was on
henequen. In an effort to lower prices, the United States could not even maintain a food
blockade against Yucatán because its demand for the fiber was so high. Wilson and other
officials worried about this dependence, and began to seek alternative sources of fiber.
The reaction to the state’s intervention in the henequen industry with the reorganization
of the Comisión Reguladora del Mercado del Henequén added to the decline. While Alvarado’s
intentions were positive as he sought to bring power back to the henequeneros of Yucatán, the
increase in prices under the Comisión Reguladora increased the anger of the United States.
Congress considered the Comisión Reguladora to be a monopoly and urged wheat farmers to
purchase fiber from other sources.129 The high prices imposed by the Comisión Reguladora
caused the United States to purchase less henequen fiber, which resulted in the halting of
payments to henequeneros and laborers.

Eventually, the Comisión Reguladora had to be

liquidated by Carranza since it could not properly sustain the henequen industry. The Comisión
Reguladora further alienated the United States, which continued to seek fiber from other parts of
the world.
In an effort to reduce its dependence on Yucatecan fiber, the United States began to
purchase more fiber from East Africa, Asia, and other regions of Latin America. Even though
efforts to develop fiber production in the United States were unsuccessful, in the 1920s,
International Harvester began to purchase more fiber from non-Yucatecan producers. In addition
to the increase in competing fibers, the demand for fiber decreased as well. After the boom of
World War I, there was less demand for wheat, which resulted in less demand for twine. The
onset of the Great Depression further decreased demand for wheat, and subsequently, for
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henequen. Finally, the invention of the combine would add to the depressed demand for fiber as
it did not require fiber in wheat harvests.
By the time Felipe Carrillo Puerto became governor of Yucatán, the henequen industry
was already in crisis. However, his goal of remedying the inequalities in society through state
intervention brought further damage to the industry. His labor mobilizations, land redistribution
efforts, and creation of the Comisión Exportadora angered both elites of Yucatán and the United
States. Henequeneros rebelled against Carrillo Puerto and ceased to plant and harvest henequen
when possible. While the henequen industry was already in rapid decline, Carrillo Puerto’s
changes to society only made things worse. The further instability in Yucatán and increased
prices of henequen encouraged the United States to continue seeking different sources of fiber.
Although the henequen system of production was an antiquated one that required what was
essentially slavery, it had allowed Yucatán to earn great revenue.
During the 1920s, it became evident that the dependence on henequen and the United
States led to economic disaster for Yucatán. While the beginning of this dependence was
examined in Chapter Two, it becomes clear how it would lead to disaster in the third decade of
the twentieth century. Yucatán had invested everything in the development and expansion of the
henequen industry and as it began to lose its profits, elites did not have anywhere else to turn. In
1917, a Yucatecan stated that “henequen is the only thing to which the inhabitants of Yucatán
can dedicate themselves.”130

Despite evidence that dependence could be disastrous during

economic panics and declines in prices, elites continued to invest only in henequen. 131 As a
result, Yucatán would begin its plunge into poverty as henequeneros could no longer pay their
debts or their laborers.
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Even though the Revolution brought devastation to the henequen industry, this decline
may have been inevitable.132 It was only a matter of time before other fiber options became
available, and it just happened that Alvarado was there to accelerate the process. His time as
governor encouraged the United States to look elsewhere for fiber, but this may have eventually
occurred naturally.

The United States had always been aware that dependence could be

dangerous, and Alvarado’s policies simply made this clearer. In addition, the Revolution did
bring many positive changes to Yucatán as it ended the slave-like labor conditions and gave
more rights to laborers. It also created thousands of schools, health reforms, and sanitation
services.133 So, while it accelerated the decline of henequen, it is also important to consider that
it may have been positive for Yucatecan society overall.
After the 1920s, the henequen industry faced continued challenges.

The Great

Depression continued to affect society, which reduced the demand for wheat and henequen. 134
During the 1930s, a huge drought in the Great Plains, as well as windstorms, the Dust Bowl,
grasshoppers, cold winters, and long, hot summers, caused further damage to the wheat
industry.135 Therefore, wheat farmers did not have need for a large supply of binder twine.
Between 1934 and 1940, President Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico redistributed large amounts of
land, which resulted in the confiscation of 61 percent of henequen fields.136 Events like this
resulted in poor relations between henequeneros and the government, and continued fueling the
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decline of the henequen industry.137 By 1938, Yucatán only made up 23 percent of the fiber
market.138
The days of unlimited wealth and prosperity in Yucatán had come to an end. While there
are many factors that contributed to the decline of the henequen industry, the changes brought
about by the Mexican Revolution were the catalysts that would bring about an era of poverty in
Yucatán. The Revolution highlighted the societal problems in Yucatán, and the expansion of
laborers’ rights increased henequen prices and made it a less desirable product in the United
States. Elites had no other successful product to turn to, and haciendas were abandoned at a
rapid rate. The massive plunge into poverty resulted in the need for assistance from the federal
government, and Yucatán would become dependent on federal subsidies.139 For what had once
been a significantly autonomous region, this new form of dependence reflects the serious
desperation of the post-henequen economy.

In less than ten years, the glorious henequen

industry experienced a very swift and painful death, and Yucatán could no longer fend for itself
without the assistance of Mexico City.
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Conclusion
A trip to Yucatán today reveals remnants of a past glory that was the henequen industry.
Almost a century after the beginning of the decline of this industry, businessmen have sought to
turn abandoned haciendas into hotels and restaurants. There is a major focus on tourism today as
visitors can tour haciendas, and visit mansions and cenotes. Hacienda Sotuta de Peón, in the city
of Tecoh, claims to be one of the last fully functioning henequen haciendas in the Yucatán
today.1 According to their website, the owners of Sotuta de Peón have searched abandoned
haciendas for machine parts, tracks, and other relics of the golden age of henequen. Their goal
has been to preserve a part of the henequen industry in order to educate visitors and to not forget
the history of the glory days of henequen.2 For a steep price of 700 pesos, tourists can take a tour
of Sotuta de Peón and relive the process of henequen production.3 The Sotuta de Peón tour is
sometimes referred to as the “fresa” experience of henequen production by local Yucatecans,
which translates to mean that the experience is reserved for conceited, wealthy tourists. It is
interesting to observe that Sotuta de Peón is one of a kind, so many local Yucatecans cannot
afford to, or would not choose to use their money to, relive the history of the industry that
formed their state.
Visits to towns such as Yaxcopoil and Misnebalam, while they have not been preserved
to the extent of Sotuta de Peón, also reveal a sense of past glory and nostalgia. Deteriorating
hacienda structures reveal stunning buildings with impressive architecture that give some insight
into the wealth and prominence of the period. Yaxcopoil allows tourists to pay 75 pesos for a
tour to learn the history of the hacienda and see how the owners lived. Dishware, tables, and
chairs have all been preserved from the era of henequen, and one can see how intricate and
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elaborate housewares were to get a sense of just how wealthy the elites became. 4 Misnebalam is
a town that was abandoned in the 1920s, as henequen was declining rapidly, and no one currently
lives there. Roofs of buildings have caved in, and while there is still some henequen machinery,
it is evident that the demise of henequen had a profound effect on small henequen towns.
While Progreso and Sisal are still functioning ports, although not to the extent that they
were during the henequen boom, many minor ports that were in operation during the henequen
era have been abandoned. The ports Mina de Oro, San Benito, and Miramar that were built for
henequen exports during the early twentieth century have all been abandoned, and today little
remains.5 Many railroad systems in Yucatán have also been abandoned. There is a railroad
museum in the center of Mérida, but throughout the city, one can observe abandoned railroad
tracks and train cars. Many truc rails, which carried henequen plants through plantations, have
also been abandoned. However, a few are still in operation to transport tourists to cenotes. At
Sotuta de Peón, guests travel on the truc rails through henequen fields to get a sense of the
experience of hacienda laborers. The tour of the Cenotes of Cuzamá also utilizes truc carts to
bring visitors to the three different cenotes. Gradually, Yucatán has begun to use elements of the
henequen industry to benefit and promote tourism in order to strengthen an impoverished
economy.
This thesis has shown the massive impact the henequen industry of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries had on the state of Yucatán. It explained how events following
Mexican independence, especially the rise of liberalism and capitalism, caused elites to seek
entry into the world market. It showed how henequen came to take control of the economy, and
how society became wholly dependent on the production and export of the henequen crop to the
4
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5

153
United States. It examined the local effects of the henequen industry, and discussed the two
different sides of modernization present in the henequen-based society. Henequen production
seemed to require a structure of elites who earned substantial revenue at the expense of
impoverished laborers. Finally, it explained why the henequen industry began to decline. It
pointed to the changes instilled by the governments of the Mexican Revolution as the catalyst for
this demise, and showed how the United States began to seek other fiber sources in order to
ensure its fiber supply during Yucatán’s period of instability.
The story of henequen is not an entirely unique one with respect to other Latin American
export economies. Dependence on the United States is a key theme for these economies, and
laborers often find themselves living in poverty. While henequen brought wealth to elites, it also
brought about poverty and peonage, which thwarted development of society. At the beginning,
henequen looked different from similar export crops because elites of Yucatán were in control of
the industry. However, the decision to export mainly to the United States and the lack of
diversification, coupled with the arrival of United States interests, such as International
Harvester, led to a strong dependence on the United States. Elites of Yucatán lost their control
of the industry, and henequen began to reflect similar themes present in sugar and banana
production elsewhere in Latin America.
The dependence on the United States became apparent once the United States sought
alternative fiber options. Without its great quantity of henequen exports, Yucatán had no major
source of revenue, and entered a state of poverty. While there were some efforts to reduce
dependence during the henequen boom, elites felt that they were unnecessary because henequen
was so profitable, and they did not foresee an end to their massive revenues. However, once the
Mexican Revolution arrived in Yucatán, and the government began to focus more on labor
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rights, the henequen society was destroyed. The United States saw higher prices and instability
as a reason to explore other fiber options, which left Yucatán impoverished.
After 1930, the henequen industry continued to decline even more. In a short period of
time following the henequen boom, Yucatán became one of the poorest states in Mexico because
it had no major source of revenue.6 In 1916, there were about 60,000 henequen laborers, but
only twenty years later, the number of henequen laborers was only about 25,000.7 The decline of
the henequen industry was swift and disastrous for Yucatán. During the 1930s, haciendas and
fields continued to be abandoned, and Yucatán became dependent on the federal government for
funding.8 Ailments such as hunger, poverty, and illness would return to Yucatán during the
1930s as well since there was no revenue to provide for cures.9 Severe economic depression had
reached Yucatán, and elites could only reminisce of their previous fortunes and prosperity.10
During the 1960s, there was an attempt to revive the henequen industry.

Elites

remembered the great wealth of the henequen era, and sought to regain this to some extent.
However, their efforts were unsuccessful because of the seven year wait before harvest, the low
price of henequen, and the disrepair of machinery and haciendas.

In addition, hard fiber

industries had already been established in other areas, and it would have been very challenging
for Yucatán to become competitive in the market again.11 In the 1960s and 1970s, the invention
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of low-cost synthetic fibers resulted in a further decline in what was left of henequen production
in Yucatán.12
Due to the collapse of the henequen industry, Mexico now imports much of its hard fiber
supply from Brazil because it no longer has the resources to produce henequen on a large scale.13
The region that once supplied a major portion of the world’s fiber now cannot produce enough
fiber to supply the rest of Mexico. Nonetheless, as of 2012, forty percent of Yucatán was still
devoted to henequen production.
hammocks, and rope.14

Most of the uses are local and include artisans’ crafts,

As a result of the harsh climate, there are not many economic

opportunities, which is why so many people still work to produce henequen.
Despite the debt peonage and monopolistic control that existed during the henequen
industry, there still exists a sense of nostalgia for the henequen era in Yucatán. It was a time
when Yucatán had a place in the world market and wealth was abundant. For a brief period,
Yucatán was able to experience wealth and prosperity on the world stage, but once henequen lost
its popularity, Yucatán, in a sense, returned to the state it had been before the henequen boom.
Hacienda tours and a walk down Paseo de Montejo give visitors an idea of the lavishness and
wealth that existed during the henequen industry. Now, there is an effort in Yucatán to promote
its tourism industry. Cuisine, cenotes, beaches, and haciendas are some of the draws of the
region, and while it is unlikely that the region will ever produce a popular export staple again,
the development of various tourist attractions have begun to draw visitors from Mexico and the

12

Allen Wells, “Henequen,” in The Second Conquest of Latin America: Coffee, Henequen, and Oil during the
Export Boom, 1850-1930, ed. Steven C. Topik and Allen Wells (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1998),
116.
13
Carrillo, Tour of Hacienda Sotuta de Peón.
14
Sterling Evans, “King Henequen: Order, Progress, and Ecological Change in Yucatán, 1850-1950,” in A Land
Between Waters: Environmental Histories of Modern Mexico, ed. Christopher R. Boyer (Tucson, Arizona: The
University of Arizona Press, 2012), 167.

156
rest of the world. Through tourism, visitors have the opportunity get a sense of the great power
once possessed by King Henequen.
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Visuals of the Henequen Industry

Henequen plant (Photo by author)
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Right Panel of Painting by Fernando Castro Pacheco of a henequen laborer at the mercy of henequen (from “Las
Tres Etapas Históricas del Pueblo Yucateco” por Fernando Castro Pacheco. Óleo sobre tela montada en madera,
243.5 x 600 (Tríptico) Préstamo Temporal del Museo Nacional de Arte al Museo de Arte Contemporáneo Ateneo de
Yucatán, http://www.macay.org/exposicion/1/fernando-castro-pacheco)

1914 Twenty Peso Bill of the Comisión Reguladora del Mercado de Henequén (from
http://articulo.mercadolibre.com.mx/MLM-441153341-20-pesos-de-la-comicion-reg-del-henequen-_JM)
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King Henequen depiction (from cover of El henequén 2 [May 31, 1917] from Evans, Bound in Twine, 44)
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Henequen machinery building, Hacienda Yaxcopoil (Photo by author)

Defibering machine, Hacienda Yaxcopoil (Photo by author)
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Hacienda Yaxcopoil (Photo by author)

Porcelain chamber pot at Hacienda Yaxcopoil (Photo by author)
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Henequen fiber drying, Hacienda Sotuta de Peón (Photo by author)

Henequen fiber, Hacienda Sotuta de Peón (Photo by author)
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A street in the abandoned town of Misnebalam, Yucatán (Courtesy of Roberto Vazquez)

The center of the abandoned town of Misnebalam, Yucatán (Courtesy of Roberto Vazquez)
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Port of Progreso (Photo by author)

Trucs used to bring tourists to the Cenotes of Cuzamá (Photo by author)
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A night in the center of Mérida, December 2013 (Photo by author)
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